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ABSTRACT
SLICING APPROACH TO SPECIFICATION FOR 
TESTABILITY IN LOTOS
Ahmet Feyzi ATEŞ
M.S. in Computer Engineering and Information Science 
Advisor: Assoc. Prof. Behçet Sankaya 
August, 1993
With the recent increase in the use of formal methods in specification of 
communication protocols, there is a need to base the conformance testing of 
protocol implementations on formal specifications. This brings in the prob­
lem of finding out special design issues to be used in the specification of such 
systems that facilitate test generation. This aspect is called Specification For 
Testability, and it is investigated in this study for the particular formal de­
scription technique LOTOS. Specification for testability is approached from 
the perspective of designing formal base protocol specifications, and then de­
riving functional specifications from base specifications in order to use in test 
generation. The method utilized for the derivation of functional specifica­
tions is Ccdled slicing. As inspired from previous work in software engineering, 
slices of protocol specifications are obtained systematically according to the 
hierarchically designed test suite structures, where each slice corresponds to a 
particular tunction of the protocol, and subsequent test generation is based on 
the obtained slices. The techni(|ues developed are demonstrated on the sim­
ple state-oriented specifications of INRES and ACSE protocols along with a 
real base specification of the OSI Transport Protocol written in the constraint- 
oriented specification style. The results indicate that tests derived from func­
tional specifications have some remarkable properties with respect to test case 
analysis and representation.
Ill
IV
Keywords: Conformance Testing, Specification For Testability, LOTOS, Slic­
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ÖZET
LOTOS’DA TEST EDİLEBİLİRLİK İÇİN BELİRTİME 
DİLİMLEME YAKLAŞIMI
Ahmet Feyzi ATEŞ
Bilgisayar ve Eııformatik Mühendisliği, Yüksek Lisans 
Danışman: Doç. Dr. Behçet Sankaya 
Ağustos, 1993
Yakın zamanlarda iletişim protokollarmm belirtiminde biçimsel metod- 
larm kullanımının artmasıyla, protokol uyarlamalarının uygunluk testlerinin 
de biçimsel belirtimlere dayandırılması gereği doğmuştur. Bu durum, protokol 
belirtimlerinde, test üretmeyi kolaylaştıracak tasarım ilkeleri bulma problemini 
ortaya çıkarmıştır. Bu konuya test edilebilirlik için belirtim adı verilmektedir, 
ve bu çalışmada biçimsel bir tanımlama tekniği olan LOTOS için incelenmiştir. 
Test edilebilirlik için belirtim konusuna, temel protokol belirtimleri tasarlama 
ve daha sonra test üretmede kullanılmak üzere işlevsel belirtimleri temel be- 
lirtimlerden elde etme perspektifinde yaklaşılmıştır. İşlevsel belirtimleri elde 
etmede kullanılan yönteme dilimleTne adı verilmektedir. Yazılım mühendisliği 
dalında daha önce yapılan çalışmalardan esinlenerek, protokol belirtimlerinin 
dilimleri, hiyerarşik biçimde tasarlanan test yapılarına göre, ve her dilim be­
lirli bir protokol işlevine karşılık gelecek şekilde sistematik olarak elde edilmiş 
ve daha sonraki test üretme saflıası elde edilen dilimlere dayandırılmıştır. 
Geliştirilen teknikler, basit, sistem-durumuna yönelik INRES ve ACSE pro- 
tokolları ile birlikte, kıstasa yönelik belirtim tarzında yazılmiş gerçek bir temel 
belirtim olan OSI Transport Protokolü üzerinde gösterilmiştir. Sonuçlar şunu 
göstermektedir ki, işlevsel belirtinılerden çıkarılan testler, test durum analizi 
ve temsili açısından bazı dikkate değer özellikler taşımaktadır.
IV
Anahtar Sözcükler: Uygunluk testi, Test edilebilirlik için belirtim, LOTOS, 
Dilimleme.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, information technology (IT) has become a major part of hu­
man civilization. The sheer variety of IT has created the significant problem 
of interconnecting systems to form networks. Networks make the information 
available wherever it is most useful, thus increasing the value of information. 
One of the most challenging issues in the past few years has been the intercon­
nection of multi-vendor network products to allow applications from different 
networks to inter-work with each other [1].
In an Open System Environment (OSE), the computer systems and software 
of different vendors are interchangeable and can be combined into an integrated 
operating environment. Open system standards, i.e. non-proprietary standards 
play the most important role in the realization of an OSE. They provide a 
standardized operating infrastructure for OSE. First, architectural standards 
are needed to build an OSE model. Second, base standards are needed to 
provide the specification of the different components of the model. Finally, 
functional standards are needed to adapt to specific environments.
In 1977, International Organization for Standardization (ISO) established 
a subcommittee to develop a structure (or architecture) that defines commu­
nication tasks. The aim was to establish a framework for coordinating the 
development of existing and future standards for the interconnection of het­
erogeneous computer systems. The result of the study of that subcommittee 
was the so calletl Open System Interconnection (OSI) Reference Models which 
became an international standard, ISO 7498 [2], in 1984.
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Figure 1.1. OSI Reference Model
To provide the communication among computer applications in a hetero­
geneous environment, complex hardware and software components are needed 
to provide the networking services. Using the divide and conquer principle, 
ISO divides the overall communication functions hierarchically into seven lay­
ers (Figure 1.1). Each layer provides services to the layer above by using the 
services provided by the layers beneath it. Applications access OSI communi­
cation services from the highest layer, i.e., layer seven. For each layer, protocols 
are defined to provide the specific set of services.
Layer one, the Physical Layer, is concerned with transmission of unstruc­
tured bit stream over physical medium; deals with the mechanical, electrical, 
functional, and procedural characteristics to access the physical medium. Layer 
two, the Data Link Layer, provides the reliable transfer of information across 
the physical link; sends blocks of data with the necessary synchronization, er­
ror control, and How control. Layer three, the Network Layer, provides the 
interconnection service. It provides transparency over the to])ology of the un­
derlying network as well as transparency over the transmission media used in 
each subnetwork comprising the network. Layer four, the Transport Layer, 
is responsible for moving data reliably form one end system to another end 
system. It provides end-to-end error recovery and How control. The Session 
Layer is primarily responsible for the coordination of the communication. The 
Presentation Layer is responsible for the representation of data. Finally, Ap­
plication Layer provides acce.ss to the OSI environment for u.sers and also gives 
distributed information services.
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Figure 1.2. Layer Concept of OSI Reference Model 
1.1 OSI Architectural Concepts
The OSI Reference Model provides a framework within which protocol stan­
dards can be specified for each layer. More fundamental to the framework are 
the OSI architectural concepts that are formulated independent of the layers 
and the associated protocols within each layer.
Layering divides the overall communication functions of an open system 
into a succession of smaller subsystems. Subsystems of the same rank (N) 
collectively form the (N)-layer of the reference model. The objects in the (N)- 
layer are called (N)-entities. The.se (N)-entities use the .services provided by 
the (N-l)-layer in order to collectively provide the services of the (N)-layer. 
Entities in the same layer but in different open systems are called peer entities.
Cooperation among the peer (N)-entities is governed by one or more (N)- 
protocols. An (N)-protocol is a set of rules and formats that govern the ex­
change of information between two ])eer (N)-entities during an instance of com­
munication. Entities in adjacent layers within an open system communicate 
with each other through their common boundary, across an interface. This 
interface is called the Service Access Point (SAP). Figure 1.2 shows the layer 
concept of the OSI Fieference Model.
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The service provided by (N)-entities to the layer above is called the (N)- 
service. The (N)-entities provide this service via invocation of service primi­
tives. An (N)-SAP is characterized by the set of service primitives or abstract 
operations that can be invoked by an (N+l)-entity at that point.
The service offered by the (N)-layer can be connection-oriented^ or con­
nectionless. For connection-oriented communication, an (N)-association be­
tween the two communicating (N+l)-entities is set by establishing an (N)- 
connection between the two (N)-SAPs. The lifetime of a connection has three 
distinct phases: connection establishment, data transfer, and connection re­
lease. Once the connection is established, the service provider at each end 
provides a connection endpoint identifier to its local service user. Subsequent 
requests to transfer data may refer to the assigned connection endpoint iden­
tifier. In connectionless mode communication, there is neither connection es­
tablishment phase nor connection release phase. Each transmitted data unit 
is self-contained, and is independent of each other.
The information units exchanged among the j>eer (N)-entities are called 
(N)-protocol-data-units ((N)-PDUs). Every (N)-PDU has two major com­
ponents: an (N)-protocol-control-information (N)-PCI and aser-data. The 
user-data component is what an (N)-entity receives from its user, i.e., some 
(N-l-l)-entity. On receiving the user-data, the (N)-entity prefixes it with an 
(N)-protocol-control-information ((N)-PCI) to form its (N)-PDU and passes it 
down to (N-l)-entity. For an (N-l)-entity the (N)-PDU is treated as an (N)- 
service-data-unit ((N)-SDU, i.e., user-data). Each time when a PDU passes 
down to a lower layer in the source system, the provider of the lower layer pre­
fixes a PCI to the PDU. By the time the PDU reaches the lowest layer, it has 
already been encapsulated with layers of PCIs (Figure 1..3). The encapsulated 
PDU at the physical layer is then ready to be transmitted across the transmis­
sion media to the lowest layer of the target system. At the target system, the 
encapsulated PDU is moved upwards towards the receiving (N)-entity. Each 
time the encapsulated PDU goes up a layer, one of its PCIs is stripped off. 
Precisely, a layer in the target system strips off PCI added earlier by the same 
layer in the source system.
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(N-l)-PCI (N)-PCI (N+1)-PDU
(N)-PDU
(N-l)-PDU
Figure 1.3. Encapsulation of PDUs
1.2 Service Definitions and Protocol Specifications
Every OSI protocol standard comprises two sets of documents : the Service Def­
inition and the Protocol Specification. A service definition is used to describe 
the functional boundary between two adjacent layers. The major components 
of service definitions define service elements which consist of service primitives. 
Service primitives are classified as follows: The Request service primitive type 
is issued when a higher layer is requesting a service from the next lower layer. 
The Indication primitive type is issued by a layer providing the service to notify 
its user. The Response primitive type is issued by a layer to acknowledge the 
receipt of an indication primitive. The Confirm primitive type is issued by the 
layer providing the previously requested service to confirm that the activity has 
been completed. A user-mitiated service primitive is one initiated by a service 
user (e.g. Request or Response), whereas a provider-initiated service primitive 
is one that is initiated by the service provider (e.g. Indication or Confirm).
A protocol specification is the specification which must be satisfied by all 
protocol entities in a layer [3]. The major components of a protocol specifica­
tion document includes the following:
- definition of PDUs,
- elements of procedures,
- mapping to underlying services,
- the description of a protocol,
- the conformance requirements.
Finite State Machine (FSM) description is the most common tool to de­
scribe the behaviour of a protocol, which is the most important component
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of a protocol specification. In short, an FSM description identifies a finite set 
of states to describe the operation of the protocol machine. This definition is 
augmented with explanation of the other components of the protocol specifi­
cation with the aid of figures, tables, and English text. Protocol standards for 
Application Layer protocols often use the semi-formal notation called Abstract 
Syntax Notation One (ASN.l) [4] for the definition of the parameters and data 
structures of the PDUs.
However, protocol specifications written in natural language often contain 
ambiguities which must be resolved in implementations. For this reason, in 
the design, specification and analysis of protocols the use of formal methods 
increases. Most of the methods of ¡protocol validation and testing require the 
protocols be specified in a formal language. The Formal Description Techniques 
(FDTs) that are presently considered for ajiplication in this area are Estelle 
[5, 6], LOTOS [7, 8], and SDL [9, 10]. Estelle and LOTOS are developed within 
ISO for application to OSI, but can also be used in other areas. SDL was 
originally developed by CCITT for the description of switching systems, but is 
also used in the description of communication protocols. Estelle and SDL are 
based on an Extended Finite State Machine (EFSM) model. Estelle is enhanced 
with Pascal data structures, expressions and statements for the description of 
interaction parameters, additional state variables, and related processing. SDL 
is largely oriented towards graphical representation, and supports abstract data 
types.
LOTOS, which is the main specification formalism used in this thesis, is 
a combination of a variation of Milner’s CCS [11] and a particular notation 
for abstract data types, ACT ONE [12]. In LOTOS, a system is specified as a 
hierarchy of process definitions. The behaviour of each process is expressed by a 
behaviour expression. The formation rules for the behaviour expressions are an 
integral part of LOTOS. In general, the behaviour expressions can be expressed 
cis possibly infinite tree-like structures. Synchronous communication among 
processes is handled by applying operators to processes, where semantics of 
the operators are expressed in terms of the behaviour expressions. This topic 
will be elaborated in Chapter 2.
1.3 Conformance Testing
A division of OSI objects into layers and entities allows protocol standards 
to be specified independent of actual implementations. However, to have suc­
cessful communication among open systems it is not sufficient to specify and 
standardize communication protocols. It must also be possible to ascertain 
that the implementations of these protocols really conform to the standard 
protocol specifications. One way to do this is by testing. The activity of test­
ing these protocol implementations against the relevant protocol specifications 
is known as Protocol Conformance Testing.
The component of protocol specifications related to conformance testing is 
the conformance requirements stated within the specifications. There are two 
types of conformance requirements. Static conformance requirements specify 
the limitations on the combinations of implemented capabilities permitted in 
an implementation which is claimed to conform to a protocol specification. Dy­
namic conformance requirements on the other hand, specify what observable 
behaviour is allowed by the relevant protocol standard. Conformance testing 
involves testing both the capabilities and behaviour of an implementation, and 
checking what is ol)served against both the conformance requirements in the 
relevant standard(s), and what the implementor states the implementation’s 
capabilities are [13]. The purpose of conformance testing is to increase the 
probability that different implementations are able to inter-work, and gives 
confidence that an implementation has the required capabilities and its be­
haviour conforms consistently in representative instances of communication.
Conformance testing is a kind of functioiial testing. An implementation 
of a protocol entity is solely tested with respect to its specification. With 
functional testing externally observed functionality of an implementation is 
tested by using tests that are derived from the specification. It is also called 
black-box testing: a system is treated as a black box, whose functionality is 
determined by observing it, i.e., no reference is made to the internal structure of 
the implementation. Only the interactions of the system with the environment 
are available. The main goal is to determine whether the right product has 
been built or not.
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ISO has lead the development of a standard methodology and framework 
for the conformance testing of OSl systems. This effort resulted in a stan- 
ilard called Conformance Testing Methodology and Framework (CTMF) which
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consists of seven parts [14, 15, 16. 17, 18, 19, 20]. Part 1 introduces the gen­
eral concepts and describes the test architectures. Part 2 defines the abstract 
test suite development methodology. Part .3 defines a language for specify­
ing the abstract test suites, called the Tree and Tabular Combined Notation 
(TTCN). Part 4 is on test realization which consists of test selection and pa­
rameterization. Part 5 puts requirements on test laboratories and clients for 
the conformance assessment process. Various conformance test reports are de­
fined in this part. Part 6 is about profile testing. Part 7 develops a number of 
proformas called implementation conformance statements in order to define the 
implementation flexibility allowed by the base protocol standards. According 
to CTMF, standard test suites are developed for each OSI protocol in order to 
be used by supplier or implementors in self-testing, by user of OSI products, 
by telecommunication administrations, or by third party testing organizations.
According to the terminology of CTMF [14], the implementation to be 
tested is called the Implementation Under Test (lUT). A number of tests de­
signed to establish conformance of the lUT is called an Abstract Test Suite 
(ATS). Test suites are made up of Test Cases, each of which tests for the 
satisfaction of one or more Test Purposes, where a test j)urpose corresponds 
to a conformance requirement stated in the specification. Specifically, a test 
case consists of a test purpose, a preamble which is a sequence of events that 
transfers the lUT into the desired initial state for testing, a test 6od?/consisting 
of the actual events that test for the satisfaction of the purpose, and a verdict 
assignment formulated as the result of the application of the test case to the 
lUT, which can be pass, fail or inconchisive.
Testing an lUT requires a conceptual testing architecture in which the 
tester makes stimuli from the bottom and top SAPs and observes the results 
from these two SAPs. Sequences of interactions occurring at these Points 
of Control and Observation (PCOs) form the essential basis for determining 
whether or not an implementation conforms to the protocol standard. This 
brings a natural functional division for the testing functions : Lower Tester for 
ASP and PDU inputs/outputs at the bottom SAP, and Upper Tester for ASP 
inputs/outputs at the top SAP. Figure 1.4 illustrates the conceptual testing 
architecture. Based on this conceptual test tirchitecture, ISO tlefines one local 
and three external abstract test methods for conformance testing. These are 
Local Test Method, Distributed Test Method, Coordinated Test Method, and 
Remote Test Method [14, 15].
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Tester
Upper
Tester
Lower
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Figure 1.4. Conceptual Testing Architecture
The following types of tests are defined by ISO to be applied to protocol 
implementations:
1. Static C onform ance R eview : A review of the extent to which the 
static conformance requirements are met by the lUT.
2. Basic Interconnection  Tests: Tests of an lUT which have limited 
scope to determine whether or not there is sufficient conformance to the 
relevant protocols for interconnection to be possible, without trying to 
perform thorough testing.
3. C apability Tests: Tests to verify the existence of one or more claimed 
capabilities of an lUT.
4. B ehaviour Tests: Tests to determine the extent to which one or more 
(lynamic conformance requirements are met by the lUT.
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1.4 Overview
Protocol standardization is performed on a variety of levels. Base standards 
developed by international bodies define fundamental and generalized proce­
dures along with a number of options. On regional or national level, functional 
standards are derived from the base standards according to the needs of specific 
applications. .Since the aim of conformance testing is to test the satisfaction of 
the requirements corresponding to the implemented capabilities of a protocol, 
the derivation of test suites must be based on functional standards.
While on one hand the use of formal methods in the specification of dis­
tributed systems increases; on the other hand this brings in the question of how 
these formal specifications can be used in conformance testing. Since the speci­
fication of the same protocol can be made in many different forms and styles, a 
similar question arises on which form to use in order to facilitate conformance 
testing. This approach is called specification for testability.
Specification for testability deals with the development of completely de­
composable formal specifications called base specifications. The test suite gen­
eration step must be taken into account at the initial design stage of a system 
while developing formal base specifications. Base specifications must be devel­
oped in such a way that the features that must be tested separately should be 
identifiable, and functional specifications can be systematically derived from 
the base specifications in order to be used as the basis of subsequent test gen­
eration.
The main contribution of this thesis is on the systematic derivation of func­
tional specifications from base specifications written in the formal description 
technique LOTOS. The approach adopted for this purpose is called slicing 
which has been previously defined and used in software engineering. By making 
.some transformations on protocol specifications, called behaviour reductions, 
slices of such specifications are obtained which define the behaviour corre­
sponding to a specific function of the protocol. The functions are extracted 
according to the hierarchically structured test suites of the base protocols. The 
techniques developed are applied on some OSI protocols written in different 
specification styles.
(Jhapter 2 starts the discussion by introducing LOTOS and its underlying 
.semantics. It gives the formal framework of conformance testing, along with the
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some formal approaches from the literature. Chapter 3 is on specification 
for testability. It gives a design trajectory which results in testable protocol 
specifications. Chapters 4 and 5 are about the application of the methods 
described in Chapter 3 on some protocol specifications written in LOTOS. 
Specifically, Chapter 4 is on the development of base specifications whereas 
Chapter 5 gives examples on the derivation of functional specifications from 
base specifications. The steps covered in the derivation of complete test suites 
from base and functional specifications are explained and compared in Chapter 
6 with several examples. Finally, Chapter 7 contains the conclusions and some 
comments on future work.
The contribution in Chapter 2 is the in depth comparison of the two major 
approaches to LOTOS based test design, namely the labelled transition system 
based approach of [21] and the EFSM-Chart based approach of [30]. In Chapter 
3, several techniques that can be used while developing formal base specifica­
tions, including parameterization and behaviour specification, are given. Var­
ious types of behaviour reductions (horizontal, vertical, diagonal) are defined 
and an original algorithm is developed in order to perform the reductions in a 
systematic manner. In Chapter 4 previously developed specifications of INRES 
and ACSE protocols are taken, and several enhancements are carried out in 
order to obtain their formal base specifications. Specifically, the specifications 
are parameterized, behaviour and data types related to the static conformance 
review process are added, and the features that must be tested are included. 
In addition to its base specification, two documents for INRES protocol are 
developed. One of them (PICS proforma) is used in parameterizing the spec­
ification, and the other one which defines a test suite structure is used in the 
derivation of functional specifications. The contributions in Chapter 5 are the 
original applications of the behaviour reduction algorithm developed in Chap­
ter 3 on three base protocol specifications. The most notable among these is 
the application of our methodology on the relatively large standard base spec­
ification of the Transport Protocol. The contribution in Chapter 6 is mainly 
the analysis of the tests generated from the functional specifications obtained 
by the techniques of this thesis.
Chapter 2
FORMAL METHODS IN 
CONFORM ANCE TESTING
As a result of the recent increase in the use of formal methods for the spec­
ification of OSI protocols there is a need to systematically derive tests from 
such formal specifications. Formal methods in protocol conformance testing 
concern testing of protocol implementations for conformance with respect to 
their formal specifications, where testing is based on a formal definition of what 
constitutes conformance [21].
Using formal methods in conformance testing brings in some benefits. First, 
the concepts of conformance testing can be defined formally, and thus more pre­
cisely. Secondly, the use of FDTs makes it possible to do formal test validation, 
i.e., checking whether a test really tests what it is intended for. Thirdly, the use 
of formal methods allows the definition and use of test generation algorithms.
For the purpose of examining the consequences of the use of FDTs on con­
formance testing, ISO and CCITT started a joint project around 1983: Formal 
Methods in Conformance Testing (FMCT) [22]. The scope of the project is 
to define a general methodology on how to perform conformance testing of a 
protocol implementation given a formal specification of the protocol.
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the formal approach to conformance 
testing. Section 2.1 summarizes the main concepts of the Formal Description 
Technique LOTOS which is used throughout the thesis. Section 2.2 contin­
ues the discussion with the theory of processes, and gives the definition of a
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labelled transition system which can be seen as a first formalization of the no­
tion of a process. Section 2.3 introduces the theory of conformance and defines 
what constitutes conformance in a formal context. Section 2.4 describes some 
relations which can be used as the basis of conformance testing. Section 2.5 
gives some methods from the literature for the systematic derivation of test 
suites from formal specifications that allow a semantic interpretation in terms 
of labelled transition systems. Finally, Section 2.6 discusses a relatively differ­
ent approach to automatic derivation of test cases from LOTOS specifications 
based on the Chart formalism.
2.1 Introduction to LOTOS
LOTOS [8] is one of the two Formal Description Techniques developed within 
ISO for the formal specification of oi)en distributed systems, and in particular 
for those related to the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) computer network 
architecture [7]. In LOTOS a distributed and concurrent system is described 
in terms of a set of interacting processes. A process is an abstract entity that 
is able to perform internal events and communicates with other processes via 
external events at interaction points called gates. An event is an elementary 
unit of synchronization among processes [2.3]. The static picture of a process 
can be imagined as that of a black box capable of communicating with other 
processes. The mechanisms inside this box are not observable. Thus, all events 
occurring inside a process (i.e., internal events) are unobservable and denoted 
by i . In LOTOS, processes can be defined by the temporal relations between 
the events constituting their externally observable behaviour, and are expressed 
by behaviour expressions . The formation rules of the behaviour expressions 
are essential parts of LOTOS, and are based on a modification of the Calculus 
of Communicating Systems (CCS) [11]. In the case that an event involves 
exchange of data, the description of data structures and value expressions is 
based on the algebraic specification of abstract delta types (ADTs) [12].
In LOTOS interactions (i.e., event structures) take the form gexiocz . . .  cvu[c], 
where g is the interaction point (gate) name and each cv,· is either value or 
variable declaration. A value declaration has the form !£', where E is a LOTOS 
expression describing a data value, and a variable declaration takes the form 
?,c : t, where x is a name of a variable and t is its sort (i.e, type) identifier. 
An action denotation may terminate with a predicate c, called the selection
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predicate, which is used to impose restrictions on the values that may be bound 
to the variables. The syntax of a process definition header in LOTOS is :
process P[gateJist](;ri ; : ¿»J : functionality
with variables X\,X2·, · ■ · , Xn occurring as free variables in the behaviour ex­
pression defining the process P. The functionality of a process is the list of the 
sorts of the values offered at the successful termination of that process.
A behaviour expression is produced by applying an operator to other be­
haviour expressions. A behaviour expression may also include instantiations 
of other processes. Given a behaviour expression B, for convenience B may 
also be called a process. There are several operators in LOTOS to describe 
behaviour expressions as follows.
• inaction  (denoted by ‘s top ’ )
stop  means that a process can execute no event.
• successful term ination  (denoted by ‘e x it ’)
exit is a process whose purpose is solely that of performing the successful 
termination action denoted by 6, after which it transforms into the dead 
process stop.
• action prefix (denoted by ‘ ;’ )
The behaviour of a; B is considered to be event a followed by the be­
haviour of B, where B \s a. behaviour expression.
• choice (denoted by ‘ []’ )
The behaviour of B\ [] B -2 will be the behaviour of either B\ or B2, where 
B\ and B2 are behaviour expressions. The choice offered is resolved in 
the interaction of the process with its environment.
• parallel com p osition  (denoted by </2, · · · ji/n]!’ )
The behaviour of B\\[g\,(j2, · ■ ■ ,yn]\H2 will be a composition in which 
B\ and B2 must synchronize with respect to the set of gates S =
■ ■ ■ lihi)■ When the set of synchronization gates S is empty, then 
the parallel composition operator is denoted as |||, and when S is the set 
of all gates, the parallel composition operator is written as ||. •
• hiding (denoted by ‘hide <j\,(j2·, ■ ■ - liJn i» H')
Hiding allows one to transform some observable actions performed on
CHAPTER 2. FORMAL METHODS IN CONFORMANCE TESTING 15
the gates (/1,^2, · · · ,</n  ^ process given by the behaviour expression
B into unobservable ones. Tliese actions are thus made unavailable for 
synchronization with other processes.
• process instantiation (denoted by 'P[gi,(j2, ■ ■ ■,9nY)
A process instantiation is formed by a process identifier P with an as­
sociated list [g\,g2·, ■ ■ ■ tSu] of actual gates which correspond to the list 
of formal gates given in the respective process definition. Such a pro­
cess instantiation occurs in the behaviour expression defining some other 
process, or process P itself. The instantiation of a process in LOTOS 
resembles the invocation of a procedure in a conventional programming 
language such as Pascal.
• guarding (denoted by ‘ [p] — > B')
Any behaviour expression B may be preceded by a predicate (i.e., a 
guard) and an arrow. The interpretation is that if the predicate holds, 
then the behaviour described by the behaviour expression is possible, 
otherwise the whole expression is equivalent with stop.
• sequential com position  (denoted by ‘ Si > >  B2 ')
The informal interpretation of this construct is that if B\ terminates 
successfully, then the execution of B -2 is enabled. Parameters can be 
passed from the enabling process to the enabled process by using the 
accept construct.
• disabling (denoted by ‘ S][> B'f)
Process B\ may be disabled Ijy the first action of process B2 and the 
control is irreversibly transferred from the interrupted B\ to the inter­
rupting B2. In the case that the interruptible Bi performs a successful 
termination action, the disabling process B2 disappears.
• let (denoted by ‘ let ,ci : ti =  E\,. .. ,.r„ : in B {x \,. . .  ,Xn)’)
Let construct of LOTOS is used to associate value expressions E i , . . . ,  E,i 
to the free variables ;ci , . . . ,  Xn of a behaviour expression B {x i , . . . ,  x„). •
• generalized choice (denoted by ‘ choice ,Ci : ¿1, . . .  ,Xn '■ In [] B\ or
‘ choice g in [ai, 02, . . . ,  n„] [] F ’ )
Using the binary choice operator ‘ []’ only finite number of alternatives 
can be expressed. Generalized choice allows an unknown number of al­
ternatives to l)e specified. Sets of gate identifiers or variable declarations 
may be used for indexing.
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A number of specification styles have been defined for LOTOS specifica­
tions [24]. In the monolithic style only observable interactions of a system are 
presented and ordered as a collection of alternative sequences of interactions 
in branching time. In the constraint-oriented style again only observable inter­
actions are presented, but their temporal ordering is defined by a conjunction 
of different constraints. Monolithic and constraint oriented styles are exten- 
sional description styles in that they define a system in terms of its external 
observable behaviour, viz. their concern is what of the system. With the state- 
oriented style the system is regarded as a single resource whose internal state 
space is explicitly defined. In the resource-oriented style both observable and 
internal interactions are presented. The behaviour in terms of the observable 
interactions is defined by a composition of sej^arate resources in which the 
internal interactions are hidden. In turn, these resources may be specified us­
ing any style. Both state-oriented and resource-oriented styles are intensional 
description styles, i.e., their concern is the how of a system.
LOTOS has the following two models; labelled transition systems as models 
for behaviour expressions, and many sorted algebras as models for data types. 
The model for behaviour expressions is not dependent upon the way data types 
are interpreted. The subsequent discussion in this chapter is mainly about 
behaviour expressions and labelled transition systems.
2.2 Labelled Transition Systems
The formalism of labelled transition systems is used for representing the be­
haviour of processes, so they are suitable for modelling distributed systems. 
Labeled transition systems serve as the semantic model for a number of speci­
fication languages, including LOTOS.
D efin ition 2.1 A labelled transition system is a 4-tuple < S\ L ,T ,sq >  with
- S is a (countable) non-empty set of states;
- L is a (countable) .set of observable actions;
- T Ç S X (L U { t })  X S is the transition relation;
- So G S is the initial state.
CHAPTER 2. FORMAL METHODS IN CONFORMANCE TESTING 17
N otation  M eaning
B - ^ c  { D , f i , c ) e T
B C  3 ^ 0 ... : 5  =  5o ^  n  . . .  n  =  (7
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B =  C or B C 
3B,,^2 : ^ 4> 5i A  j52 4> (7,a € L 
3Bo... 5„ : 5  = Fo ^  ^  ... = (7
3(7 (7
-.3(7 (7
{a Ç: L \ B 
{iT e L* I 5  4>}
{B ' I F  A  F '}
B - H  
B ^ C  
B ^ C
Q ai '...‘^ an ^
B
a \  ' . . . ' a n
B ^  
out(B) 
T r{B )
B after a
B is stable
Table 2 . 1 . Notation for Labelled Transition Systems
The labels in L represent the observable interactions of a system; the special 
label T ^ L represents the unobservable, internal action. Table 2.1 introduces 
some notation and definitions for labelled transition systems. A trace is a 
sequence of observable actions. The traces of a labelled transition system 
specification S, Tr(S)^ are all sequences of visible actions that S can perform. 
The set out{S) contains traces of length 1 . 5  after cr collects all states that can 
be reached after having performed cr. A stable process accepts only external 
events, and can not perform internal action. A finite state process is one in 
which the number of reachable states is finite.
Simple labelled transition systems can be represented by (action-) trees or 
graphs, where nodes represent states and edges labelled with actions represent 
transitions. Figure 2.1 illustrates the representation of a simple system.
It is cumbersome to represent complex systems such as protocols directly 
by action trees as labelled transition systems. A more sophisticated way of 
representation than graphs or trees is needed. That is a language that allows 
concise representation of (possibly infinite) labelled transition systems. The 
operational semantics of LOTOS, which can be obtained by a system of infer­
ence rules, generate a labelled transition system for each behaviour expression
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Figure 2.1. Action Tree of a Simple System
of the language. Table 2.2 gives the inference rules corresponding to the oper­
ators of the subset of the language employing a finite alphabet of observable 
actions with no exchange of data, which is called Basic LOTOS [7].
The simple labelled transition system in Figure 2.1 can be represented by 
a behaviour expression in LOTOS as :
a; (6; d; stop [] c; e; stop) [] «; b; d; stop. (2.1)
In the following, no distinction will be made between B as a behaviour 
expression, or B as the initial state of its .semantics labelled transition system. 
A process is identified with the labelled transition system modelling it, with 
the behaviour expression representing the labelled transition system, and with 
its initial state.
2.3 Theory of Conformance
The starting point for developing a formal approach to conformance testing 
is the definition of what constitutes conformance. Regarding the fact that 
the relevance of a protocol specification with respect to testing is its set of 
conformance requirements, a s])ecification can be considered as the collection of 
conformance re(|uirements. Formally, a specification S in a j^articular standard
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C om bin ator A xiom s or Inference Rules
none
exit stop
B (a 6 L) 
i ;B  ^  B
A  r ; h B, 0 B2
B 2 ^ B ', l ·  B, 0 B2 B'
stop
exit
a ;R
i;R
Rl 0 B2 
B,\\B2
B,[>B2
B\{ffi 1 ■ · · ■>9n)
Note : R\<7i , . · · ,^n « short notation fo r  hide </i, ·. ·, <7,1 in B.
Table 2 .2 . Axioms and Inference Rules for Basic LOTOS
A  B[,B2 A  R ' l· Bx\\B2^ B\\\B!, ( « / t)
Bx ^ B [l·B χ \ \ B 2 ^ >B[\\B2
B2 A R 'h R ,| l^ 2 ^ ■Bx\\B',
Bx A  R[ (- B ,[>  B2 A  B[[> B2 {a ^  8)
Bx B {l· B ,[>  B2 ^  B[
B2 A  R ' h Bx[> B2 A  R'
B -^  B 'l· B \ {gx,....Tin) R '\((/i,...,(yn) a e  {(/1 ,. • *
B -^  B 'l· B\{gx,....,,gn) A  R'\(<7, , . . . ,< /„ ) a ^ {<7i,.
can be written as
S =  {r,,7-2,?'3, . . . }
where each r,· is a conformance requirement [2 1 ]. A conforming implementation 
then is the one which satisfies all requirements specified by the standard;
Vr e  .S' : I sat r (2.2)
The formal language in which requirements are expressed is denoted by L r . 
Languages that express requirements or properties are called Logical Languages. 
Although they are powerful, logical languages are not constructive. For this 
reason current standardized FDTs (Estelle, LOTO.S, SDL) are not based on 
logical languages. Formal descriptions written in these FDTs do not define 
requirements, but observable behaviour. For conformance testing, however, it is 
important to know which requirements are implicitly defined by the expressions 
in the formal descriptions.
Let Cfdt be the formal language of the FDT. By introducing the relation 
spec, the set of all requirements implicitly specified by an expression B  6 C-fdt
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is defined as:
Sb =  {r  & Cr \ B  spec r) (2.3)
Combining (2.2) and (2.3), we have for an implementation I that conforms 
to B  :
/  conforms — t o B  =dej Vr € Cr : B  spec r implies I sat v (2.4)
In this way, conformance can be defined as a relation between implementa­
tions and behaviour specifications, with the meaning that an implementation 
conforms to a specification if every requirement specified by the behaviour 
specification is satisfied by the implementation. Conformance as a relation is 
referred to as an implementation relation.
2.4 Implementation Relations and Conformance
An implementation relation formalizes the notion of correctness of an imple­
mentation /  with respect to a specification S [2 1 ]. Implementation relations 
can be obtained by comparing observations made of I with observations made 
of S. For an implementation relation it is sufficient that observations of the 
implementation can be related to the observations of the specification, in the 
sense that, the behaviour of the implementation can be ’explained’ from the 
behaviour of the specification. An implementation is considered to be correct 
if all observations made of it by any environment can be explained from the 
behaviour of the specification.
The definition of the conformance relation given in (2.4) depends on the 
language £ r and the relations spec and sat. Different choices for these al­
low the definition of different implementation relations, and result in different 
classes of conforming implementations with the same language Cpor· Many 
implementation relations have been proposed in the literature. They are either 
equivalences, in which case one must show that the implementation provides ex­
actly the behaviour stipulated by the specification, or preorders, in which case 
one shows that the implementation provides at least the behaviour required.
If we choose the same language CpoT as the formal language of the class 
of implementations, i.e., if the underlying semantics of implementations with 
respect to behaviour is the same as that of specifications, a basic relation
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between ])rocesses is that of trace j)reorcler <i,.. Formally, 
I <ir S —def V<7 G L* ; /  iniplies S ■ (2.5)
Informally, when defined in an observational way, the relation <tr specifies that 
traces observed by an implementation should also be observed by the specifica­
tion. Equivalently, it specifies that any trace which is not in the specification 
shall not be in the implementation. A tester consisting of a single test case 
can be constructed for each specification in order to test for the satisfaction of 
the <ir relation [2r)j. This test case reaches a state marked with verdict fail 
whenever the first action of a trace that is not j^resent in the sj)ecification is 
observed. For an infinite set of possil)le actions, this tester will be very large 
for practical specifications.
To judge the validity of an implementation it is not sufficient to consider 
only the sequences of actions it can perform, what an implementation can refuse 
to do must also be considered [25]. The deadlocks observed by /  after having 
performed a certain sequence of actions must also be observed by S. The 
resulting implementation relation is called testing preorder or failure preorder 
<te {reduction red in [26]). Formally,
 ^ A —def V(T G T*, VA C L :
i f  3P  : ( /  / '  A Vrt € A : 7'
then 3S' : (,? 4> .S" A Vu € A : S'
By introducing a specific requirement language Cmusi’,
tC-must —def {a fter a must A \ a E L'*, A C L]
(2.6)
(2.7)
which states the requirement that after having performed cr, at least one of the 
actions in A must be performed, the relation given in (2.6) can be reformulated
as :
I < t , S i f f  V cre L * ,V A C L :
• S after <T must A implies I after a m ust A
( 2.8)
Like <ir , <ie has a severe disadvantage for conformance testing. It is char­
acterized using a quantification over all <7 € L*, which poses the problem of 
having to verify that the implementation does not have unspecified deadlocks 
for all cr Ç. L*.
In [26] the implementation relation con f was introduced to reduce this 
problem. The relation con f reduces the quantification to traces in the speci­
fication, so it checks only the deadlock behaviour of an im])lementation after 
those sequences of actions that the specification is able to perform. By using 
co n f it is not checked whether an implementation has extra traces not specified 
in the specification, i.e., extensions in the functionality of the implementation 
with respect to the specification remain undetected. Formally,
/  con f S =def VcT € Tr{S), V/1 Ç L : (2.9)
i f  3P : {]  r  A Wa e  A : I' 
then 3S' : (5  ^  S' A V« e /1 : .V'
By using the requirement language C,nusti the implementation relation con f 
can be defined as :
7 con f .S' iff V(7 e Tr(,S'),V/l Ç L : (2.10)
S after <7 must A implies 1 after a must A
Considered in itself, the con f relation is not attractive as an implementation 
relation. It is not transitive, and therefore not a preorder. However, this 
relation plays an important role in incremental testing: in order to test for <te, 
correctness with respect to <tr and con f can be separately checked because 
when taken together relations <tr and con f exactly give <te [2 1 ].
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2.5 Language Based Systematic Test Suite Derivation
In the realm of labelled transition .systems the implementation relation conf, 
defined in the previous section, is a reasonable candidate to formalize the notion 
of conformance for the purpose of conformance testing [21]. Therefore, the next 
question is how to derive test suites for con f systematically from a labelled 
transition system specification S. This section introduces some test derivation 
algorithms starting from the fact that for a complete test suite the requirements 
specified by a specification should be exactly those tested by the test suite.
The Canonical Tester T(S) for a specification S consists of the test suite 
needed to establish the implementation relation conf. An implementation 
I  conforms to a specification S according to con f if all required behaviour 
of S is implemented in I [27]. The Canonical Tester can be regarded as a
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process which is the ‘ inverse’ of the specification in the sense tliat the Canon­
ical Tester of tlie Canonical Testei- of a sj^ecification is the s])ecification itself 
(i.e., T {T {S )) =  T{S)). It runs in parallel with the lUT and communicates 
with it with full synchronization. According to [26], the basic idea behind the 
Canonical Tester T(S) is:
• it is capable of exploring all and only traces in S\ i.e., 7S-(T{S)) — 7'r(.S');
• I conforms to S if and only if every deadlock between 1 and the tester 
T{S) can be explained by the tester having reached a terminal state.
If a representation is given by a behaviour expression with labeled transi­
tion system semantics, then there are two possibilities for the derivation of test 
cases. Either the behaviour expression is replaced by its semantics, from which 
tests are derived using algorithms for labelled transition systems, or the algo­
rithms are transformed to work on behaviour expressions as well. The second 
option is more natural because behaviour expressions give finite, implementable 
representations of infinite labelled transition systems.
In the literature two main approaches to the construction of T(S) from S 
can be found in [26] and [28]. The first one elaborated in [26] is an example 
of the first option stated above. It uses a model of processes (failure trees) 
identifying processes that are equivalent with respect to testing. This leads 
up to a complete algorithm that constructs canonical testers T{S) which are 
unique for testing equivalent processes. The second one is the syntactical 
approach explored in [28], which is based on the second option of deriving 
tests from behaviour expressions. Here the tests are derived directly from 
the specifications’ syntaxes. The method is named the CO-OP method after 
its main components. The three main attributes used in the compositional 
derivation of the canonical tester T(B ) of a behaviour expression B  in Basic 
LOTOS are:
• C om p u lsory (B ), which is the set of sets of actions that may not be 
refused by B  after it has reached any possible stable state, i.e., a state 
from which no internal action is possible. •
• O p tion s(B ), which is the set of actions that may be refused by B  because 
of the presence of an alternative internal action i in an unstable state.
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• B after a, wliich is the subsequent l)eliaviour of B after having j^erfonned 
the action a.
The construction of the tester is compositional in the sense that the attributes 
needed to compute the tester T(B\ * B2) can be obtained from the attributes 
of the testers T{B\) and T (B 2) where * is any Basic LOTOS operator. The 
approach developed in [28] results in a comj^letely inverse behaviour of the 
specification, which consists of a single process, and in which it is difficult to 
identify individual test cases.
A recently developed method given in [2 1 ] extends the CO-OP method to 
a small subset of fvdl LOTOS and makes it possible to obtain individual test 
cases. The method is based on the idea that, in order to derive complete set 
of test cases from a labelled transition system 5', the requirements tested by 
these test cases must be exactly the requirements specified by S. Hence for 
every requirement of type after a must A specified by S, i.e., for every <t, A 
with
S ^  and S after a m ust A (2 -1 1 )
there must be after a m ust A among the tested requirements.
The first step in generating test cases is the derivation from S of the re­
quirements after a m ust A, according to (2.11). This procedure can start 
with a =  e, and then proceeds recursively. All A C L  with S after e must A 
are determined, and for each A there must be a test case
Ia =  E {a;ta \ (I e  A }
where ta is the behaviour of the test case after a (S operator represents the 
LOTOS choice operator among multiple behaviour expressions). It suffices to 
derive test cases for those sets A that are minimal with respect to C because 
if a test case ta tests requirement after e m ust A, then it also tests the re­
quirements for after e must A' with A C A'. Since for each A satisfying S 
after e m ust A, always Ap\out[S) C A, and S after t m ust (A flotit(5 )), it 
is sufficient to consider only A C out(S).
The next step in the construction of the behaviour of the test case after a, 
i.e., ta. ta must test the requirements after a m ust A. The above procedure 
can be recursively applied if the calculation can be repeated with =  e, i.e. if 
there is an S' such that;
S after a m ust A iff S' after e must A.
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For any process 6’ , the behaviour of the tester after interaction in an event 
is fully dependent on the behaviour of S after interaction in this event. If 
there is more than one state S' with S S', then, after interaction in a, it is 
not known to the tester which transition has been chosen within the process 
under test. The behaviour of .S' after interaction in a can then be seen as a 
non-deterministic choice, which is given by the expression:
choice S after a =dej E {i] S' | S' 6 S after a)
The expression choice S after a defines the non-deterministic choice among 
all states that are reachable by S after having j^erformed a (S represents the 
generalized choice oj^erator).
So, the three attributes needed to derive a test case are oui (.S'), 
choice S after a, and sets A that are minimal with respect to Ç. In or­
der to facilitate the construction of sets A from behaviour expressions, the 
concept of acceptance sets, denoted by C ,^ is introduced in [21]. These sets 
are defined using existential quantification over states, and each set consists of 
sets of external actions that can occur in a state, i.e., they rej)resent the action 
capability of a state. In order to obtain accejjtance sets that are minimal with 
respect to Ç, some optimization steps are performed on C ,^ which is denoted 
by the relation Ç. The resulting sets are called reduced acceptance sets.
Based on the definitions presented above, the following algorithm generates 
a test case for a specification S {v represents the verdict associated with the 
particular state of the test case):
Algorithm 2.1 (Test Case Generation) A test ca,se t for a specification S 
is obtained by:
• Step 1 . Choose M  □  ^o(C) where C Q C ;^
(The transformation 4'o(C) defines a set of sets formed by taking one (or 
more) element from each set in C)
• Step 2 . Choose A € Mand v(t) =  fail,
or if M  =  (j> then A =  oui{S) and v(t) =  pass,
Step 3. tji =  E {a; | a € A ], where in is a test case for choice S after
A.
CHAPTER 2. FORMAL METHODS IN CONFORMANCE TESTING 26
B out{B) st(B ) C {B ) choice B after </
stop <!> true U>) stop
a; Bi { « } true { { « } ) i; £1, i f  a =  g 
stop i f  a ^  g
i; out(Bi) fa lse C {B ,) choice Bi after g
B, [] B^ out{B\)
\Jout{B2)
st{B ) 
and st{B 2)
{ou t{B )]
[ j i f  7Wt(st(Bi))
choice B\ after g 
[jchoice B2 a fte r ;
then C{Bt) 
\ J i f  not{st{B2)) 
then C{Bi)
Table 2.3. Compositional Computation of Acceptance Sets
A reduced acceptance set is related to the set Compulsorxj of the CO-OP 
method, the difference being that for a reduced acceptance set (7, always 
\JC =  out{S). As a consequence of this property, Options of the CO-OP 
method is not needed any more.
2.5.1 Test Derivation Prom Finite Systems
Having acceptance sets as a way to derive test cases, compositional rules can 
be defined with which acceptance sets can be compositionally derived from a 
restricted class of LOTOS behaviour expressions. Table 2.3 gives such rules. In 
order to obtain the compositional rule for [], information about the stability of 
the operands is required. The stability of a behaviour expression B  is defined by 
the predicate st{B ), and is added as an extra attribute, which is also computed 
compositionally.
Example 2.1 If we consider the example behaviour expression given in (2 .1 ) 
representing the process of Figure 2.1:
B =  a\{h\ d\ stop [] c; e; stop) [] a; b] d; stop
CHAPTER 2. FORMAL METHODS IN CONFORMANCE TESTINC 21
The test case in Figure 2.2 is derived following Algoritlmi 2.1 as follows, using 
B =  Bi [] B-2, with:
B i  =  a; {h; d; stop [] c; e; stop)
B '2 = a; b; d] stop
• out(B) =  {rt), st{B\) =  st{B-2) =  si,(B) =  true,
C { B ) = { { a ) ) ,  * „ (C (B ) )=  { { « ) } ,
Choose A = {o } ,  and v = fail.
choice B  after a =  i;(6; d] stop [] c; e; stop) [] i; (6; d; stop)
• Let B' =  choice B  after a — i;(6; d; stop [] c; e; stop) [] i; (¿; d; stop) 
out(B') =  { 6, c), st(B') =  fa lse,
C (B ') =  {ou t{B ')}
\JC{v, (b·, d; stop [] c; e; stop))
\J C {i; b; d; stop)
= {{6 ,c},{6}), i„(C(B')) = {(6 ,c), {(.)}.
Choose A =  {/>}, and v =  fail.
choice B' after b =  choice i;{b; d;stop [] c; e;stop) after b
[] choice i; b; d; stop after b 
=  i;d;stop
• Let B " =  choice B' after b = i;d; stop 
out{B") =  {d }, st{B ") =  fa lse,
C{B'') =  { { d ] ] ,  t „ {c (B " ))  =  { {d} ) .
Choose A = {d}, and v = fail, 
choice B " after d =  i;stop
• Let B'" =  choice B ” after d — i;stop
out{B"') =  <!>, C{B'") =  { f ] ,  and <Hfi{C{B'")) =  f .
A = out{B"') = <j), and V = pass.
2.5.2 Test Derivation with Infinite Branching
A language that allows infinite branching is accomplished by introducing ac­
tions that consist of a pair of gates and values, denoted by < g ,v  >. The 
usual interpretation of such actions is that of value communication. A gate
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fail
fail
fail
pass
Figure 2 .2 . Sample Test Case
represents a place where communication takes jjlace, e.g. a SAP, and the value 
represents the message that is communicated at that place. This is the kind of 
communication that occurs in the FDT LOTOS.
When non-finite systems are considered, the method proposed in [21] de­
rives the test cases in two steps. First, the initial behaviour of test cases, i.e., 
how to determine the set A in the test case Ia =  E {a; ta \ a G A ] is considered, 
and then the subsequent behaviour of the tester, viz., the part ta is determined.
The initial behaviour of a test case involves determining a set A C L such 
that A G M  Q ^o(C') where C  E C((S). Test derivation from behaviour 
expressions with value communication suffers from the problem of infiniteness. 
Because of infinite branching, although finite reduced acceptance sets exist, 
elements of such sets, also sets, turn out to be infinite.
To deal with these infinite sets while computing 'Lo(C'), the elements of 
the acceptance set C  can be divided into subsets. Each element A of (7 is 
represented by the union of sets D" G D\ where sets D' together form a 
larger set Z), to which a bijection can be defined from C . This brings in the 
computation of ^o(C') in two steps. The first step is the computation of ^o(D) 
where D is a set of sets of sets of actions. The next step involves, for each E G 
the computation of 4'o(jF')· This set has a simpler structure; it is a set of 
sets of actions. For the derivation of test cases, an A € 'I'o(E') is required. Such 
an A is always finite and has the form {<  >■, < gm'^n >}■
The corresponding test case is;
I a € {<  ^i,ui >, < <72, > } }
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B oxit{B) st{B) D(B)
stop true {</>}
g lx  [p]; Bx {<7?  ^ [p]} true W ·  ·^  [p]}}
i; Bi OXlt(Bi) fa lse D(Bx)
Bx [] B 2 oxit(Bi) St{Bx) {oxitfB))
\Jout{B2) and ,s/.(£?2) [ j \ f t h e n  D{Bi )
[ J i f  not{st{B2)) then D {B 2 )
Table 2.4. Compositional Computation of Acceptance Sets for Infinite Systems 
which can be written as
!u], > W t<g2,V2> [] ··· []
Compositional rules for the derivation of the attributes out(B), st{B),  and 
D(B)  are given in Table 2.4.
For the subsequent behaviour of test cases it is sufficient to consider finite 
number of test cases where ta =  choice B after < g ,v  >. Table 2.5 
gives compositional rules for choice B after < g ,v  >  which is analogous 
to choice B  after g in Table 2.3 [B[v/x] denotes the expression B  where 
each free occurrence of x is replaced by the value u, and p[v/x] denotes the 
substitution of a value v for a variable x in a predicate p.)
E xam ple 2 .2  A test case for the following behaviour expression B is derived 
in detail :
B =  g lx  [;t <  20];/i!(a; +  2 ); stop [] \\gly [xj >  10] ; /dy; stop
• out{B) =  {g^lx [.T < 20],</??/ [xj > 10]}, 
st(g lx  [x <  20]; h\{x +  2 ); stop) =  true, 
st(\-,glxj [y >  10] ; /i!?/; stop) =  fa lse,
D{B)  =  { out {B) } [JD{ i ]g ‘l·y [;// > 10] ; /ily; stop)
=  {{<7?.r [;r < 20],^??/ [y >  10] ) }  [2/ > 10] } }
=  [x <  20],g'hj [y >  10]}, {g^.y [y > 10] } } .
CHAPTER 2. FORMAL METHODS IN CONFORMANCE TESTİNC 30
B choice B after A
stop stop
g'tx \p]-,B] i; Bi [u/x] \{ g =  h and p [u/x] 
stop if g i=- h or not p [v/x]
i; Bi choice B\ after < h, v >  if p 
stop if not
B, [] B2 choice B\ after < h,v > 
choice B '2 after < h,v >
Table 2.5. Compositional Computation of .Subsequent Behaviour for Infinite 
Systems
Choose E € 'I'o(^('^)) -^nd A G 'I'o(^)··
^ o { D ( B ) )  =  { {g^x  [x < 20],i^ ?;i/ [y > 10]}, { g ‘hj [y > 10]}},
E =  {g'ly [y >  10]}, and A ^ { < g ,  15 > } .
The test case then is: t = <y!l5; where is a test case for
choice B  after < ¿r, 15 >.
• choice B  after < 5», 15 >
=  choice g l x  [x < 20]; h\{x + 2); stop after < 15 >
[] choice i \gNj [y > 10] ;/dy; stop after < (7,15 >
=  i;/i!l7; stop [] i; /i!l5; stop.
Let B '  =  choice B  after < g, 15 > =  i;/dl7; stop [] i; /i!l5 ;stop  
ou t (B ' )  =  {/t !l7 ,/i!l5 }, s i(i;/i!l7 ;stop ) = si(i;/dl.5; stop) = f a l s e ,  
D { B ' )  =  o u t {B ' )  U outii·, /i!l7; stop) |Ji'ui(i; /i!l5; stop)
=  { { /d l7 , /d l5 } ,{ /d l7 } ,{ /d l5 } } .
Choose E € ~ { { /d l7 ,/i ! l5 } }  :
E =  { /i!l7 ,/i!l5 }, and A G 'l'o(£^) =  {<  >» < > }·
The test ca.se t<g,i5> is :
S{a;i„ 1« e {<  / i,15>,< //,,17 > } }  =  //!15; [] //.!17;/</,,ir>.
Both equations choice B' after < /i, 15 >, and choice B' after 
< /i, 17 >  are equal to i;stop .
Taking the parts together a test case for B is ;
t =  ¿r! 15; (/ill5; stop [] /ill7; stop)
2.6 Chart Based Test Generation
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The framework presented in [2 1 ] for formal specification based test generation, 
is by no means complete, and some open questions remain. At some points 
simplifications and choices for formalizations are made. These choices are open 
for further discussion, depending on investigations whether the presented for­
malizations are workable ones. An examj)le is the relation between physical 
objects (the lUT) and formal objects (the specification, requirements). It is 
assumed that implementations and test ap])lication can be formally modelled, 
and that observations calculated for the class of models are also valid for the 
physical implementations. For validation of the usefulness of the framework it 
should also be applied to other specification formalisms. The method is ap­
plied to toy specifications formed by a restricted class of LOTOS behaviour 
expressions. The extension of the method to handle full LOTOS behaviour 
expressions needs further study.
This section introduces another approach to the generation of test cases 
which is based on the idea that data flow as well as the control flow of the 
implementation must be tested. It combines FSM-based techniques with func­
tional software testing and analysis [29]. The following j)hases are distinguished 
in the derivation of test suites from LOTOS specifications.
- Normalization of the specification,
- Identification of the functions to be tested,
- Generation and analysis of test cases,
- Test selection and representation.
The operational semantics of LOTOS is used to convert the specifications into 
an intermediate form, and then data and control flow is extracted from this
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intermediate form. The second and fourth phases deal with the data flow as­
pect whereas the third phase deals with the control flow asj>ect of testing. In 
the following each of the above phases are exj)lained in detail based on the 
ideas found in [30]. The applications of the methodology will be examined in 
Chapter 6.
2.6.1 Normalization
Individual test cases that make up a test suite can be seen as part of the 
behaviour defined in the specification which is then inverted to specify the 
behaviour of the tester. Therefore, it is necessary to identify the control and 
data flow in the specification. In order to identify the control and data flow, 
an intermediate representation called the normalized specification is needed. 
The intermediate representation for full LOTOS specifications is called the 
EFSM-Chart. Chart is originally introduced by Milner as a sequential nonde- 
terministic interleave model for parallel comjjutation [31].
Definition 2.2 A chart is a 7-tuple 'in =  <  .7, N, F, R,jo·, Z, ho >  where
- J is a finite set, the control states of m,
- is a finite set, the transitions of m,
- F is a finite set, the variables of m,
- 7? is a finite set, the rules of m,
■ io € J is the initial control state of in,
- Z C J is a, finite set, the terminal control states of m,
- ho is the initial assignm.ent to the variables of m.
The possible transitions of a chart are defined by a set of rules whereby 
each rule defines a class of transitions.
D efin ition  2.3 A rule of a chart is an 8-tuple r =  < a ,j , j\ n ,p ,c , f ,h  > 
where
- a is an action, the when clause of r,
- 7 € J is a control state, the fi'om clause of r,
- y  € J is a control state, the to clause of r,
- n € is a transition number, the transition clause of r,
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- p is a, predicate, the guard clause of r,
- c is a predicate, the condition clause of r,
- /  is a function, the action clause of r,
- h is a function, the assignment clause of r.
The semantic interpretation of EFSM-Chart is that; the transition n oc­
curs when the chart is in the control state j ,  and the predicate p is true for the 
current assignment of the variables. Then it may participate in an event that 
matches the when clause of a if the condition c is satisfied. This leads the sys­
tem to the new control state j ' . The action clause of r represents the variables 
that are updated by the function /  due to value passing in the interprocess 
communication, whereas the assignment clause h represent value passing due 
to process instantiations.
A LOTOS specification can be converted into EFSM-Chart in two phases. 
In the first phase the following syntactic transformations are performed on the 
input specification in order to facilitate the chart construction.
• All occurrences of full parallel composition are transformed into general 
parallel composition on all of the synchronized gates.
• All occurrences of sequential composition are replaced by a generalized 
parallel composition on a gate which is hidden.
• Generalized choice expressions on gate lists are converted into normal 
choice expressions on niulti])le instances of the same behaviour actualized 
with a different element of the gate list.
• Process instantiations are expanded in-line until actual gate parameters 
are found identical to formal ones.
• Internal events which are not the first action in a choice exj)ression are 
removed.
• Since variables in LOTOS have local significance, they are renamed 
uniquely to avoid global conflicts in the chart.
In the second phase this resulting specification is converted into a chart by 
bottom-up synthesis. The chart corresponding to a behaviour B is recursively
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built from the sub-charts corresponding to sub-behaviours contained in B. Be­
haviour operators are eliminated one by one by constructing the corresponding 
state machines.
The chart for exit and stop has only one state and no transition. Since all 
sequential compositions are transformed into parallel compositions in the first 
phase, exit and stop behaviours are treated in the same way while constructing 
the chart.
The chart corresponding to the action prefix operator a[c]; B is obtained 
by generating a new state and adding a transition from this state to the initial 
state of the chart for B^  with a when clause of a and a condition clause of 
c. The chart corresponding to the behaviour expression f; B  is constructed in 
the same way with the exception that the when clause of the new transition 
is is qualifying it as a spoiitaneous transition. The chart corresponding to the 
behaviour expression \j)] —^ B  xs obtained by generating a new state and adding 
a new transition form this state to the initial state of the chart for 5 , whose 
when and guard clauses are i and respectively. In all of the above cases the 
initial assignment Iiq of the chart for B is stored in the assignment clause of 
the added transition.
For the choice operator, the transitions of the two machines are merged 
and a single machine with an initial state corresponding to the initial states 
of the merged machines, is obtained. The disable operator is interpreted like 
the choice operator, and a new machine is formed by adding the initial rules 
of the disabling process to every state of the disabled process as alternative 
behaviour.
The chart corresponding to the let X\ : t^  =  E i , . . . ,  x,i : t,i =  En in B  and 
choice x\ : t i , . . . ,Xn '■ t  ^ [] B  is obtained by updating the initial assignment 
ho of the chart for B. For the hide operator, all interactions that are hidden 
become internal, and only the resulting data flow in terms of assignments to 
the variables is kept.
For interleaved parallel composition, a Cartesian product of the two ma­
chines is calculated. While constructing the chart corresponding to the syn­
chronized parallel composition, all possible execution paths are not considered, 
and a single sequence of actions is obtained. During this construction different 
synchronization features of LOTO.S, i.e., value rnatcimig, value passing and 
value generation are handled separately.
Translation of process instantiations depends on wliethon· the instantia­
tion is recursive or not. No new transition is created for non-recursive in­
stantiations, and the parameters passed in the instantiation are stored in tlie 
initial assignment of the chart. For recursive instantiations a new transition 
is created with a when clause of z,.
E xam ple 2.3 If we consider the behaviour expression given in Example 2.2 : 
B =  g?x [x <  20]; ^!(.r +  2); stop [] i',g'!y [y >  10]; //.!?/; stop 
The corresponding chart is :
m =  < { I , . . . ,5 } , {n l ,n 2 , . . . ,7 i5 } , { . 'c ,y ) , / i ’, l , {3 ,6 ) ,e  > where
R =  < {g7x : Nat, 1,2, i?!, ti-ue, [.r < 20], e, e),
{zj, 1,3, n2 , true, true, e, e},
{/i!(.T -f 2), 2,4, n3, true, true, e, e},
{g'hy : Nat, 3,5, n4, true, [y > 10], e, e},
{/i!,V, 5 ,6, n5, true, true, e, c} >.
2.6.2 Identification of the Functions to be Tested
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Data flow analysis which is widely used in code optimization [32] plays an 
important role in software testing [33]. When apjjlied to protocol testing, 
the flow of data reflects how input primitive parameters determine the values 
of context variables, and they in turn affect the values of output primitive 
parameters. Input/Output primitives are ASPs and PDUs. A Data Flow 
Graph (DFG) models the flow of data in the chart. In [30] an algorithm is 
given which constructs the data flow graph from the EFSM-Chart.
In order to obtain the protocol functions to be tested, the data flow graph 
must be decomposed into slices according to a user-defined criteria. Each 
slice thus obtained consists of a number of transitions from the chart which 
collectively represents a protocol function.
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2.6.3 Generation and Analysis of Test Cases
A test case generated from a deterministic finite-state machine consists of se­
quence of events, i.e., it is linear; whereas the presence of the action is in the 
chart makes it highly nondeterministic. This necessitates the generation of 
nonlinear test cases. The algorithm j)roposed in [30] to generate unparame­
terized test cases from EFSM-Chart take nondeterminism into account. An 
outline of the algorithm is as follows:
First a transition tour of the EFSM-Chart is obtained. Transition tour 
generation is based on converting the EFSM-Chart into an Euler graph and 
then performing a depth-first traversal of this graph while each time passing 
through a node including a distinct edge into the tour. The tour is then divided 
into sequences that start from the initial state and end in the initial state or 
one of the final states. These sequences are called partial test cases. A partial 
test case may contain spontaneous transitions (is transitions). Next, the partial 
test case is checked if there exists a spontaneous transition which is not present 
in the partial test case, but is an alternative to any of the transitions in it. If 
so, the partial test case is updated by adding a sequence of transitions that 
start with the alternative spontaneous transition and ends in a final state or 
a state belonging to the partial test case. This procedure is repeated until 
no spontaneous transition exists that is alternative to the updated partial test 
case. An edge is virtually added from each final state to the initial state and 
the partial test case becomes a completed test case.
Since the above algorithm may generate redundant, uninteresting or infea­
sible test cases, the next step is the analysis of the generated test cases. In 
order to facilitate the analysis process, a graph which reveals the control struc­
ture of, as well as the data dependencies within test cases, is produced. This 
is called the Test Case Dependence Graph (TCDG) [34]. In some of the test 
cases, predicates can never be satisfied on a path due to the existence of an 
assignment on that path which causes the predicates always evaluate to false. 
By using TCDG, the slice of each predicate in a test case is obtained in order to 
be evaluated to detect any infeasibilities. The slice of a predicate with respect 
to a test case consists of all statements in the test case whose execution possi­
bly affect the boolean value of the predicate. .Since, the detection of infeasible 
test cases is an undecidable problem, the produced predicate slices must be 
evaluated by the test designer.
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Some of the generated test cases may contain redundant assignments which 
do not have any affect on the function of the tester. So the next step is the 
reduction of the test cases. By using TCDG, every assignment in a test case 
onto which no data dependence is present (i.e., which has no effect on the 
subsequent behaviour) is dropped. Since any infeasibilities are already removed 
in the previous step, all predicates in a test case which do not depend on tlie 
parameter values of input primitives can also be droj>ped.
2.6.4 Test Selection and Representation
Specification of tester’s behaviour in a test case is completed by test selection 
and representation [34]. Send event parameters left unassigned in the previous 
steps are also assigned to specific values.
If functional test selection is used, the protocol functions identified by using 
the data flow graph must be tested using the test cases obtained from the 
chart. For this purpose, it is necessar}  ^ to extract the transition labels of each 
slice of the data flow graph. Generated test cases are then selected using 
transition labels of each of the data flow functions. Alternatively, hierarchical 
test selection of ISO [15] can also be used at this step. The generated test cases 
are placed in a test suite hierarchy, a test purpose is assigned to each test case, 
and using this information a verdict is associated with each final event of the 
test cases. A closely related approach with this method will be introduced in 
Chapter 3.
Final step in the derivation of test suites is test case representation. Since 
the standard notation for specifying conformance test suites defined within ISO 
is TTCN [16], the aim at this step is to obtain suitable representations of test 
cases according to TTCN. The behaviour of the tester is the dual of lUT’s be­
haviour, and can be obtained by behaviour inversion. Except internal actions, 
the direction of all of the events in a test case are inverted, that is input events 
are converted to output events and vice versa. ‘Pass’ verdicts are assigned for 
each final event of the test cases, and in order to deal with unforeseen responses 
from the lUT, an OTHERWISE event with an associated verdict of ‘Fail’ is 
added as alternative to each receive event of tester. ‘ Inconclusive’ verdicts are 
assigned to events resulting from internal transitions. Any constraints imposed 
on the values of ASPs and PDUs are determined, and event parameters left 
unassigned during previous steps are assigned to specific values.
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Since the behaviour specification in LOTOS is not state-machine oriented 
but algebraic, LOTOS has no built in unidirectional input/output type of intei·- 
actions. Instead LOTOS interactions are multi-directional with value passing, 
generation and matching. This raises some ])roblems in performing behaviour 
inversion automatically because the directions of the events are not evident 
from the specifications. In order to overcome this problem additional value 
declarations can be added to every interaction to make the direction of the 
interactions explicit.
2.6.5 Application
When we apply the chart based test design methodology to the sample be­
haviour expression for which a test case is derived in Example 2.2 by using the 
approach given in [21], and for which the chart is produced in Example 2.3, 
we obtain the following two unparameterized test cases represented in TTCN 
form.
Test Case 1: 
g! X [x<20] 
h? y [y=(x+2)] 
h? y [y=x] 
70THERWISE
Pass
Inconclusive
Fail
Test Case 2: 
g! X [x>10] 
h? y [y=x] 
?Otherwise
Pass
Fail
The first test case tests for the correct execution of the path beginning with the 
external action ‘g?x’ while at the same time considering the internal transition 
that the implementation can make at any time. The second transition tests 
only for the execution of the s])ontaneous transition. Since, in the case of a 
value offer at gate ‘g ’ which is less than 20 but greater than 10 , it is possible 
for the implementation to reject the first case due to an internal transition, the 
second test case is needed. Tlie parameter values of send and receive events 
can be varied to try sending the same events with different parameter values 
according to the constraints.
Chapter 3
SPECIFICATION FOR 
TESTABILITY
A standardized protocol specification is the first step in a complete develop­
ment process that will eventually result in a piece of hardware or software, or 
a mixture of both, that can be called an implementation of the protocol stan­
dard [35]. An important aspect that should be considered in the specification 
of protocols is to ensure that the specifications will result in testable implemen­
tations, where testable in this context means facilitating testing. This aspect 
is called Specification For Testability.
Specification for testability deals with finding out special design issues that 
must be obeyed by protocol specifiers in order to end up with testable protocol 
specifications [36]. On one hand, high quality specifications are an essential 
ingredient of any automated or semi-automated process of test generation, 
while on the other hand, a specification of the same protocol can be made in 
many different forms and styles [24]. Not all of these styles are equivalent in 
terms of testability, i.e., one may facilitate conformance testing more than the 
other. Therefore, it is necessary that an FDT must be used in conjunction with 
a methodology and/or style which ensures that the resulting specifications are 
not only concise, correct and complete, but they are also testable and suitable 
for automated test case generation.
Within this perspective, specification for testability deals with the following 
activities:
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• developing formal base specifications using certain styles that help ob­
taining testable specifications,
• including in the specifications the aspects of the protocols that need to 
be tested,
• deriving functional and profile si)ecifications from base s])ecifications,
• designing tests from functional specifications.
This chapter starts the discussion on to the concept of specification for 
testability by introducing a design trajectory based on the activities stated 
above. This first section is about the development of formal base specifica­
tions. It defines what a base specification is and ])iesents some methods on 
obtaining formal base specifications from the respective base standards. An im­
portant use of base specifications is the systematic derivation of functional and 
profile specifications. Functional and ])iofile specifications, and their relation­
ship with test selection is discussed in the Section 3.2. This section introduces 
an alternative approach called specification selection which is based on the idea 
that selection of tests can be done before actually generating them. It also in­
troduces our approach to specification selection which is referred to as slicing. 
Finally Section 3.3 is about the related ajiproaches to specification selection 
from the literature. The concepts developed in this chapter are illustrated with 
a number of examples from some protocols specified in LOTOS, in chapters 4 
and 5. Designing tests from functional specifications is the subject of Chapter 
6.
3.1 Base Specification Development
Protocol standardization is done on a variety of levels. On an international 
level, base standards are developed by ISO and CCITT for each layer according 
to The Basic Reference Model given in [2]. Base standards, as developed 
by international bodies, define fundamental and generalized procedures, an 
infrastructure that can be used by a variety of applications. Most informal OSI 
base standards do not define the behaviour of a j)rotocol entity uniquely, but 
by allowing multiple choices in service elements, service parameters, functional 
units, and elements of procedures, they leave some sj)ace for implementors. 
The requirements on a minimum set of capabilities to be satisfied by all of
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the implementations are stated in the static conformance requirements of the 
standards. There is a need to reflect these in the formal s})ecifications. For 
this purpose, base specifications are developed by considering mandatory and 
optional features of a system at all levels.
Development of base specifications that jirovide a suitable basis for test 
suite generation is an incremental jnocess. The first step is the reflection of 
implementation capabilities in the sj^ecifications. This can be achieved by 
parameterizing the specification. Then comes the incor])oration of the confor­
mance requirements into the specifications, i.e., behaviour specification. Base 
specifications must be developed in such a way that features tested separately 
should be identifiable.
3.1.1 Parameterizing Specifications
For each protocol standard a Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement 
Proforma (PICS Proforma) has to be defined and standardized [20]. A PICS 
proforma states explicitly the implementation flexibility allowed by the proto­
col standard. It is a document in the form of a questionnaire which details 
the implementation options by listing all the possibilities for selection, and the 
legitimate range of variation of the global parameters controlling the imple­
mentation of the functions. The implementor states the implemented options 
of a protocol by filling in the entries in the standard proforma, which then 
becomes the Protocol Implementation Conformance. Statement (PICS) of that 
particular implementation.
Appendix B defines a PICS Proforma for the INRES Protocol [37], for 
which the complete base specification in LOTOS is given in Appendix A. In 
compliance with the requirements for PICS proformas stated in [20], the PICS 
proforma for INRES contains prose entries identifying the implementation, the 
implementor, “yes/no” entries indicating the implementation of each optional 
and conditional capability. The required supjjort for conditional capabilities 
depends on how the implementor completed particular optional entries. Fur­
thermore, for PDU fields there are entries indicating the range of values imple­
mented.
PICS proforma information must be incorporated into formal base specifica­
tions. The allowance for different capabilities and options in standards means
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that specifications can be parameterized. Tlu^  PICS proforma, is tlie formal 
parameter of the specification, and tlie PICS for a particular implementation 
defines actual parameters of the specification for that j)articular im])lementa- 
tion. Static conformance requirements (SCR) define constraints on the values 
of the PICS parameters.
Thus, a protocol specification S can be written as a parameterized sj)ec- 
ification with formal parameters PICS-Proforma of the type SCR-type, i.e., 
the set of all possible correct values, determined by the static conformance 
requirements. This can be expressed as:
S( PI CS — Proform a  : SCR. — type)
The instantiation of S for a particular imjslementation /  with its associated 
PICS/ is given by;
SiPICSj )
The set of requirements derived from the behaviour specified by S(PICS/) 
define the dynamic conformance requirements for the implementation I .
Before conformance testing starts, the capabilities of the lUT should be 
checked for conformity to the static conformance requirements stated in the 
standard. This process is called the Static Conformance Review. Within the 
above framework, static conformance review can easily be implemented in base 
specifications. It corresponds to checking whether the PICS has a valid value 
with respect to the static conformance requirements, i.e., whether the PICS is 
of the type defined by SCR.
Since LOTOS allows the definition of specification parameters, base speci­
fications in LOTOS can easily be parameterized. Implementation capabilities 
are defined in terms of predicates, and the names assigned to these predicates 
are made parameters of the specification. Static conformance review can be 
implemented as an ADT function which takes an instance of PICS jjroforma as 
input, and returns a boolean value whicli determines whether or not the value 
satisfies the static conformance requirements of the protocol. Only if static 
conformance requirements are satisfied does the specification describe active 
behaviour, viz. it provides the implementor or tester with an abstract model 
of the protocol dynamic conformance requirements.
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3.1.2 Behaviour Specification
The base specification has to cover all mandatory and optional features de­
scribed in the protocol standard. It should be developed in a hierarchical 
manner, and features tested separately shoidd be identifiable. [38].
The normal (valid) behaviour is s])ecified based on the state tables given in 
the informal standard using traditional techniciues. As mentioned previously, 
PICS parameters can be used to specify conditions related to the optional 
features of the protocol wherever a])]u’opriate.
Like valid behaviour, invalid and ino])|)oi tune behaviour si)ecification is im­
portant with respect to conformance testing [39]. Invalid behaviour specifies 
the implementation’s response to badly constructed incoming events (PDUs 
and/or ASPs), and events are called inopportune if they occur when not al­
lowed by the protocol specification. Both invalid and inoj)])ortune behaviour 
specify the behaviour of the [»rotocol machine when operating against an en­
vironment that behaves incorrectly. This kind of behaviour is important when 
the implementations are subject to 7'obust7iess testing which can be seen as part 
of conformance testing.
Since the default behaviour of LOTOS specifications in respon.se to unspec­
ified events is to run into deadlock, both invalid and inoj)])ortune behaviour 
must be explicitly defined in the base specifications. This can be done on a state 
by state basis. The response of the protocol entities to invalid/inopportune 
events is specified with the consideration of such inputs in each state. Obvi­
ously, this can be achieved more easily if the state-oriented specification style 
[24] of LOTOS is used.
It is not possible to distinguish a normal behaviour from an in­
valid/inopportune behaviour without additional constructs such as predicates, 
comments, or keywords. Since new keywords require modification in the lan­
guage, invaIid/inopj)ortune behaviour can be specified as alternative choice 
branches in LOTOS processes, and distinguished by using comments.
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3.2 Functional and Profile Specifications
The existence of base standards does not make the design of an OSI system 
straightforward. OSI base standards, as discussed in the previous section, allow 
multiple choices in service elements, service parameters, functional units, and 
elements of procedures. It is not ex])ected that an OSI j)roduct would provide 
the implementation of every possible feature stated in the base standard. A 
careful selection of such choices is required by aiiy OSI implementation. An 
implementation for a special area must therefore be restricted to a certain 
subset of the base standard.
On a regional level, e.g. Europe, the selection of options is harmonized 
in order to facilitate interoperation [36]. The resulting protocol standards are 
called profiles. A profile is a set of one or more base standards and the iden­
tification of the chosen classes, subsets , oj^tions and parameters of those base 
standards necessary for accomi)lishing a particular function [39]. In order to 
ascertain interoperability among different profiles, standardized profiles called 
International Standardized Profiles (ISP) are defined to identify groups of re­
lated profiles.
A profile may cover a number of ¡protocols from different layers. A func­
tional standard defines, for a ])articular layer and its associated base standard, 
a precise combination of options and procedures to be used in a given profile. 
Functional standards are currently developed by regional or national standard­
ization bodies based on the informal base standards. Functional specifications 
are the corresponding formal definitions of functional standards. In order to 
base the test generation process on functional specifications, a systematic way 
of deriving functional specifications from base specifications is needed. The 
ways to achieve this and its advantages are discussed in the sequel.
3.2.1 Hierarchical Test Selection
Through conformance testing, conformance to only those implemented func­
tions of a protocol which have been chosen from a number of ojjtions, can be 
shown. Therefore, the test generation methods have to consider the idea of 
choosing from options. Such a reduction of the size of the generated test suite 
by choosing an appropriate subset is called test selection.
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The standardized approach to conlbrniance testing given in the OSI Con­
formance Testing Methodology and Framework suggests the hierarchical de­
velopment of test suites [15]. The initial development stage for any protocol 
test suite is the lest Suite Structure and Test Purposes (TSS&TP) standard, 
where the test suite structure is designed in terms of nested test groups in a 
top down manner, and the test pur])oses are explained in plain English. This 
document forms a stable basis for the development of the abstract test suites. 
A good test suite structure has to satisfy several needs in order to be used as 
the basis of a suitable test suite. It is im])ortant in ensuring the coverage of 
the resulting test suites, and needs to demonstrate that it is possible to maji 
any feature which has a conformance requirement to at least one appropriate 
test purpose.
In order to be used in test selection it is also important that the test suite 
structure is capable of being subsetted in some convenient manner [40]. That is, 
if parts of the protocol are oj)tional then it must be convenient to exclude from 
the test suite all test cases foi· those features which are not implemented. In 
turn this implies that the structure must be expandable to an arbitrary level 
of detail. The standardized method of achieving this is by a tree structure 
where each non-leaf node, representing a test group, contains basic structuring 
information on how its branches are to be developed, and where the leaves of 
the tree are the test purposes themselves.
Appendix C contains the test suite structure and test purposes document 
developed for the INRES protocol, the detailed operation of which is explained 
in Chapter 4. The standard testing methodology gives guidance on what struc­
ture is required at the highest levels of a test suite. It identifies three require­
ments: Basic Interconnection Tests, Capability Tests and Behaviour tests [40]. 
The latter subdivides into three categories; Valid Behaviour tests. Invalid be­
haviour tests, and Inopportune behciviour tests. The meaning of these cate­
gories is that Basic Interconnection tests are used simply to see if a tester can 
establish communication with the implementation it is testing. Capability tests 
are intended to discover if the im])lementation of the protocol shows any signs 
of actually supporting each unit of functionality that it is claimed to support. 
The intention is to save unnecessary testing if a given feature is clearly unsup­
ported. As there are only a small number of Capability tests for the INRES 
protocol, it is considered unnecessary to identify a subset of these to be used 
as Basic Interconnection tests; and Bcisic Interconnection tests and Capability 
tests are grouped in a single category. Since such tests can be achieved by a
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selection of Behaviour tests, no special tests are devised for this category, but 
appropriate references to Behaviour tests are given, as reconiinended by the 
standard methodology given in [15].
As will be explained in detail in the following chapter, INRE.S is an asym­
metric protocol in that an implementation can function as an initiator or re­
sponder, each role being quite different from each other. As this is a major 
consideration of an implementation it follows that this division forms the toj) 
level of the structure for the test suite.
For INRES TSS&TP the decision was made to place the subdivisions of 
Invalid and Inopportune Behaviour tests in a single group alongside the Valid 
Behaviour tests. This was based on the fact that PDUs do not contain large 
number of parameters, and the practical consideration that an extra subdivi­
sion would convey no useful information but would add an unnecessary depth 
of complexity to the tree.
For the valid behaviour section of the INRES TSS&TP it was found nec­
essary to add a new substructure for clarity. This comprises the three phases 
of the protocol: Connection Establishment, Data Transfer, and Disconnection. 
On the other hand, the substructure for invalid/inopportune behaviour tests 
were divided on a state by state basis. These elements exercise the ability of 
the implementation to correctly perform state event transitions when given an 
appropriate stimulus.
Test selection can be based on the developed TSS&TP, by jjarameteriz- 
ing the test suite, and then selecting those ap])licable tests according to the 
test suite structure. But, this means that test cases must exist for the whole 
protocol including all options. The number of test cases generated may be 
very large, or even infinite. This implies that the execution of all generated 
test cases is impossible, or simply too expensive. Alternatively, tests can be 
generated from functional specifications instead of base specifications, which 
will largely simplify the generation and selection of test cases. So there is a 
need to the systematic generation of the functional specifications from base 
specifications.
Since the two step procedure of first generating too many test cases and 
then making a selection from this set may be undesirable; this overproduction 
can be avoided by j)erforming the selection on the specification instead. Before 
test generation, some transformations can be aj)plied to the base specification
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such tliat tests derived from the transformed, jjartial sj)eciiication correspond 
to a selection of the tests from the original specification. This ])rocess is called 
Specification Selection.
3.2.2 Protocol Slicing According to Test Suite Struc­
ture
The approach to specification selection investigated in this thesis performs the 
transformations on base specifications according to the hierarchically struc­
tured test suite trees defined and standardized for each base ju'otocol. It is 
based on the idea that before generating the test cases, an ap])ropriate test 
suite structure has to be designed, and a base specification has to be decom­
posed into abridged specifications reflecting the nodes of the test suite struc­
ture tree on a suitable level. The nodes of the test suite structure tree are 
test groups, and decomposition stojjs at the test case level. This approach to 
specification selection can be considered as a kind of slicing aj)])lied to protocol 
specifications written in the formal description technique LOTOS.
The notion of program slicing, originally introduced in [41], is the process of 
finding all statements in a program that directly or indirectly affect the value of 
a variable at a specific point in the program. The statements selected constitute 
a slice of the original program with respect to that variable occurrence. A slice 
is a self-contained executable program with the sim])le meaning that it should 
evaluate the varialile occurrence identically to the original program for all test 
cases [42]. Slicing is useful in program debugging, automatic parallelization, 
and program integration.
The established method of automatically obtaining program slices accord­
ing to some user-defined criteria is based on the use of a particular program 
representation called the Program Dependence Graph (PDG). The PDCl of a 
program has one node for each simple statement (assignment, read, write etc.), 
and one node for each control predicate expression (if-then-else, while-do etc.).
It has two types of directed edges, namely data dependence edges, and con­
trol dependence edges. Data dependence edges reveal the relationship between 
the definition and use of each of the program variables. Control dependence 
edges on the other hand identify the possible execution paths in the program 
[42]. Once a program is re])resented by its ])rogram dependence graph, the
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slicing problem is simply a vertex-reachibility problem, and thus slices may be 
computed in linear time [43].
The slicing method used in decomposing base specifications for the jiur- 
pose of obtaining functional specifications is similar to program slicing in the 
sense that, the aim is to obtain self-contained and executable functional spec­
ifications which describe only the required behaviour with respect to a test 
group objective. But since LOTOS is not ])rocedural language develoj)ed to 
write programs, but an algebraic sj^ecification formalism defined to describe 
observable behaviour of distributed systems, it is not straightforward to obtain 
the data and control dependencies within LOTOS specifications directly. An 
intermediate form called EFSM-Chart which corresponds to the normalized 
specification is devised for this purjjose. But since the transformation of a 
LOTOS specification into state machine requires much effort, it is of no use 
when the aim is to obtain the protocol slices before the actual test generation 
procedure starts.
3.2.3 Slicing and Behaviour Reductions
Protocol slicing according to a sjjecific. test suite structure is a hierarchical pro­
cess and leads to a tree of specifications. Each node of this tree corresponds 
to a non-leaf node of the related test suite structure tree, and the abridged 
specification describes only those dynamic conformance requirements that the 
objective of the test group focusses on. Since the functionally decomposed 
specification directly provides the behaviour related to the test cases consti­
tuting the corresponding test group, to base the generation of conformance test 
suites on functional specifications rather than base specifications can play an 
important role in automating the test generation jjiocess.
The derivation of subsets from a specification by slicing for the purpose of 
obtaining functional specifications, is referred to as behaviour reduction. The 
three types of transformations that can be defined on base specifications are; 
vertical reduction, horizontal reduction and diagonal reduction.
Vertical behaviour reductions deal with specification modularity and omit 
some of the processes comi^letely which are not of interest to a specific func­
tional specification. Reductions based on classes, functional units, entity roles, 
regimes and phases of protocols are mainly done by vertical reductions. As
CHAPTER 3. SPECIFICATION FOR TESTABILITY 49
an example, for asymmetric protocols each role (e.g. Initiator and Responder) 
can be considered as a sej^arate protocol, and vertical reduction is applied to 
obtain the behaviour specific to each role.
While performing horizontal reductions, j^rocesses are not omitted com­
pletely but some behaviour expressions within the processes can be excluded. 
For example valid and invalid/inopportune behaviour are usually specified as 
alternative choice branches, and functional specifications consisting only of 
valid behaviour or invalid/inop])ortune behaviour Ccui Ije obtained by applying 
horizontal reductions to choice branches such that irrelevant branches are sim­
ply discarded. Horizontal reductions can be a])])lied to other LOTOS operators, 
as well.
Diagonal reductions on the other hand, do the reductions at much more 
lower levels in a more selective manner. Some specification constructs which 
can be subject to diagonal reductions are as follows:
• Optional PDUs, and PDU parameters,
• Formal variable parameters in the definition, and the corres{)onding ac­
tual variables in the instantiation of the processes,
• Formal gate parameters in the definition and the corresjjonding actual 
gate parameters in the instantiation of the j^rocesses,
• Some value and variable declarations of event structures.
Furthermore, diagonal reductions jjerformed on the constructs stated above 
necessitate further reductions (horizontal, vertical, or diagonal) within the pro­
cess bodies in the resulting specifications.
All of the three types of reductions performed on base specifications result in 
some of the data type definitions to become completely or partially redundant. 
Since the presence of redundant data types does not cause any problem with 
respect to LOTOS semantics, this situation has no effect on the executability 
of the obtained specifications. These redundant data types can be the subject 
of other reduction procedures which have to consider the data part as well as 
the behaviour part of the LOTOS specifications. These kinds of reductions are 
not discussed in this thesis.
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3.2.4 Systematic Protocol Slicing
When we consider horizontal and vertical behaviour reductions, it is observed 
that they are closely related. A horizontal reduction performed within a process 
body which causes the elimination of, for example, a choice branch, will in most 
cases result in the removal of another process completely whicli happens to be 
a vertical reduction. Diagonal reductions on the other hand must be performed 
more selectively within the bodies and definitions of the processes that are to 
be included in the final reduced specification. By using these relationships 
among the three types of reductions, a method (actually a heuristic) can be 
defined to perform behaviour reductions on input specifications based on some 
user defined criteria. The complicated nature of the application of all types 
of reductions requires human expertise, and thus it is hard to automate these 
transformations.
This section presents our method to perform simple behaviour reductions 
on base protocol specifications, which is applied to sample protocols in Chapter 
5. First some definitions and assumptions about the method is given, and then 
the algorithm is presented.
3.2.4.1 Definitions
As defined in Chapter 2, a behaviour expression in LOTOS is built by applying 
operators to other behaviour expressions. The following definition introduces 
the notion of composite behaviour expression which is used as the main con­
struct in the reduction algorithm.
Definition 3.1 A composite behaviour expression (CBE) within the body of a 
process in a LOTOS specification is recursively defined by the following rules:
1. Each of the following are composite behaviour expressions, and also the 
base actions of their respective CBEs.
i) inaction (stop),
ii) successful termination (exit),
iii) process instantiation.
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2. U B  is a composite behaviour expression, tlien so is;
i) a;B , where a is any LOTOS event structure, and,
ii) [i] — y where [t] is a guard exjrression.
The composite behaviour ex])ressions of a process are separated with tlie 
following LOTOS opercitors which are called horizontal constructors.
- binary choice ([]),
- parallel composition (|[T]|, |||),
- disabling ([>).
The following operators can be applied to a single composite behaviour expres­
sion or multiple composite behaviour expressions separated by the horizontal 
constructors.
- hide,
- generalized choice,
- let.
The following example illustrates the typical use of CBEs in LOTOS pro­
cesses.
E xam ple 3.1 Within the following proce.ss definition :
process WaitforIC0Nresp2[ISAPjMSAP]:noexit:= 
ISAP?sp:SP[isICONresp(sp)];MSAP!MDATreq(CC);
Dataphase_Res[ISAP,MSAP](succ(l))
[]
MSAP?sp:MSP[isMDATind(sp)];WaitforIC0Nresp2[ISAP,MSAP]
(* System errors are ignored (Invalid/Inopportune Beh.) ♦) 
endproc (* WaitforIC0Nresp2 *)
The two behaviour ex])ressions separated l)y the choice ojjerator are 
composite behaviour expressions with base ¿ictions Data])hase_Res, and 
WaitforICONresp2, respectively.
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The starting point for the subsec|ueiit discussion is a. flattened LOTOS 
specification S which consists of a data j)art D and a behaviour part B, i.e, 
S =  {D^B] ,  The behaviour part B is defined as the set of all process defini­
tions in the specification, where the processes are uniquely identified and arc^  
statically independent from each other.
=  {Po, ^1, · . . ,  Pn) with, Vi, j  and i ^  j , Pi ^  Pj
Each process body is made up of one or more comjjosite behaviour expressions 
separated by horizontal constructors. If a comj)osite behaviour expression in­
cludes a guard, then the guard must be the first expression in the CBE. For the 
sake of simplicity the specification itself can also be considered as a process, 
the root process of tlie specification, and the behaviour part defines its bod}^
3.2.4.2 The Algorithm
Before the actual behaviour reduction procedure starts the following transfor­
mations must be carried out on the input base specification in order to obtain 
a flat specification.
1. Carry out the first phase of the chart construction algorithm on the input 
base specification.
2. Redefine all processes in the base specification so that they are uniquely 
identified and are statically independent from each other.
3. Transform the guards dej)ending on interaction primitives which are not 
the first expressions in their respective CBEs, into selection predicates.
The first step is the application of the first phase of the chart construction 
algorithm given in Section 2.6. This results in the elimination of sequential and 
full parallel composition constructs from the specification. Then all processes 
are redefined with unique identifiers, and are made statically independent from 
each other, i.e., no process apart from the root process includes the definition 
of any other process in its ‘where’ clause. In the third step, all guards which 
depend on the parameters of interaction ])rimitives, and which are not the 
first expressions in a composite behaviour exjiression are eliminated, and their 
boolean expressions are placed in the selection predicates of the preceding 
external events. The following example illustrates the third step.
CHAPTER 3. SPECIFICATION FOR TESTABILITY
Example 3.2 Tlte LOTOS code given l)elow is from tlie Initiator part of the 
IN RES protocol specification.
process Disconnected.Ini[ISAP,MSAP,d2]:exit:=
ISAP?sp;SP;
([isICONreq(sp)]-> MSAP!MDATreq(CR);d2!s(0);exit
[]
[not(isICONreq(sp))]-> Disconnected_Ini[ISAP,MSAP,d2])
(* User errors are ignored (Invalid/Inopportune Beh.) *)
endproc (* Disconnected.Ini *)
Since the the guards are not the first exjjressions of their respective CBEs, 
and they depend on the values of interaction variables, they are dropped and 
their boolean expressions are put into the selection predicates of the preced­
ing events. Since there are two guard ex])ressions, two event structures and 
selection predicates must be created. The result of this transformation is given 
below.
process Disconnected_Ini [ISAP,MSAP,d2]:exit: = 
ISAP?sp:SP[isICONreq(sp)];MSAP!MDATreq(CR);d2!s(0);exit 
[]
ISAP?sp:SP[not(isICONreq(sp))];
Disconnected.ini[ISAP,MSAP,d2]
(* User errors are ignored (Invalid/Inopportune Beh.) *)
endproc (* Disconnected_Ini *)
The main ingredient of the behaviour reduction algorithm given in Figure 
3.1 is the test suite structure (TSS) of the relevant base protocol. By taking 
the specification corresponding to their parent nodes as input, the algorithm 
produces a smaller functional specification for each node of the TSS tree. In 
this way every node defines the base sj^ecification for its successor nodes. The 
behaviour reductions corresponding to the TSS nodes are j^erformed according 
to the externall}^ provided abstract constraints that are assumed to be defined 
for each node of the TSS tree. These constraints are abstract in the sense that
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neither any specific requirements are placed on, nor any way of realizing them 
are explicitly given. They can be annotations used to distinguish different 
types of behaviour, names assigned to service primitives and PD Us, .selection 
predicates, guard expressions, PICS parameters, etc.
The algorithm starts with the root process, and inspects its every compos­
ite behaviour expression. Any composite behaviour expression satisfying the 
constraints is included in the functionally reduced specification, and then the 
process instantiated by the base action of the CBE is put in a list for subse­
quent consideration for possible inclusion in the output reduced specification. 
The algorithm proceeds recursively until all of the CBEs of the processes are 
inspected. Since this procedure may disrupt the functionalities of some of the 
processes in the resultant specification, the last step is the correction of these 
functionalities according to the rules of LOTOS.
If the total number of processes in a specification is p and the average 
number of CBEs within a process is n, then the time complexity of the 
algorithm given above in the worst case is 0(np). Line 1, and 2 of Be- 
haviour_R eduction  take time 0 (1 )  irrespective of the number of processes 
and CBEs. If we do not consider the time spent in the actual process of per­
forming vertical, horizontal, and diagonal reductions because they depend on 
the abstract constraints, the time spent in R educe, exclusive of the recursive 
call to itself, is 0 (1 ). Since line 2 can be executed at most n times for a pro­
cess, and the total number of processes is p, the total time spent in R educe 
is 0(np). The last step of B ehaviour_R eduction takes O(np) time, so the 
worst case time complexity of the whole algorithm is 0(np).
A number of examples of the application of the above algorithm on some 
OSI protocol specifications can be found in Chapter 5.
3.3 Related Work
Specification selection is elaborated in [21] for test case generation from sj)ec- 
ifications based on labelled transition systems with infinite branching, using 
the implementation relation conf. By using a restriction operator on labelled 
transition systems which prunes all branches with labels from a specific set, the 
specified behaviour is constrained to be finite, and this results in finite number
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Algorithm 3.1 Behaviour_Reduction
Inputs : Flattened Base Specification, TSS (expressed as a set of abstract 
constraints)
Output : Reduced Specification
Method : The methodology employed is based on extracting relevant be­
haviour expressions and including them in the resultant specification.
Procedure Behaviour-Reduction
1. Let P be the root process defining the behaviour of the base specification.
2. Define the body of process P in the reduced specification.
3. Reduce(P).
4. Correct any functionality mismatch in the resultant specification. 
Procedure Reduce(P:Process);
1. For each CBE within the process P of the base specification do the 
following steps :
1.1. If the CBE satisfies the related abstract constraints Then
1.1.1. Perform any diagonal reductions on the CBE according to 
the abstract constraints.
1.1.2. Include the CBE in the reduced specification within the body 
of the process P
1.1.2. If the base action associated with CBE is a non-recursive pro­
cess instantiation and the instantiated process is not defined in 
the reduced specification Then
1.1.2.1. Define the body of the instantiated process in the reduced 
specification.
1.1.2.2. Perform any diagonal reductions on the definition of the 
process.
1.1.2.3. Put the instantiated process in an Included List.
1.2. Else
1.2.1. Apply a horizontal reduction to the CBE.
1.2.2. If the base action associated with the CBE is a process instan­
tiation Then
1.2.2.1. Apply a vertical reduction to the body of the instantiated 
process.
2. For each Process P in the Included List :
2.1. Reduce(P)
Figure 3.1. Behaviour Reduction Algorithm
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oi test cases to be generated. The obtained results reveal that apart from avoid­
ing overproduction of test cases, performing test selection by transforming the 
specifications has the advantage that information about the structure of the 
specification can be used in the selection process. A specification written as a 
behaviour expression has a certain structure in terms of how the specification 
is built from simpler behaviour expressions, such as a process is composed in 
parallel or in sequence with another process. If it can be assumed that this 
structure is reflected in the structure of the implementation, it can be used to 
guide the test selection procedure. For example, if a process is composed of two 
independently parallel processes, it may not be necessary to test all possible 
interleavings of actions of those processes. Such structure information is lost 
if selection is performed from a set of test cases.
Another related approach to specification selection can be found in [44], 
which uses the structure information of LOTOS specifications to develop a 
framework for deriving test cases to consider only parts of the behaviour de­
scription that corresponds to the chosen test purposes. In order not to loose 
important structure information that can serve to reduce the efforts for test 
case generation and for determining test purposes, a notation called minimal- 
hierarchical specification is introduced. A specification is minimal-hierarchical 
if it satisfies the orthogonality condition defined in [24], which requires inde­
pendent architectural requirements to be specified by independent definitions; 
and it consists of the minimum number of processes which are necessary to ex­
press the intended behaviour of the specification. An algorithm is presented in 
[44] to convert an arbitrary LOTOS specification into an equivalent minimal- 
hierarchical specification in two steps, each step producing a specification as 
output that satisfies one of the conditions stated above.
The minimal-hierarchical specification is used in the derivation of the test 
cases while not considering the whole specification, but only parts of it corre­
sponding to specific test purposes. One of the main differences with our ap­
proach arises here when a test purpose in the context of a minimal-hierarchical 
specification is defined as the successful execution of a subprocess of the spec­
ification. According to our approach it is not possible to isolate the behaviour 
corresponding to a specific test ])urpose within the body of a single process, 
because the desired functionality may l)e spread over the whole specification. 
Thus the whole specification must be considered when the intention is to iden­
tify specific functions.
Chapter 4
BASE SPECIFICATION  
DEVELOPM ENT
111 case of formal specification based protocol engineering the starting point is a 
formal specification of the protocol. Formal specifications are written following 
certain basic structuring principles [39]. Concurrency and multiplicity are for 
modelling multiple independent connections. Recurrence and sequentiality are 
for the use of subsequent connections on the same connection endpoint, and 
for the distinct phases that compose a connection, respectively. In LOTOS, 
concurrency/multiplicity is expressed as interleaved parallel composition; re- 
currence/sequentiality is mapped to recursion and successful termination with 
value passing. A language dependent structuring principle is the definition of 
constraints as processes, and constraint-oriented specifications in LOTOS use 
this feature extensively to express mutual satisfaction of the constraints by 
multi-way synchronized parallel composition.
This chapter consists of the aj^plications of base specification development 
principles discussed in the previous chapter, on some protocols specified in LO­
TOS. The principles are built on the basic structuring principles given above. 
Section 4.1, introduces the INRES protocol, and the its bcise specification. 
Similarly Section 4.2 is about the development of the ACSE base specification 
from the respective l)ase protocol.
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P D U Meaning Parameter Respective SPs
CR Connection Establishment none ICONreq,ICONind
CC Connection Confirmation none ICONresp,ICONconf
DT Data Transfer sequence number,ISDU IDATreq,IDATind
AK Acknowledgement sequence number
DR Disconnection none IDLSreq,IDISind
Table 4.1. INRES IPDUs
4.1 INRES Protocol
The first exan.ple that we will consider is the fairly simple O.STlike Initiator- 
Responder (INRE.S) protocol [37], for which the complete flattened LOTOS 
specification in state-oriented style can be found in Appendix A.
INRES is a connection-oriented protocol that operates between two proto­
col entities, Initiator and Responder. The protocol entities communicate by 
exchanging the protocol data unit:·; CR, C(J, DT, AK, and DR. The meaning 
of the INRES PDUs (IPDUs) are given in Table 4.1.
The communication between the two protocol entities takes place in three 
distinct phases: the connection-establishment phase, the data transmission 
phase, and the disconnection phase. In each phase only certain PDUs are 
meaningful.
C onnection-E stablishm ent: A connection establishment is initiated by 
the user of the Initiator entity with an ICONreq service primitive. The entity 
then sends a CR to the Responder entity. Responder answers with CC or 
DR. In the case of CC, Initiator i.ssues an ICONconf to its user, and the data 
transfer phase can be entered. If Initiator receives a DR from the Responder, 
the disconnection phase is entered. If the Initiator receives nothing at all within 
5 seconds, CR is transmitted again. If, after four attempts, still nothing is 
received by the Initiator, it enters the disconnection pha.se.
When Responder receives a CR from the Initiator, it issues a ICONind to 
its user. The user can respond with ICONresp or IDISreq. ICONresp indicates 
the willingness of the user to accept the connection. Responder entity thereafter 
sends a CC to Initiator, and the data transfer phase is entered. Upon receipt 
of an IDISreq, Responder enters the disconnection phase.
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D ata Transfer : When the Initiator user issues an IDATreq primitive, the 
Initiator sends a DT to the Responder and is then ready to receive another 
IDATreq from the user. IDATre<i has one parameter that is a service data 
unit (ISDU), which is the information that the user wants to transmit to the 
peer user. This user data is transmitted transparently by the Initiator protocol 
entity as a parameter of the protocol data unit DT. After having sent a DT to 
the Responder, Initiator waits for 5 seconds for a respective acknowledgement 
AK. If AK is not received, the DT is sent again. After four unsuccessful 
transmissions. Initiator enters the disconnection phase.
DT and AK carry a one-bit sequence number as a parameter. Initiator, 
after having entered the data transmission phase, starts with the transmission 
of a DT with sequence number 1. A correct acknowledgement of a DT ha.s the 
same sequence number. After receipt of a correct acknowledgement, the next 
DT with the next sequence number can be sent. If Initiator receives an AK 
with incorrect sequence number, it sends the last DT once again. A DT can 
only be sent four times. Afterwards, Initiator enters the disconnection phase. 
Disconnection phase is also entered upon receipt of DR.
Following the establishment of the connection. Responder expects the first 
DT with sequence number 1. After the receipt of a DT with the expected 
number. Responder gives the ISDU as a parameter of an IDATind service 
primitive to its user and sends an AK with the same sequence number to the 
Initiator. A DT with an unexpected sequence number is acknowledged with 
an AK with the sequence number of the last correctly received DT. The user 
data of an incorrect DT is ignored. If Responder receives a CR, it enters the 
connection establishment phase, and upon receipt of an IDISreq from its user,it 
enters the disconnection phase.
D isconnection  : An IDISreq from the Responder user results in the send­
ing of a DR by the Responder. Afterwards Responder can receive another 
connection establishment attempt CR from Initiator.
At the Initiator side, the DR results in an IDISind to be sent to the user. An 
IDISind is also sent to the user after DT or CR have not been sent successfully 
to the Responder. Then a new connection can be established.
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4.1.1 PICS Parameterization
INRES is an asymmetric protocol, i.e., one side, the initiator, can only establish 
connections and send data while the other side, the responder, can accept 
connections, release them and receive data. An implementation may either 
behave as the initiator or the responder entity, but not both. This fact is 
reflected in the PICS Proforma for INRES given in Appendix B.
For the parameterization of the base specification based on the PICS Pro­
forma, “yes/no” entries related to the conditional capabilities can be taken into 
consideration as boolean entries. Entries indicating the range of values are not 
taken as parameters, and the following specification definition is obtained :
specification Inres_Protocol[ISAP,MSAP] (cl, c2 : Bool):noexit 
(♦ cl, c2 : PICS parajneters. *)
(* cl : Initiator capability is supported *)
(* c2 : Responder capability is supported *)
The behaviour part, i.e, the main body of the specification starts with the 
static conformance review. It is expressed as an ADT function as follows :
behaviour
(* Static Conformance Review. *)
[CapabilityConform (cl, c2)] -> INRES [ISAP,MSAP](cl,c2)
Only if static conformance requirements are satisfied does the specification 
describe active behaviour, viz. it provides the implementor or tester with an 
abstract model of the j^rotocol dynamic conformance requirements described 
by the process named INRE.S.
C apabilityC onform  is a boolean valued function which returns true if and 
only if exactly one of the roles mentioned in the PKJS proforma (i.e., either 
initiator or responder) is implemented, and returns lalse otherwise. This is 
formally expressed in the tyj)e declarations part ot the specification by defining 
a particular data type for this function.
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type StaticConformance is Boolean
opns CapabilityConforín : Bool, Bool -> Bool 
eqns forall cl, c2 : Bool 
ofsort Bool
CapabilityConform (cl,c2) =
((cl and not(c2)) or (not(cl) and c2)) 
endtype (♦ StaticConforraance *)
The parameters cl and c2 can be used in the behaviour part as follows:
process INRES[ISAP,MSAP](cl,c2 :Bool) :noexit:=
[cl]-> Initiator[ISAP,MSAP]
[]
[c2]-> Responder[ISAP,MSAP] 
endproc (* INRES *)
which divides the whole specification into two disjoint parts, the part specifying 
the behaviour of the initiator entity, and the part specifying the behaviour of 
the responder entity. Since the predicates cl and c2 can not be both true at the 
same time for a particular implementation, either one of the paths defined by 
the guard expressions is selected, and therefore no deadlock possibility exists.
4.1.2 Behaviour Specification
The valid behaviour is specified based on the state tables given in the informal 
standard using traditional techniques. The state tables for the initiator and 
Responder protocol entities are given in Table 4.2 and Table 4..3, respectively. 
The state tables show the interrelationship between the state of the protocol 
machines, the incoming events that occur, the actions taken, and finally, the 
resultant state of the protocol machines. The intersection of an incoming event 
(row) and a state (column) forms a cell. Some cells contain predicate expres­
sions comprising boolean variable which is equivalent to the expression 
‘c= 4 ’ (-> represents the boolean not). Blank cells represent the combination 
of incoming events and states that are not defined for the respective state 
machines, i.e, they rej>reseut inoj^portune behaviour.
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State
Event
STAG
(Disconnected)
STAl
(WaitforCC)
STA2
(Coiiiiectecl)
STA3
(Sending)
ICONreq CR
c=l
.STAl
CC ICONconf
.STA2
IDATreq DT 
c—1 
STA.3
STA2
AK" p;DT
c=c+l
.STA.3
-■pldDISind
.STAG
Timeout p;CR
c=c+l
.STAl
-nphlDISind
.STAG
p;DT
c.=c+l
.STA.3
-pldDISind
.STAG
DR IDLSind
.STAG
IDLSind
.STAG
IDI.Sind
.STAG
IDI.Sind
STAG
Table 4.2. .State Table for Initiator Protocol
State
Event
STAG
(Disconnected)
STAl
(W aitforlCONresp)
STA2
(Connected)
CR ICONiiul 
STA1
ICONind
STAl
ICONresp CC
STA2
DT+ AK, IDATind 
.STA2
DT- AK
STA2
IDISreq DR
.STAG
DR
STAG
DR
STAG
Table 4..‘3. State Table for Re.sponcler Protocol
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The top level structure of the specification for each entity reveals the de­
composition of the protocol into three distinct phases; namely connection es­
tablishment, data transfer, and disconnection.
process Responder[ISAP,MSAP]:noexit:=
(hide d in
Connectionphase_Res[ISAP,MSAP,d]
I[d]I d;Dataphase_Res[ISAP.MSAP](succ(l))) 
[>Disconnection_Res[ISAP,MSAP] 
endproc (* Responder *)
Since a state-oriented specification style has been employed, each state of 
the protocol at each side is represented by a separate process. For example, 
the following piece of code describes the the behaviour of the Initiator protocol 
machine when it receives an Acknowledgement (AK) PDU in the Sending state. 
It inspects the sequence number of the incoming AK-PDU and if it is the 
expected number, the machine returns to its previous state where it is ready 
for another send-data request. If the number is incorrect according to the 
protocol, then the data is retransmitted and the current state is not changed.
process Sending[ISAP,MSAP]
(z:DecNumb,numberrSequencenumber, olddata:ISDU):noexit:= 
MSAP?sp:MSP
[isMDATind(sp) and not(isDR(data(sp))) and 
isAK(data(sp)) and (num(data(sp)) eq number)];
Dataphase.Ini[ISAP,MSAP](succ(number))
[]
MSAP?sp:MSP
[isMDATind(sp) and not(isDR(data(sp))) and isAK(data(sp)) 
and (num(data(sp)) ne number) and (z < 4)];
MSAP!MDATreq(DT(number,olddata));
Sending[ISAP,MSAP](s(z),number,olddata)
[]
endproc (* Sending ♦)
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The default behaviour of the INRES protocol entities in response to invalid 
and inopportune behaviour at each state, represented by the blank entries in 
the respective state tables, is to ignore such inputs. In the base specification, 
this is specified by alternative choice branches at each state, where no action 
is taken when an invalid or inopportune PDU is received.
process WaitforlCONrespl[lSAP,MSAP,d]:exit:=
[]
MSAP?sp:MSP[isMDATind(sp)];WaitforlCONrespl[ISAP,MSAP,d]
(* System errors are ignored (Invalid/Inopportune Beh.) *) 
endproc (* WaitforlCONrespl *)
4.2 ACSE Protocol
For the second example we consider the protocol specification for the Associa­
tion Control Service Element (ACSE) [45]. The state-oriented LOTOS speci­
fication of the behaviour part of this protocol is given in Appendix D.
ACSE is defined for the purpose of the management of application asso­
ciations. It provides facilities for the establishment and release of application 
associations between Application Entities (AEs). Association is the term used 
for the connections established at the Application layer. An application associ­
ation is a presentation connection with additional application layer semantics. 
There is a one-to-one mapping Ijetween application associations and presenta­
tion connections. Because the sole purpose of ACSE is to manage application 
associations, it does not provide any data transfer service elements.
The ACSE Protocol Machine (ACPM) operates in either the normal mode 
or the X .410-1984 mode. When o])erating in the X .410-1984 mode, the ACPM 
does not exchange any ACSE APDUs with its peer. The following discussion 
and the base specification in Appendix D assumes that the ACPM operates in 
the normal mode.
The ACPM is driven I>y the receipt of input events from its ACSE service 
user or the presentation service ])rovider. It uses five APDUs (Table 4.4), 
and three procedures. These procedures are association establishment, normal
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PDU
AAIIQ
AARE
RLRQ
RLRE
ABRT
Name
A-ASSOCIATE.request PDU 
A-ASSOCIATE.response PDU 
A-RELEASE.request PDU 
A-RELEASE.response PDU 
A-ABORT.request PDU
Table 4.4. ACSE APDUs
release, and abnormal release.
A ssociation  Establishm ent: A .A S S O C IA T E  service element is used 
in by an AE to establish an application association with a peer AE. This service 
element uses over thirty parameters. Some of them are described below.
• A pplication  C ontext Nam e: This parameter identifies the application 
context used for the application association. An application context de­
fines the rules governing the communication of the two AEs used for the 
entire application a.s.sociation. The initiating ACSE user first proposes 
an application context. The accepting user returns either the same or a 
different one. If the initiator can not operate in the acceptor’s application 
context, it issues an A.ABORTrequest primitive.
• m ode: This parameter specifies the mode in which the ACSE service will 
operate for the association. Its value can be either normal or X .410-1984. •
• A P  T itles/Q ualifiers: An application entity is identified by AET (ap­
plication entity title) which consists of APT (application process title) 
and an AE qualifier.
• R esult and Result Source: The result parameter is provided by ei­
ther the acceptor, the ACSE service-provider, or the presentation service 
provider. Its value can be ’’ accepted” , ” rejected(permanent)” , or ” re- 
jected(transient)” . The result source parameter identifies the source of 
the result parameter, and the diagnostic parameter, if present. The value 
of the result source parameter can be either ’’ ACSE service-user” , ’’ ACSE 
service-provider” , or ’’ presentation service-provider” .
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D iagnostic: This parametei' is used only if the result parameter has 
the value ’’ rejected” . It gives the reason behind the rejection of the 
association.
User in form ation : Either the initiating AE or the responding AE may 
include the user information. Its meaning depends on the application 
context that accompanies the request.
The AARQ APDU is used in the association establishment procedure. 
Upon receiving an A.ASSOCIATErequest primitive from its ACSE service 
user, the requesting ACPM forms an AARQ APDU. The AARQ APDU 
is then sent as the user data parameter of a P.CONNECTrequest primi­
tive. When the accepting ACPM receives ¿in AARQ APDU, it checks if 
the AARQ APDU is acceptable syntactically. If not, the association estab­
lishment procedure is disrupted and no A.ASSOCIATEindication is issued. 
If the accepting ACPM does not support the protocol version requested by 
the initiating ACPM, it will respond with an .AARE APDU and indicate 
the result value of ” rejected(permanent)” . When the accepting ACPM re­
ceives an A.ASSOCIATEresponse primitive, the result parameter should spec­
ify whether its user has accepted or rejected the association. The accepting 
ACPM forms an AARE APDU and sends it to the requesting ACPM using a 
P.CONNECTresponse primitive. If its user accepted the association request, 
the accepting ACPM sets the result parameter of P.CONNECTresponse to ’’ ac­
ceptance” , otherwi.se it is set to ” u.ser-rejection” to indicate that its user has 
rejected the association.
N orm al Release: An application association can be released in an orderly 
manner by means of A .R E L E A S E  service element. The RLRQ and RLRE 
APDUs are used in the normal release of an association. When an ACPM 
receives a A.RELEASErequest primitive, it forms a RLRQ APDU and sends 
it as the user data of a P.RELEASErequest primitive. When the accepting 
ACPM receives an A.RELEASErespon.se primitive, it forms a RLRE APDU 
and sends it as the user data of a P.RELEASErespoirse primitive. Thus, the 
purpose of RLRE is to acknowledge the received RLRQ.
A bn orm al Release: If an AE detects an unrecoverable error, it uses 
A .A B O R T  service element to abort an api^lication association with possible 
I0.SS of data that are in transit. The ABRT APDU is used in the abnor­
mal release procedure There arc’: only two Helds in an ABRT APDU: abort
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source (mandatory) and user information (optional). When an ACPM receives 
A.ABORTrequest, it forms an ABRT APDU with the abort source field set to 
” ACSE service user” . It then sends the ABRT APDU as the user data of a 
P-U.ABORTrequest primitive to release the association. When an ACPM de­
tects a protocol error, it issues an A.ABORTindication primitive to its service 
user, forms an ABRT APDU with the abort source field set to ” ACSE service 
provider” , and sends it as the u,ser data of a P-U.ABORTrequest primitive.
The ACSE service provider can also abort an application association us­
ing A-P.ABORT. A-P.ABORT is a pass through service element from the 
Presentation layer, i.e., it is semantically identical to P-P.ABORT. When an 
ACPM receives a P-P.ABORTindication primitive, the ACPM issues an A- 
P.ABORTindication primitive to its user, and the association is released.
4.2.1 PICS Parameterization
[46] defines the PICS proforma for ACSE. Apart from the standard entries 
identifying the implementation, the implementor, and the entries indicating 
the range of PDU parameters, there are a number of boolean entries indicating 
the implementation of optional and conditional capabilities. The five condi­
tional entries which are the possible candidates in parameterizing the base 
specification are:
1. cl : Association initiator capability is supported,
2. c2 : Association responder capability is supported,
.3. c3 : The implementation can behave as the requestor of the release of 
the association,
4. c4 : The underlying session protocol supports Version 2,
5. c5 : The described ACSE protocol version is greater than 1.
Since the test suite structure developed in [47] on which the behaviour 
reductions given in Chapter 5 are based, does not take into account the different 
types of behaviour resulting from the choice of oj)tions c4 and c5; only cl, c2 
and c3 are used in parameterizing tlie base specification as shown below.
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specification ACSE_Protocol[A,P] (cl,c2,c3 : Bool): noexit 
(* cl, c2, c3 : PICS parameters. *)
(* cl : Association initiator capability is supported ♦)
(* c2 : Association responder capability is supported *)
(* c3 : RLRQ APDU is sijpported for transmission *)
The static conformance review part is the siime as that of INRES, whereas the 
ADT function checking the satisfaction ot the static conformance requirements 
is slightly different reflecting the fact that ACSE is not an asymmetric protocol.
type StaticConformance is Boolean
opns CapabilityConform : Bool, Bool -> Bool 
eqns forall cl, c2 : Bool 
ofsort Bool
CapabilityConform(cl, c2) = (cl or c2) 
endtype (♦ StaticConformance ♦)
behaviour
(* Static Conformance Review *)
[CapabilityConform (cl, c2)] -> ACSE[A,P](cl,c2,c3)
A major difference between the protocol specifications of ACSE and INRES 
is that, the implementations of the ACSE protocol can behave both as initiator 
and responder of the associations. Since ACSE is not an asymmetric protocol, 
the use of the parameters related to the role of the implementation, i.e, cl and 
c2, in the behaviour ])art is quite different when compared with INRES. This 
time cl and c2 can not be defined as guard expressions, because in the case that 
they are both true for a particular implementation, according to the semantics 
of LOTOS, one of the paths can be chosen nondeterministically before engaging 
in an interaction. This brings in the possibility of the protocol entity running 
into deadlock in case of an interaction request for which it is not ready for. 
For this reason, boolean parameters which do not represent the choice among 
mutually exclusive options must be used in selection predicates, not in guard 
expressions, while specifying alternative behaviour, as shown below:
process Unassociated[A,P](cl,c2,c3 : Bool):exit:= 
A ? X : primitive [IsAASCreq(x) and cl];
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□
P ! Input ? X : primitive 
[IsPCONind(x) aind IsAARQ(user_data(x)) and 
not(coramon_prot_version(get_AARQ(user_data(x)))) and c2];
endproc (♦ Unassociated ♦)
4.2.2 Behaviour Specification
As an Application layer protocol, the PDU structures of ACSE are defined in 
ASN.l. Therefore transformation of PDU type definitions from ASN.l into 
the data type definition language ACT-ONE of LOTOS has to be done in 
order to obtain a complete base specification. The transformation scheme 
adopted is based on the approach developed in [48]. The size of the resulting 
data type definitions is much larger than the original ASN.l definitions. Since 
ASPs and PDUs for Application layer protocols contain a large number of 
parameters, instead of writing the same interaction primitives every time within 
the behaviour part, they are defined in the data type part of the LOTOS 
specification as ADT functions, and names assigned to these functions are used 
in the behaviour part. The following example illustrates the behaviour of the 
ACSE protocol machine when it has been requested to initiate an association.
process Unassociated[A,P,d](cl,c2,c3 : Bool):exit:=
A ? X : primitive [IsAASCreq(x) and cl];
P ! Out ! PCONreq(make_AARQ(get_AASCreq(x))); 
awaitAARE[A,P,d](cl,c2,c3)
[]
endproc (* unassociated *)
The ADT function P(.'ONreq(make_AAR(J(get_AAS(Jreq(x))) represents the 
formation of the AARCJ PDU by using the parameters of the input service prim­
itive AASCreq, and (uiclosing it in the user data of the P.(jONNE(JTindication
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primitive. The actual definition of the function is placed in the data type part, 
type primitive is
AASCreq, AASCind, AASCrsp, AASCcnf, ARLSreq, ARLSind,
opns
PCONreq : ACSE.apdu -> primitive
make_AARQ : AASCreq -> ACSE_apdu
eqns
(*♦♦♦ make_AARQ *♦♦♦)
(♦ AASCreq -> ACSE_apdu *)
ofsort ACSE_apdu 
forall AASC : AASCreq
make_AARQ(AASC) = ACSE_apdu(AARQ_apdu( 
Bit(1),app_context_name(AASC), 
called_ap_title(AASC), 
called_ae_qualifier(AASC), 
called_ap_invocation_id(AASC), 
called_ae_invocation_id(AASC), 
calling_ap_title(AASC), 
calling_ae_qualifier(AASC), 
calling_ap_invocation_id(AASC), 
calling_ae_invocation_id(AASC), 
type_genere010(Not_Present), 
user_inf0 (AASC)
) )
ofsort ACSE_apdu 
forall apdu : ACSE.apdu
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user_data(PCONreq(apdu)) = apdu; 
endtype (* primitive ♦)
According to [47], since each ACSE PDU is carried as the user data of 
a different presentation service primitive, and the PDU and the presentation 
service primitive carrying it together form the protocol, no inopportune tests 
are defined for ACSE, but only invalid tests. In each state, only one PDU as the 
user data of a specific presentation service primitive is considered to be valid, 
so combinations of the same presentation service primitive with other ACSE 
PDUs are coiTsidered to be invalid protocol behaviour. The code given below 
is specifies the behaviour of the protocol to invalid inputs in the associated 
state, which is represented by the process ‘associated’ . According to ACSE 
protocol definition, when an unexpected PDU is received, the abnormal release 
procedure is invoked. The abnormal release procedure is represented by the 
process ‘protocoLerror’ in the base specification.
process Associated[A,P](cl,c2,c3 : Bool):exit :=
[]
P ! Input ? X : primitive
[IsPRLSind(x) and not(IsRLRQ(user_data(x) ) ) ] ;  
protocol_error[A,P](cl,c2,c3)
(* Invalid Behaviour *)
endproc (♦ Associated *)
process protocol_error[A,P](cl,c2,c3 
A ! maJ£e_AABRind;
P ! Out ! PUABreq(madce_ABRT); 
ACSE[A,P](cl,c2,c3) 
endproc (* protocol_error *)
Bool):noexit :=
Chapter 5
DERIVATION OF FUNCTIONAL  
SPECIFICATIONS
An important use of base specifications is the systematic derivation of func­
tional specifications. In this chapter, the slicing approach developed in Chapter 
3 to the derivation of functional specifications is applied to sample base proto­
cols. First state-oriented specifications are considered. In Section 5.1 functional 
specifications of INRES and ACSE protocols are obtained for each of the test 
groups defined on their respective test suite structures. Section 5.2 considers 
the more complicated transport protocol, and illustrates the application of di­
agonal reductions along with horizontal and vertical reductions on the base 
specification of this protocol.
The kind of behaviour reductions to be carried out depend on the test 
groups defined on the related test suite structure. As will be evident from the 
application examples given in this chapter, most of the test suites designed for 
OSI protocols are subdivided into the following test groups at the highest level:
• Basic Interconnection Tests,
• Capability Tests,
• Valid Behaviour Tests,
• Inopportune Behaviour Tests,
• Invalid Behaviour Tests.
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Test cases for basic interconnection and capability tests can be obtained by 
selecting tests from valid behaviour group. Therefore, at the highest level, it 
is reasonable to consider only valid and invalid/inopportune behaviour tests, 
while decomposing base specifications. So, generally, the first step in behaviour 
reductions is the extraction of the parts from the specifications which define 
valid and invalid/inopportune behaviour. The test groups related to valid and 
invalid/inopportune behaviour tests are generally divided further into specific 
test groups depending on the nature of the base protocol in question. Behaviour 
reductions are performed for all test groups of the test suite structure.
5.1 Behaviour Reductions On State-Oriented Specifi­
cations
5.1.1 Behaviour Reductions On INRES
Figure 5.1 shows the test suite hierarchy of INRES protocol. Appendix C 
contains the full test suite structure and test purposes document. INRES is an 
asymmetric protocol in that an implementation can function as an initiator or 
as a responder, each role being different from each other. Since this is a major 
consideration of an implementation it follows that this division forms the top 
level of the structure for the test suite. Accordingly, the first application of the 
behaviour reduction algorithm is to obtain separate protocol specifications for 
each of the roles.
Before applying the behaviour reduction algorithm given in Chapter 3 to 
the base specification, some syntactic transformations have to be carried out. 
These are the first phase of the cliart construction, redefinition of the processes 
so that they are syntactically independent form each other, and elimination 
of the guards which are not the first expressions in their respective CBEs. 
Appendix A contains the base specification of INRES obtained after having 
performed these transformations.
The two protocols corresponding to each of the roles can be obtained by 
performing a horizontal reduction inside the process named ‘ INRES’ , and then 
a vertical reduction to exclude all i)iocess definitions which do not describe 
the intended behaviour. For example, the specifications of the Initiator and
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Figure 5.1. Test Suite Structure for INRES
Responder protocols can be obtained by eliininating the branches conditioned 
by the PICS parameters ‘c2’ and ‘c l ’ , respectively. Since when a process is 
vertically reduced from the specification its body is not considered, if they are 
not instantiated elsewhere ,all other processes which are directly or indirectly 
instantiated by the reduced process are omitted, too. Since PICS parame­
ters differentiating between the two roles are not needed any more, they can 
be dropped. The resulting specifications corresponding to the two separate 
protocols have the following top level structure:
specification Inres_Protocol_I[ISAP,MSAP]inoexit 
(♦ Data types ♦) 
behaviour 
INRES [ISAP,MSAP]
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where
process INRES[ISAP,MSAP]:noexit:= 
Initiator[ISAPjMSAP] 
endproc (* INRES ♦)
endspec
specification Inres_Protocol_R[ISAP,MSAP]rnoexit
(♦ Data types *)
behaviour
INRES [ISAP,MSAP]
where
process INRES[ISAP.MSAP]:noexit: 
Responder[ISAP,MSAP] 
endproc (* INRES *)
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endspec
After extracting out the behaviour specific, to a particular role, valid 
behaviour and invalid/inopportune behaviour descriptions must obtained as 
two separate specifications. The reduced specifications for valid and in­
valid/inopportune behaviour can be produced by evaluating the annotations 
distinguishing the two types of behaviour, and performing horizontal reduc­
tions based on these annotations. The s])ecification of valid behaviour can be 
obtained by omitting the branches describing invalid/inopportune behaviour. 
Since INRES takes no action in response to iiivalid/inopportune test events, 
and does not change its current state, such behaviour must be augmented with 
some valid behaviour expressions in order to end up with an executable spec­
ification. The following LOTOS code gives part of the specification of the 
invalid/inopportuno behaviour of Initiator entity.
specification Inres_Protocol_I_BIO[ISAP.MSAP]:noexit
process Connectionphase_Ini[ISAP,MSAP,d]:exit:= 
hide dd in
Disconnected_Ini[ISAP,MSAP,dd]
I[dd]I dd?z:DecNumb;WaitforCC[ISAP,MSAP,d](z) 
endproc (♦ Connectionphase.Ini *)
process Disconnected_Ini[ISAP,MSAP,dd]:exit:= 
ISAP?sp:SP[isICONreq(sp)];MSAP!MDATreq(CR);dd!s(0);exit 
(* CBE added to provide with functionality exit *)
n
ISAPTsp:SP[not(isICONreq(sp))];
Disconnected.Ini[ISAP,MSAP,dd]
(* User errors are ignored (Invalid/Inopportune Beh.) ♦)
[]
MSAPTsp:MSP[isMDATind(sp) and not(isDR(data(sp)))]; 
Disconnected_Ini[ISAP,MSAP,dd]
(* DR is only accepted by process Disconnection *)
(* System errors are ignored (Invalid/Inopportune Beh.) *) 
endproc (* Disconnected_Ini *)
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endspec
The reduced specification corresponding to the valid behaviour tests is sub­
divided into three test groups each corresponding to one of the phases of the 
protocol, namely connection establishment, data transfer, and disconnection. 
Accordingly, the corresponding slices are obtained for each phase. A specifi­
cation for each phase can be obtained by considering the modular structure 
of the specification. By performing horizontal and vertical reductions, a sep­
arate protocol for each phase can be obtained. Below is the specification of 
the valid behaviour of the initiator entity during disconnection phase. It is 
obtained from the respective base specification by horizontally reducing the 
instantiations of the processes ‘Connectionphase_Ini’ and ‘Dataphase.Ini’ from 
the body of the process ‘ Initiator’ ; and vertically reducing their definitions 
from the specification. In this case the abstract constraints refer to the names 
of the processes.
specification Inres_Protocol_I_BV_DC[ISAP,MSAP]rnoexit 
(* Data types *) 
behaviour 
INRES [ISAP,MSAP]
where
process INRES[ISAP,MSAP]:noexit:= 
Initiator[ISAP jMSAP] 
endproc (* INRES *)
process Initiator[ISAP,MSAP]:noexit:= 
Disconnection_Ini[ISAP,MSAP] 
endproc (♦ Initiator *)
process Disconnection_Ini[ISAP,MSAP]:noexit:=
MSAP?sp:MSP[isMDATind(sp) and isD R (data(sp))];ISAP!IDISind;
Initiator[ISAP,MSAP] 
endproc (* Disconnection_Ini *)
endspec
The subsequent division under the invalid/inopportune behaviour test 
group is state based, i.e., the behaviour of the protocol entity is tested for 
invalid and inopportune behaviour in each state. The respective slices corre­
spond to the behaviour described by each of the processes in the base spec­
ification. Below is the specification of the initiator entity in response to in­
valid/inopportune behaviour in its connected state.
specification Inres_Protocol_I_BI0_STA2[ISAP,MSAP]:noexit 
(* Data types ♦) 
behaviour 
INRES [ISAP,MSAP] 
where
process INRES[ISAP,MSAP]:noexit:=
Initiator[ISAP jMSAP] 
endproc (* INRES *)
process Initiator[ISAP,MSAP]:noexit:= 
hide d in
d;Dataphase_Ini[ISAP,MSAP] (succ(O)) 
endproc (♦ Initiator *)
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process Dataphase_Ini[ISAPjMSAP]
(number : Sequencenumber):noexit:= 
hide d in
Connected_Ini[ISAP,MSAP,d](number) 
(* 1 is the first Sequencenumber *) 
endproc (* Dataphase_Ini *)
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process Connected.Ini[ISAP,MSAP,d]
(number:Sequencenumber):noexit:=
ISAP?sp:SP[not(isIDATreq(sp))];
Connected.ini[ISAP,MSAP,d](number)
(* User errors are ignored (Invalid/Inopportune Beh.) ♦)
□
MSAP?sp:MSP[isMDATind(sp) and not(isDR(data(sp)))]; 
Connected.Ini[ISAP,MSAP,d](number)
(* DR is only accepted by process Disconnection *)
(♦ System errors are ignored (Invalid/Inopportune Beh.) *) 
endproc (♦ Connected.ini *)
endspec
5.1.2 Behaviour Reductions On ACSE
Figure 5.2 shows the test suite hierarchy defined for the ACSE protocol which 
is obtained from the complete test suite structure and test purposes document 
given in [47]. Since the base specification developed describes only the normal 
mode operation of the protocol, the parts related to the X-410.1984 mode of 
the protocol are omitted from the test suite structure.
Appendix D contains the flattened base specification of the ACSE protocol 
from which the functional specifications are obtained. As in the case of INRES, 
functional specifications corresponding to valid and invalid behaviour are ob­
tained by considering each CBE in each of the processes. Since CBEs defining 
invalid behaviour are already distinguished by comments, each specification 
can be obtained by eliminating the irrelevant choice branches horizontally. 
The subsequent division under the invalid behaviour test group is state based. 
The code below is the specification of the invalid behaviour of ACSE protocol 
machine in its associated state. A diagonal reduction is applied to the event 
structure at internal gate d within the ])rocess ‘ACSE’ , and also to the first 
parameter of the process ‘Norm_Rel’ . PICS parameters have been dropped, 
too.
specification ACSE_Protocol_BI_STA5[A,P]rnoexit
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Figure 5.2. Test Suite Structure for ACSE
(♦ Data Types *) 
behaviour 
ACSE[A,P]
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where
process ACSE[A, P ] : n o ex it := 
hide d in
d ; (Norraal_Rel[A, P]
[> Abort[A,P])  
endproc (* ACSE *)
process Normal_Rel[A,P]:n o e x it := 
hide d in
Associated[A,P,d]  
endproc (* Normal_Rel *)
process A ssociated [A ,P ,d ]:n o exit :=
P ! Input ? X : prim itive
[IsPRLSind(x) and not(IsRLRQ(user_data(x)) ) ] ;  
p rotocol_error[A , P]
(* Invalid Behaviour *) 
endproc (* Associated *)
process Abort[A, P ] : n o ex it :=
P ! Input ? X : prim itive
[IsPUABind(x) and not(IsABRT(user_data(x)) ) ] ,  
protocol_error[A,P]
(* Invalid Behaviour *) 
endproc (* Abort *)
process protocol_error[A , P ] ¡n o e x it .—
A ! make_AABRind;
P ! Out ! PUABreq(make_ABRT);
ACSE[A,P]
endproc (* protocol_error ♦)
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endspec
The reduced specification corresponding to the valid behaviour tests is first 
subdivided into three tests groups each corresponding to one of the phases of 
the operation of the protocol, and then to individual test groups according to 
specific roles or service primitives. A specification for each phase of the protocol 
can be obtained by considering the modular structure of the specification, and 
a specification for each role can be extracted by performing the reductions 
based on the PICS parameters. In other words the PICS parameters serve as 
the abstract constraints in this case. The specification given below is for the 
valid behaviour of the ACSE entity as the acceptor in the normal release phase 
of the protocol. Based on the PICS parameter ‘c3’ , all but one of the choice 
branches within the process ‘Associated’ are horizontally reduced, and their 
definitions are vertically reduced from the resultant specification.
specification ACSE_Protocol_BV_NR_AC[A,P]rnoexit 
(♦ Abstract Data Types *) 
behaviour 
ACSE[A,P] 
where
process ACSE[A,P]:noexit:= 
hide d in
d ;Normal_Rel[A,P] 
endproc (* ACSE *)
process Norraal_Rel[A,P]:noexit:= 
hide d in
Associated[A,P,d]
I[d]I d;AwaitARLSrsp[A,P] 
endproc (* Normal_Rel *)
process Associated[A,P,d]:exit:=
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P ! Input ? X ; primitive 
[IsPRLSind(x) and IsRLRQ(user_data(x))];
A ! make_ARLSind(get_RLRQ(user_data(x))); 
d;exit
endproc (* Associated *)
process AwaitARLSrsp[A,P]:noexit:=
A ? X : primitive
[IsARLSrsp(x) and (result(get_ARLSrsp(x)) eq affirmative)]; 
P ! Out ! PRLSrspA(make_RI-.RE(get_ARLSrsp(x)));
ACSE[A,P]
[]
A ? X : primitive
[IsARLSrsp(x) and (result(get_ARLSrsp(x)) eq negative)];
P ! Out ! PRLSrspR(make_RLRE(get_ARLSrsp(x)));
Normal.Rel[A,P] 
endproc (* AwaitARLSrsp *)
endspec
5.2 Behaviour Reductions On Constraint-Oriented 
Transport Protocol Specification
5.2.1 Introduction To The Transport Protocol And Its 
Base Specification
The purpose of the transport layer is to provide transparent and reliable data 
transfer between transport service users. Like all other connection-oriented 
protocols, the operation of the trans])ort protocol consists of three distinct 
phases: connection-establishment, data transfer, and connection release.
A transport service user uses T -C O N N E C T  service element to set up a 
full duplex transport connection with its peer. During transport connection 
establishment, the two users and the transport service provider can negoti­
ate the quality of the service to be provided. There are two data transfer
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P D U N am e
CR connection request
CC connection confirm
DR disconnect request
DC disconnect confirm
DT data
ED expedited data
AK data acknowledge
EA expedited acknowledge
RJ reject
ERR TP DU error
Table 5.1. Transport TPDUs
service elements, T -D A T A , and T -E X P E D IT E D  D A TA . T -D A T A  ser­
vice element delivers the data reliably between transport users. If the expe­
dited data option has been selected during connection establishment, then the 
T -E X P E D IT E D -D A T A  service element is used to convey expedited data, 
i.e., data which is not subject to normal flow control restrictions. After a 
connection has been established, either the service users or the provider may 
use the T -D IS C O N N E C T  service element to release the transport connec­
tion. Once this service is invoked, any TSDU in transit may be lost. Thus 
T-DISCONNECT is destructive. It can also be used for connection rejection 
by either the transport service user or the called user. The transport standard 
defines a total of ten TPDUs which are explained in Table 5.1.
If the underlying network is fairly reliable, then the transport protocol that 
is required to accomplish the data transfer does not need to do much work. But 
if the underlying network is unreliable, then some elaborate transport protocol 
mechanisms are required to cope with the deficiency. ISO defined three types 
of network services:
• T y p e  A  N etw ork Service: Type A network .service is es.sentially per­
fect. The fraction of i)ackets that are lost, du])licated, or garbled is 
negligible. Network resets are so rare that they can be ignored. •
• T yp e  B network service: T}q)e B network service provides network 
connections with an acceptable residual error rate l)ut an unacceptable
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signalled failuie rate. Residual errors are those that are not corrected, 
and for which the transport service is not notified. On the other hand, 
a signalled failure is a failure detected by the network layer which then 
signals the transport entity for recovery.
• T y p e  C network service: Type C network service is not reliable 
enough to be trusted at all; residual error rate is unacceptable. These 
networks do not detect the errors resulting from the loss, duplication, 
re-ordering and corruption of data.
Based on the three kinds of network services, ISO defines five transport 
classes:
• T P  0 : TP 0 provides the simplest protocol mechanism to support a Type 
A network.
• T P  1: TP 1 provides a connection with minimal service to recover from 
network signalled failures.
• T P  2: TP 2 is basically an enhancement to TP 0, and permits multiplex­
ing of transport connections, i.e., more than one transport connection can 
be provided by using a single network connection. It is used to support 
Type A networks.
• T P  3: TP 3 is basically a combination of TP 1 and TP 2. It allows an 
explicit flow control and has the ability to recover from a network failure.
It is also used to supjmrt a Type B network.
• T P  4: TP 4 is designed for Type C network service. It is the most so­
phisticated transport protocol. It must be able to handle lost, duplicate, 
and garbled packets, as well as network failures.
When a transport entity processes an event, it will call a transport proce­
dure. The transport standard defines a total of 23 procedures. Each transport 
class uses only a subset of these procedures.
A ssignm ent to a network con n ection  : This procedure, common 
to all classes, cissigns either an existing or a new connection to a new 
transport connection.
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• Transfer of TPDUs : This procedure, common to all classes, uses the 
normal and expedited data services provided by the Network layer to 
transfer TPDUs.
• Segmentation and reassembly : Because of system constraints, a 
sending transport entity (TE) may need to segment a TSDU into an 
ordered sequence of TPDUs. Reassembly is performed by the receiving 
TE.
• Connection establishment : In all transport classes but TP 4, a two 
way handshake protocol is used for connection establishment. This in­
volves the sending of a CR TPDU by the initiating TE followed by the 
sending of a CC TPDU by the responding TE.
• Implicit normal release : This procedure applies to TP 0 only. A 
transport connection is released implicitly by releasing the underlying 
network connection. No TPDUs are exchanged in this procedure.
• Error release : When a signalled failure or a disconnect indication is 
received from the network service provider, the simple protocol mecha­
nism used by TP 0 and TP 2 simply releases the transport connection 
without providing any recovery actions.
• Association of TPDUs with transport connections : Whenever a 
TE receives a TPDU from the Network layer, it will map the TPDU to 
an appropriate transport connection.
• Treatment of protocol errors : If the received TPDU can not be 
mapped to a transport connection, it is considered to be a protocol error.
• Concatenation and separation : The purpo.se of concatenation is 
to improve efficient use of a network connection. In this procedure, a 
number of TPDUs are concatenate into a single NSDU for transmission, 
and later on separated by the receiving TE.
• Explicit normal release : The explicit normal relea.se procedure is used 
by a TE to terminate a trans|)ort connection. It involves the exchange 
of DR and DC TPDUs between the TEs. •
• Numbering of DT TPDUs : T b facilitate the use of synciiroiiizcition, 
ilow control, and rese(|uenciiig procedures, it is necessary for each DT 
TPDU carry a secpience number.
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• Expedited data transfer : This procedure places expedited user data 
into the data filed of ED TPDU. All transport classes but TP 1 use the 
normal data transfer service to deliver expedited transport data.
• Reassignment after failure : When a TE receives a network sig­
nalled failure, it calls this procedure to take care of the problem. The 
result is that the transport connection is assigned to a different network 
connection. When the reassignment is achieved , the resynchronization 
procedure is invoked.
• Retention until acknowledgement of T P D U s : This procedure, 
applying to T P l, TP3, and TP4, provides a mechanism for the sending 
TE to retain copies of the TPDUs which were sent, until it receives 
an acknowledgement. Should no acknowledgement be received before 
a certain period of time has elapsed, the unacknowledged TPDUs are 
retransmitted.
• Resynchronization : This procedure is used by TP 1 and TP 3 to 
restore a transport connection upon receipt of an N.RESETindication 
from the Network layer.
• Frozen references : This procedure is used to prevent re-use of 
source/destination references because the TPDUs associated with the 
old references may still exists somewhere in the network.
• Multiplexing and demultiplexing of transport connections : The
multiplexing procedure allows multiple transport connections to share a 
single network connection. The receiving TE must perform demultiplex­
ing.
• Explicit flow control : This procedure is used to regulate the flow of 
DT TPDUs between the TEs. This flow control is independent of the 
flow control present in the Network layer.
• Checksum : This procedure is mandatory for the CR TPDU which 
is used during the connection establishment phase. Its use is optional 
during data transfer phase. •
• Retransmission on timeout : A sending TE uses a local retransmis­
sion timer to determine the iippropriate time to retransmit an unacknowl­
edged TPDU.
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• R esequencing : This procedure is used to sort any misordering of DT 
TPDUs which may be caused by the underlying network.
• In activ ity  control : This procedure deals with the unsignalled termi­
nation of a network connection or the failure of the ])eer TE (half open 
connections). It is invoked upon the expiration of an inactivity timer.
• Splitting and recom bining : To achieve a higher throughput or a 
greater resilience against network failures, this procedure allows a trans­
port connection to be assigned to multiple network connections.
• T hree way handshake conn ection  establishm ent : Unlike other 
transport classes which use a two way handshake for connection estab­
lishment, TP 4 uses a three way handshake. The only addition is that 
after receiving a CC, the initiator must respond with DT (ED) or AK 
(R.J) TPDUs.
The transport base protocol specification considered in this study is the 
constraint-oriented specification given in [49]. It describes the transport pro­
tocol, (Classes 0, 1, 2, 3) using the formal description techniciue LOTOS. Full 
account is taken of the multiplicity aspects of the protocol, and the behaviour 
of a never terminating transport entity capable of supporting multiple connec­
tions, is described. Encoding related behaviour specification and data types 
are also included.
According to the definition of the specification, some of the component 
processes describe constraints that apply to, and depend upon, the behaviour 
of the protocol entity at only one of the two service service boundaries (i.e., 
transport and network service l)oundaries). This class of constraints are re­
ferred to as service constraints, whilst the term protocol constraints refer to 
those which are described by the other components. The service constraints 
ensure, for instance, that the identification of a connection by means of a con­
nection endpoint identifier is unique within the scope of any given address. 
Since the provision of multiple connections, and encoding related behaviour is 
not an immediate concern while deriving the abstract test cases, some transfor­
mations have been applied to the base specification, in order to eliminate the 
behaviour related to the provision of multiple connections and TPDU encoding. 
The resulting structure of the base specification is as follows:
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specification TransportProtocolEntity[t,n]
(tpeo : TPEOptions):noexit
(* Global Type Definitions ♦)
behaviour
[Conform(tpeo)] -> TPEntity[t,n](tpeo) 
where
(* Local Type Definitions *)
process TPEntity[t,n](tpeo:TPEOptions):noexit: 
TPEConnections[t,n](tpeo) 
endproc (* TPEntity *)
A formal data type is provided for the implementor’s declaration of classes 
and options that are defined in the conformance clause of the protocol. A 
boolean-valued function (C onform ) is applied to the value of this parame­
ter, that determines whether or not the value satisfies the static conformance 
requirements of the standard. The process ‘TPEntity’ sjjecifies the valid be­
haviour of transport protocol entities. This process describes the relationship 
between provision of transport connections and usage of network connections 
by instantiating the process named ‘TPEConnections’ .
The further decomposition of the protocol constraints, represented by the 
process TPEConnections, exploits the usage of internal gates. The form of 
the definition of TPEConnections, and the design of event structures at the 
internal gates, are aimed at facilitating the representation of distinct protocol 
constraints by distinct processes.
process TPEConnections[t,n](tpeo:TPEOptions):noexit:= 
hide p,a,d,s in
TSTP[t,p,a,d,s,n](tpeo)
I[p,a,d,s]I
TPNS[p,a,d,s,n] 
endproc (♦ TPEConnections *)
At p TPDU transfers are described, together with related information. The 
events at p have the following structure:
p?cl:Class?d:Dir?c:Copy?tpdu:ETPDU?err:TPErr
• chClass is the protocol class in which the TPDU is handled.
• d:Dir tells whether the TPDU is transmitted or received.
• c:Copy tells whether or not the TPDU is considered a duplicate.
• tpdmETPDU is the TPDU to be transferred.
• err:TPErr significant for received TPDUs, qualifies protocol errors.
The internal gates a and d facilitate the formal representation of assignment 
to an existing network connection. At a (re)assignment to network connec­
tion, and at d deassignment from network connection occurs. The information 
passed at a consists of network connection ownership, and parameters as de­
termined upon successful connection establishment.
a? own:NC0?ncp:NCPar
The information passed at d consists of a qualifier indicating whether or not 
the network connection is to be disconnected.
d?w:Deassign
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The reason for the internal gate s consists in transferring the information 
¿ibout occurrences of a reset of a network connection to the transport entity. 
There is no event structure defined for this gate.
Process ‘TSTP’ specifies the constraints that refer to the provision of trans­
port connections, i.e., class and o])tions negotiation, segmenting and reassem­
bling, flow control, connection release, splitting and recombining; while process 
‘TPNS’ specifies the constraints that refer to the usage of network connections 
including concatenation and separation, usage of network expedited.
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The process ‘TSTP’ accesses the network service boundary in order to pro­
vide the TPDU acknowledgement by receipt confirmation option. The defini­
tion of TSTP includes the instantiation of the process ‘TCs’ that formulates 
the constraints local to a transport connection, and TCNAccess which is an 
auxiliary process by means of which the network service access by transport 
connection instances is restricted to the interactions of their concern (TPDU 
acknowledgement by the Receipt Confirmation option by the Class 1 transport 
connection instances).
process TSTP[t,p,a,d,s,n](tpeo : TPEOptions)rnoexit:= 
hide r in
TCs[t,p,a,d,s,r,n](tpeo)
|[p]|
TCNAccess[p,d,n] 
endproc (♦ TSTP ♦)
The internal gate r is introduced to indicate the release of a transport connec­
tion. Any interaction at r consists of the reason why the connection is released, 
which is needed for the release procedures.
r?w:RelReason
The constraints on the usage of network connections can be formulated 
locally to a network connection. Process ‘TPNS’ therefore consists of successive 
instances of process ‘NC’ .
process TPNS[p,a,d,n]:noexit:= 
hide dd in
NC [p,a,d,n,dd]
I[dd] I
dd;TPNS [p,a,d,n] 
endproc (* TPNS *)
5.2.2 Behaviour Reductions
In this section the slicing approach is a|)plied to a real base specification de­
veloped by protocol experts in the constraint oriented style. The behaviour
reductions are performed based on the test suite hierarchy shown in Figure 
5.3, which is obtained from the test suite developed for transport protocol 
Class 2, within the CTS-WAN Project [50]. Due to the size of the base specifi­
cation, only a part of the TSS^s considered, and our aim is to obtain a separate 
protocol specification describing the behaviour of Class 2 protocol entity during 
the release of a transport connection.
Since the base specification given in [49] defines the behaviour of all classes 
but Class 4, the first reduced specification corresponds to the behaviour of 
the Class 2 transport protocol entity. Among the 23 transport procedures 
explained above, the following are the ones that are applicable to Class 2 
protocol entities.
• Assignment to a network connection,
• Transfer of TPDUs,
• Segmentation and reassembly,
• Connection establishment,
• Error release,
• Association of TPDUs with transport connections,
• Treatment of protocol errors,
• Concatenation and sej^aration
• Explicit normal release,
• Numbering of DT TPDUs,
• Expedited data transfer (with normal network data transfer service),
• Multiplexing and demultiplexing,
• Explicit flow control.
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Since Class 2 protocol operates on Type A network service where network 
resets are ignored, this fact must be reflected in the definition of the process 
‘TPEConnections’ and the subsequent behaviour specification by dropping the 
internal gate s, which happens to be diagonal reduction.
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Figure 5.3. Test Suite Structure for Transport Protocol Class 2
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process TPEConnections[t,n](tpeo:TPEOptions): noexit: = 
hide p,a,d in
TSTP[t,p ,a ,d](tpeo)
I[p,a,d]I
TPNS[p,a,d,n]
endproc (* TPEConnections *)
As a consequence of this, the actual and corresponding formal gate parame­
ters of the two instantiated processes, ‘TSTP’ and ‘TPNS’ , have undergone a 
diagonal reduction process. The arguments of the parallel operator no longer 
contain the s gate. By the way the gate n in the instantiation of the process 
‘TSTP ’ is dropped because a Cdass 2 protocol entity does not need to access 
the network service boundary in order to acknowledge data by the receipt con­
firmation option. Accordingly, the instantiation of the process ‘TCNAccess’ is 
horizontally reduced from the body of the process ‘TSTP’ . Since it is not used 
elsewhere in the specification, its definition is also vertically reduced.
process TSTP[t,p,a,d](tpeoiTPEOptions):noexit:= 
hide r in
TCs[t,p,a,d,r](tpeo) 
endproc (* TSTP *)
Another diagonal reduction is a])])lied to the event structure at gate p. 
Since only Class2 ju'otocol is sjjecified, there is no need to include a separate 
event to indicate the class of the particular transport connection. So the events 
at gate p in the resultant specification have the following structure:
p?d:Dir?c:Copy?tpdu:ETPDU?err:TPErr
Process ‘TCs’ , consists of the instantiation of the process ‘TC” which actu­
ally describes the behaviour of the transport protocol entity. According to the 
definition of the process given below, one connection has to be released (by the 
process ‘T C ’ performing an interaction at gate dd and exiting), in order for 
the next one to be sujjported by the trans|)ort entity.
process TCs[t,p,a,d,r](tpeo:TPEOptions):noexit:= 
hide dd in
TC[t,p,a,d,r,dd](tpeo)
I[dd]I
ddjTCs[t,p,a,d,r](tpeo) 
endproc (♦ TCs ♦)
Protocol constraints specified by the process ‘T C ’ are classified as follows:
1. Service constraints, i.e, constraints at t only, are specified by TCEP.
2. Relationship between TSPs and TPDUs, specified by TSPTPDU,
3. Normal exchange of TPDUs between the two peer entities, specified by 
TPDUFlowProcedures independently at events at t and error recovery 
procedures,
4. (re)assignment of the transport connection to one (or more) network 
connection(s), specified by TCA. This process specifies also connection 
release that follows the expircition of the reassignment/resynchronization 
timers.
5. Connection release, specified by T(JRelease,
6. Exception handling, specified by TCE. This comprises error recovery pro­
cedures, specified by NS Error Recovery, and treatment of protocol errors, 
specified by Protocol Error Handling.
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process TC[t,p,a,d,r,dd](tpeo:TPEOptions):exit:= 
TCEP[t](TSCallingRole) [] TCEP[t](TSCalledRole) 
ICt]|
(hide k in
(TSPTPDU[t,p,k] [> exit 
I[p,k]I
TPDUFlowProcedures[p,k](tpeo) [> exit)
I[t,p,k]I
TCA[t,p,a,d,r,k,dd](tpeo)
I[t,p,d,r,k]I
(TCReleaseCt,p,r,dd]
I [p, r] I
TCE[p,d,r,k,n] [> exit)) 
endproc (* TC *)
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process TCE[p,d,r,k,n]rnoexit:=
NSErrorRecovery[p,d ,k ,n]
|[p,d]|
ProtocolErrorHandling[p,d,r] 
endproc (* TCE *)
The internal gate k, introduced by the definition of TC, serves the purpose of 
separating concerns in the description of error I'ecovery mechanisms, particu­
larly relating to retention of TPDUs until acknowledgement and retransmis­
sion.
The procedures relating to normal flow of TPDUs between the two peer 
entities, described by the process ‘TPDUFlowProcedures’ is further structured 
as follows:
process TPDUFlowProcedures[p,k](tpeo:TPEOptions):noexit:= 
(SupportedOptions[p](tpeo)
|[p]|
TPNegotiations[p]
|[p]|
TPDUNumbering[p] 
l[p]|
ExplicitFlowControl[p]
|[p]l
Checksum[p])
|[p]l
DTRetransmission[p,k] 
endproc (* TPDUFlowProcedures *)
Each instantiated process descril)es the required actions to be carried out dur­
ing the execution of the respective trans])ort procedure.
Various types of reductions are performed in the process ‘T C ’ . Since there 
are no error recovery procedures specified in the Class 2 protocol, the internal 
gate k which is introduced to serve the purpose of sej^arating concerns in the 
description of such procedures, can Ije dropped. Additionally, horizontal re­
duction is applied to the instantiation of the process ‘ NS Error Recovery’ within 
the process TCE. This further results in the vertical reduction of the definition 
of the process ‘ NS Error Recovery’ from the specification.
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process TC[t,p,a,d,r,dd](tpeo:TPEOptions):exit:=
TCEP[t](TSCallingRole) [] TCEP[t](TSCalledRole) 
l[t]|
C(TSPTPDU[t,p] [> exit 
|[p]l
TPDUFlowProcedures[p](tpeo) [> exit)
|[t,p]|
TCA[t,p,a,d,r,dd](tpeo)
I[t,p,d,r]I
(TCRelease[t,p ,r ,dd]
|[p,r]|
TCE[p,d,r,n] [> exit)) 
endproc (♦ TC *)
process TCE[p,d,r,n]rnoexit:=
ProtocolErrorHandling[p,d ,r] 
endproc (* TCE *)
Since checksum and retransmission procedures are not applicable in Class 
2, horizontal reduction is applied to their instantiations within the process 
‘TPDUFlowProcedures’ , and the respective process definitions are vertically 
reduced from the resulting specification.
process TPDUFlowProceduresCp,k](tpeo:TPEOptions):noexit:= 
SupportedOptions[p](tpeo)
|[p]|
TPNegotiations [p]
|[p]|
TPDUNumbering Cp]
ICp]l
ExplicitFlowControl[p] 
endproc (* TPDUFlowProcedures *)
Since there is no retransmission procedure, there does not exist any possibility 
of receiving a duplicate TPDU, and the interaction at gate p related to the 
reception of duplicate TPDUS (i.e., ?c;Coi)y) can be dicigonally reduced.
The behaviour of the base protocol in response to invalid inputs is specified 
l)y the process ‘ ProtocolErrorllandling’ . So, valid behaviour specification can
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be obtained by vertically reducing this process, and the process ‘TCE’ which 
instantiates only this process. So, the resulting structure of the process ‘T C ’ 
is as follows:
process TC[t,p,a,d,r,dd](tpeo:TPEOptions):exit:=
TCEP[t](TSCallingRole) [] TCEP[t](TSCalledRole)
|[t]|
((TSPTPDU[t,p] [> exit 
ICp]l
TPDUFlowProcedures[p](tpeo) [> exit)
I [t,p] I
TCA[t,p,a,d,r,dd](tpeo)
I[t,p,d,r]I 
TCRelease[t,p,r,dd]) 
endproc (* TC ♦)
Additionally, the event structure at the p gate is diagonally reduced one step 
more by dropping the value with type TPErr, which qualifies incoming TPDUs 
for protocol errors. The resulting event structure at gate p is as as follows:
p?d:Dir?tpdu:ETPDU
The last step in behaviour reductions is to obtain the specification of the 
Class 2 transport protocol during connection release phase. The specification 
defining the connection release procedure can be obtained by performing some 
horizontal reductions within the process ‘T(J’ , resulting in the final form given 
below.
process TC[t,p,a,d,r,dd](tpeo:TPEOptions):exit:=
TCEP[t](TSCallingRole) [] TCEP[t](TSCalledRole)
I[t,p,a,d,r]I
((TSPTPDU[t,p] [> dd;exit)
I[t,p,d,s,r]I 
(TCRelease[t,p ,r ,dd])) 
endproc (* TC ♦)
The release of a transport connection is initiated under any of the following 
cases:
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• Transport connection refusal by responder, following an internal decision.
• Network connection failure, because error recovery and reassignment is 
not made use of in Class 2.
• The internal decision of releasing the transport connection upon detection 
of a protocol error which is part of the invalid behaviour.
• Transport connection release by the transport service user.
The release at the transport service interface, in relationship to events at gate 
r, is described by TCRelS, whereas the ordering of events at the entity internal 
gates, as determinetl by the peer-to-peer release procedures, is described by
TCRelP.
process TCReleaseCt,p,r,dd]:exit:=
TCRelS[t,r,dd]
|[r]|
TCRelP[p,r,dd] 
endproc (* TCRelease *)
The following constraints are described by TCRelS:
• if the transport connection is to be released with no previous execution 
of a T.CONNECT primitive by the entity, then no service primitive is 
executed by the entity.
• Otherwise,
-  T.DISCONNECT primitive is to be executed, and
— the release indicator passed at gate r shall be User it and only if a 
T.DISCONNECTrecpiest was previously executed.
process TCRelS[t,r,dd]:exit:= 
r?w:RelReason;dd;exit 
[]
t?tc:TSP[IsTCON(tc)] ;
(r?rr:RelReason[rr ne Normal];TCEPRelease[t]
□
t?tdr:TSP[IsTDISreq(tdr)] ; 
r!Normal of RelReason;dd;exit) 
endproc (* TCRelS *)
The service constraints related to the release of a connection are specified by 
the process ‘TCEPRelease’ .
process TCEPRelease[t]:exit:= 
t?tsp:TSP[IsTDIS(tsp)];exit 
endproc (* TCEPRelease *)
TCRelP describes the connection release procedures but with no concern 
for the interactions with the TS user. These procedures define constraints 
relating to the following cases:
• Connection refusal by responder (TCRespRefusal),
• Release at responder (TCRespRelP),
• Release at initiator (TCInitRelP),
• Connection Release due to ])rotocol error.
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process TCRelP[p,r,dd]:exit:= 
p?cl:Class!Recv?CR:ETPDU[IsCR(CR)] ; 
(TCRespRefusalP[p,r,dd](cl)
[]
TCRespRelP[p,r,dd](cl)
[]
Class2ErrorRelease[p,r,dd])
[]
p?cl:Class!Send?CR:ETPDU[IsCR(CR)]; 
(TCInitRelP[p,r,dd](cl)
[]
Class2ErrorRelease Cp,r ,dd])
□
r?w:RelReason;dd;exit 
(* Release due to protocol_error *) 
endproc (* TCRelP *)
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Since we eliminated the interaction related to the class of the protocol (i.e., 
?cl:Class) previously, there is no need to pass this value as parameter to the 
instantiated processes. This is another type of diagonal reduction which is 
applied to the formal and corresponding actual process parameters. After 
eliminating the branch related to the release of transport connection due to 
protocol error (since we deal only with valid behaviour), the resulting body of 
the process ‘TCRelP’ is:
process TCRelP[p,r,dd]:exit:= 
p!Recv?CR:ETPDU[IsCR(CR)] ;
(TCRespRefusalP[p,r,dd]
[]
TCRespRelP Cp,r ,dd]
C]
Class2ErrorRelease[p,r,dd])
[]
p!Send?CR:ETPDU[IsCR(CR)] ;
(TCInitRelP[p,r,dd]
[]
Class2ErrorRelease[p,r ,dd]) 
endproc (* TCRelP ♦)
Following is the final reduced specification related to connection release 
procedure under the valid behaviour category of Class 2 transport protocol.
process TCRespRefusalP[p,r,dd]:exit:= 
choice etp:ETPDU,drr:DRReason []
[IsDR(DR) and (drr IsReasonOf DR)] -> 
p!Send!etp;
(AwaitDC[p,r]
III
r?w:RelReason;dd;exit)
[]
Class2ErrorRelease[p,r,dd] 
endproc (* TCRespRefusalP *)
process TCRespRelP[p,r,dd]:exit:= 
choice ecc:ETPDU [] [IsCC(ecc)] ->
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p !Send!ecc;
TCDataRelease[p,r ,dd]
[]
Class2ErrorRelease[p,r ,dd] 
endproc (♦ TCRespRelP *)
process TCInitRelP[p,r,dd]:exit:= 
p!Recv?DR:ETPDU[(IsDR(DR) or IsER(DR))]; 
r?w:RelReason;dd;exit 
[]
p !Recv ?CC:ETPDU[IsCC(CC)]; 
TCDatciRelease [p, r , dd]
[]
Class2ErrorRelease[p,r,dd] 
endproc (* TCInitRelP *)
process TCDataRelease[p,r,dd]:exit:= 
r?w:RelReason;Release[p,r ,dd]
[]
Class2ErrorRelease[p,r ,dd] 
endproc (♦ TCDataRelease *)
process Release[p,r,dd]:exit:= 
ExplicitRelease[p,r,dd] 
endproc (* Release *)
process ExplicitRelease[p,r,dd]:exit:= 
choice edr:ETPDU [] [IsDR(edr)] -> 
p!Send!edr;
p!Recv?et;ETPDU[(lsDR(et) or IsDC(et))]; 
dd;exit
endproc (* ExplicitRelease *)
process Class2ErrorRelease[p,r,dd]:exit:= 
r?rr:RelReason[rr eq NoReass or (rr eq NoResyn)]; 
dd;exit
endproc (* Class2ErrorRelease *)
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process AwaitDCCp,r,dd]:exit:= 
p !Recv?dct:ETPDU[IsDC(dct)] ; 
r ?w:RelReason;dd;exit 
endproc (♦ AwaitDC ♦)
Chapter 6
TEST DESIGN USING BASE AN D  
FUNCTIONAL SPECIFICATIONS
As defined in Chapter 1, TTCN is the standardized specification language of 
test suites. It combines a tree notation for dynamic behaviour with a tabular 
representation of various language constructs [51]. An abstract test suite (ATS) 
in TTCN consists of 4 parts:
• Test suite overview : The test suite overview section first names the 
test suite and defines its context with respect to the appropriate lUT 
protocol standard, PICS, and test methods. It describes the structure of 
the abstract test suite and provides an index of its test cases.
• D eclarations: An abstract test suite is composed of objects of many 
types, such as timers, PCOs, messages. Declarations of such objects are 
the next major component of a test suite specified in TTCN.
• Constraints: In the constraints section of an ATS, particular data val­
ues are specified for PDU fields and ASP parameters as used in the 
constrained test events in the dynamic behaviour part of the test suite.
• D ynam ic B ehaviour: The dynamic behaviour section of a TTCN ab­
stract test suite comprises the main body of the ATS including the test 
cases, test steps and default behaviours.
A abstract test suite in TTCN can l>e generated from protocol specifications 
by following the sti’ ps given below.
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1. Generation of the declarations i)art. Largely, this can be done by syntac­
tic transformations.
2. Generation of base constraints using the PDU and ASP definitions.
3. Generation of modified constraints.
4. Generation of test cases.
5. Representing the selected test cases according to the syntax and seman­
tics of TTCN.
6. Completion of the test suite overview.
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This chapter is about the applications of the chart based test design 
methodology introduced in Chapter 2 within the perspective of testable spec­
ifications developed in the previous chapters. Test cases are derived from the 
respective base and functional specifications of INRES and ACSE protocols. 
Section 6.1 applies the methodology to base specifications, and Section 6.2 in­
cludes some important results on the generation of test cases from the reduced 
specifications.
The results given in this chapter are obtained by the computer-aided soft­
ware tool LOTEST [27] which implements the test design methodology dis­
cussed in Chapter 2 Section 2.6 to derive test cases from LOTOS specifications. 
LOTEST is an interactive tool and includes a number of modules that facili­
tate various steps of test design. It has been tleveloped on SUN workstations 
using the X_Window programming environment.
The backbone of the LOTEST environment is the Ibrmal notation of EFSM- 
Chart which has a mathematically precise semantics, and simple representation 
of data flow. The first step applied to a LOTOS specification is compilation. 
The compiler does lexical syntactic and semantic analysis, and produces an 
internal representation of the LOTOS specification in the Prolog clause form. 
After compilation, the chart generator is activated, which translates the inter­
mediate form of the specification into a chart by bottom-up synthesis. Then 
input for data flow graph and test cases can be generated. There are four in­
teractive tools: c too l, d fgtoo l, ed ittest, and testgen. The chart is displayed 
in the form of a finite state machine by ctool. The dfgtool displays the data 
flow graph with automatic blocking and offers several facilities for block merg­
ing. Edittest is u.sed to help the test designer to interactively go through the
CHAPTER 6. TEST DESIGN USING BASE A ND F UNCTION A L SPECIFICATIONSl 06
test cases and identify uninteresting ones. It is also used to eliminate redun­
dant assignment and predicates from the test cases with the help of the data 
flow graph. Finally testgen is for selecting the unparameterized test sequences 
based on the data flow information.
6.1 Test Generation Prom Base Specifications
Before the actual test generation procedure can start, a LOTOS specification 
must be normalized in order to identify the control flow and data flow within 
the specification. As an EFSM representation, the chart reveals the control 
structure of the specification. The size of the chart generated depends on the 
size of the specification as well as how it is structured. For example, the chart 
generated from the ACSE base specification consists of 141 states and 194 
transitions, while the charts obtained from the INRES Initiator and Respon­
der protocol specifications contain 36 states, 50 transitions, and 26 states, 34 
transitions, respectively.
Once the control structure of the specification is obtained, test cases can be 
generated by using the transition-tour method [52]. As explained in Chapter 2 
the algorithm proposed in [30] generates the test cases from the EFSM-Chart 
by taking nondeterminism into consideration. From their respective charts, the 
algorithm generates 53 test cases for ACSE, and 16 test cases for the Initiator 
base specifications.
The generated test cases must be inspected in order to detect any infeasi­
bilities and redundancy. The test case generation algorithm may also generate 
uninteresting test cases. Analysis of test cases is done by using the interactive 
tool edittest. Edittest dis])lays the test cases in one text window, the rules 
that occur in the test case in one text window, and finally the EFSM chart in 
another text window. By editing the text windows, infeasible and uninteresting 
tests cases can be eliminated or replaced with feasible and meaningful ones. 
Out of the 53 test cases generated for the ACSE protocol, 6 test cases happened 
to be infeasible, and 17 of them found to be uninteresting and meaningless. 
When the infeasibilities have been resolved, all of them l)ecome equivalent to 
existing test cases, so they can also be considered as redundant. In the case of 
the Initiator protocol, none of the test ca.ses are found to be infeasible, but 3 
of them are redundant test cases, i.e., their functions can be achieved by using
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others.
The last step in the analysis of the generated test cases is the elimination 
of unnecessary assignments and predicates, which is referred to as test case 
reduction. Most of the test cases generated from the ACSE base specification 
contain redundant assignment statements which have no effect on the function­
ality of the tester, and they have been dropped. The assignment statements 
in the test cases result from value passing in LOTOS specifications due to 
interprocess communications and process instantiations. The following is an 
example of the test cases that contain redundant assignments. Given in the 
from of the rules of the chart, it tests the lUT for the correct implementation of 
the abnormal release procedure in the ‘Associated State’ by stimulating it with 
a P-U.ABORTrequest primitive. The assignment statements ‘c(22):=calling’ 
and ‘c(19):=c(22)’ have no effect on the functionality of the test case, so they 
can be dropped.
< A ?x (9 ) :p r im it iv e ,188 ,191 ,3 ,tru e ,[IsA A S C req(x (9 )) ] ,e ,e > ,
<P! Out!PC0Nreq(make_AARQ(get_AASCreq(x(9))) ) : p r im itiv e ,
1 9 1 ,1 9 2 ,7 ,t ru e ,tru e ,e ,e > ,
<P! Input?x( 4 ) :p r im it iv e ,192 ,196 ,11 ,tru e ,
[and(and(IsPCONcnfA(x(4)) , IsAA R E(user_data(x(4))) ) ,  
eq(resu lt(get_A A R E (u ser_data(x(4)) ) ) , a ccep ted ))] ,e ,e > ,
<A!make_AASCcnfU(get_AARE(user_data(x(4)) ) ) ,1 9 6 ,2 0 7 ,2 6 ,
t r u e ,t r u e ,e ,e > ,
< i , 2 0 7 ,223 ,41 ,t r u e ,t r u e ,c (2 2 ) : = c a ll in g ,c (1 9 ) := c (2 2 )> ,
<P! Input?x(2 1 ) :p r im it iv e ,223 ,242 ,58 ,tru e ,
[and(IsPUABind(x(21)) , IsABRT(user_data(x(21)) ) ) ] ,e ,e > ,
<A!make_AABRind(get_ABRT(user_data(x(21)) ) ) ,2 4 2 ,2 6 5 ,7 2 ,
t r u e ,t r u e ,e ,e > ,
< i r ,2 6 5 ,1 8 8 ,7 9 ,t r u e ,t r u e ,e ,e > .
Before being represented the tests must be selected according to some user- 
defined criteria. There are two approaches to the selection of tests generated 
from base specifications. The first approach is to apply the functional test 
selection, and to base the selection process on the protocol functions identified 
by the user. In order to identify the protocol functions, the flow of data in the 
specification must be extracted. The flow of data in a LOTOS specification 
reflects how input ])iimitive parameters determine the values of the context 
variables, <uid they in turn determine the values of the output primitives
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A data flow graph (DFG) models the flow of data in the chart. Four types of 
nodes are used in DFG:
i-nodes represent input primitives, 
d-nodes represent variables and data, 
f-nodes represent ADT functions, 
o-nodes represent output primitives.
The edges of the DFG are used to represent the flow of information and labelled 
with the transition number on which the flow is achieved.
Generation of the data flow graph from the chart is performed by using 
the algorithm proposed in [30]. The when, action and assignment clauses of 
each rule in the chart are scanned statically, and various types of nodes and 
arcs are created that reveal the flow of data within the chart. Generation of 
DFG is only possible when PDUs and ASPs are explicitly identified. Also, it 
is necessary to identify operations associated with different kinds of PDUs and 
ASPs, which is achieved by processing the abstract data type definitions. The 
structure of the PDUs and ASPs must be provided by the user.
In order to identify the individual protocol functions from the data flow 
graph, it must be sliced according to some user-defined criteria. Data flow 
graph slicing is performed in two phases by using the d fgtool. The first step 
is called blocking and the second step is called merging where the criteria must 
be provided by the user based on the knowledge of the specification. Related 
to test selection, protocol functions obtained from the data flow graph must 
be tested using the test cases obtained from the chart. For this purpose, it 
is necessary to extract the transition labels of each function of the data flow 
functions. If a single test case covers all the labels in a given function, it is this 
test case which is selected, otherwise more than one test case is selected for 
full coverage. The testgen tool gets test cases from the data flow graph and 
then generates full coverage of each of the data flow functions by test cases.
In the second approach to test selection, test cases are jilaced in a test suite 
hierarchy, and a test purpose is assigned to every test case. Once the hierarchy 
and the purposes are tletermined, for each test purpose one or more test cases 
must be selected from the generated test cases. If the specification defines 
invalid and inopportune behaviour along with valid behaviour, the resulting 
test cases must be considered regarding invalid cind inopportune behaviour, as
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well.
The test suite structure and test purposes document for ACSE [47] contains 
a total of 88 test purposes. Among the 53 test cases generated from the base 
specification, 30 of them are meaningful and can be used to cover 60 of the test 
purposes. For example, the following test case represented in the rules of the 
chart satisfies the purpose of testing the lUT in state ‘AwaitAARE’ when it 
receives an A.ABORTrequest from the user. It is actually the first test purpose 
within the A C S E /B V /A R /A A  test group objective as defined in [47].
< A ?x (9 ):p r im it iv e ,188 ,191 ,3 ,tru e,[IsA A S C req(x (9 )) ] ,e ,e > ,
<P!Out!PC0Nreq(make_AARQ(get_AASCreq(x(9))) ) ,1 9 1 ,1 9 2 ,7 ,
t r u e ,t r u e ,e ,e > ,
<A?x(3) .'p rim itive , 192 ,203 ,18 ,tru e , [IsAABRreq(x(3))]  ,e ,e > ,
<P!Out!PUABreq(make_ABRT(get_AABRreq(x(3 ) ) ) ) ,2 0 3 ,2 1 2 ,3 4 ,
t r u e ,t r u e ,e ,e > ,
< ir ,2 1 2 ,1 8 8 ,4 9 ,t r u e ,t r u e ,e ,e > .
Due to the specification of invalid behaviour by using negation in selec­
tion predicates rather than specifying the related cases explicitly one test caise 
can be interpreted to cover more than one test purpose. Also, by interpreting 
some of the generated test cases in different ways according to their pream­
bles, bodies and postambles, some test cases can be interpreted to cover more 
than one test purpose. For example, the following test case which tests the 
behaviour of the ACSE protocol implementation in response to invalid inputs 
in its ‘ Unassociated’ state covers all four of the test purposes under the group 
ACSE/BI/STAO. That is, ‘not(IsAARQ(user_data(x(9))))’ is a short way of 
saying ‘ IsAARE.. or IsRLRQ.. or IsRLRE.. or IsABRT..’ .
<P! In p u t?x (9 ),1 8 8 ,1 9 0 ,2 .tru e ,
[and(IsPC0N ind(x(9)) ,not(IsA A R Q (user_data(x(9)) ) ) ) ] , e ,e> ,
<A!raake.AABRind,1 9 0 ,1 9 5 ,6 ,t r u e .tr u e , e , e> ,
<P!Out!PUABreq(make_ABRT),1 9 5 ,2 0 6 ,1 0 ,t ru e , t r u e , e , e> ,
< ir ,2 0 6 ,1 8 8 ,2 5 ,t r u e ,t r u e ,e ,e > .
Since the chart construction algorithm implemented within LOTEST treats 
the disable operator specially by creating an alternative transition not ema­
nating from every state of the chart corresponding to the disabled behaviour
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expression, but only the first state of it, some test purposes remain uncovered 
by the generated test cases.
When we consider the Initiator protocol, 14 meaningful test cases cover 
16 test purposes of the TSS&TP for INRES given in Appendix C, and 3 test 
purposes remain uncovered due to the treatment of the disable operator as 
mentioned above. For example, the test case given below satisfies the only test 
purpose under the test group IN RES/I/BIO /STAl.
< IS A P ?sp (l),2 1 5 ,1 4 9 ,1 .t r u e .t r u e ,e ,e > ,
<MSAP!MDATreq(CR),1 4 9 ,1 5 2 ,5 . t r u e ,t r u e ,e ,e ,>,
< i ,1 5 2 ,1 5 5 ,9 ,t r u e ,t r u e ,z (3 ) := s (0 ) ,z (2 ) := z (3 )> ,
<MSAP?sp(2),1 5 5 ,1 6 0 ,1 3 ,tru e ,
[and(an d(isM D A T ind(sp(2)),not(isD R (data(sp(2)) ) ) ) ,
n o t ( is C C (d a t a (s p (2 ) ) ) ) ) ] , 
e ,e> ,
< is ,1 5 5 ,1 6 1 ,1 4 ,t r u e ,t r u e ,e ,e > ,
< i r , 160 ,155 ,17 ,t r u e ,t r u e ,e ,z ( 2 ) := z (2 )> ,
< 1 ,1 6 1 ,1 6 6 ,1 9 ,[z (2 )= = 4 ].t r u e ,e ,e > ,
<ISAP! ID IS ind ,166,171,22 .t r u e ,t r u e ,e ,e > ,
< i r , 171,2 1 5 ,2 7 ,t r u e ,tr u e ,e ,e > .
Since INRES protocol ignores any invalid and inojiportune behaviour and does 
not change its state, test cases for such behaviour must be augmented with 
extra sequences that bring the lUT in its initial state. This makes the tests 
for invalid/inopportune behaviour longer.
Events and assignments in a test case comprise the dynamic behaviour of 
the test case. The flow of control is sequential except when there is a spon­
taneous transition. Before representing the test cases, except internal events, 
all other events are inverted, which means that input events are converted to 
output events and vice versa.
Any constraints on the initial values of A.SPs, PDUs and other substructures 
are defined as base constraints. Each test case imposes other constraints which 
are called dynamic constraints or modified constraints. Default values and 
other information that are unchanged in many constraints are considered in 
base constraints. Base constraints can be modified by re-specifying a number 
of fields. For each A.SP and PDU two ba.se constraints are defined, one for
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input events and another for output events.
When test case generation is based on base specifications, usually large 
number of test cases are produced where many of them are uninteresting or 
meaningless. This necessitates the selection of the generated tests based on 
some user-defined criteria. As mentioned above, test selection is either done 
by using functional analysis, or hierarchical test selection is employed. If hier­
archical test selection is employed, an alternative way is to generate the test 
cases from functionally reduced specifications. By this way selection of the 
tests can be done before actually generating them, while at the same time the 
number of generated test cases can be minimized.
6.2 Test Generation From Functional Specifications
Once the base specification is sliced into reduced specifications, test cases can 
be generated, and depending on the level of subdivision, a reduced specifica­
tion provides several test cases that represent the corresponding test group. 
The steps involved in the application of the methodology are almost the same 
as in the case of base specifications. But, as discussed above test selection 
step is omitted, and the technique used in the generation of test cases may 
be changed. Regarding the test case reduction, some reductions may not be 
needed any more. The steps involved in the generation of test cases from 
functional specifications is outlined in the following subsections.
6.2.1 Chart Generation
The first step is again normalization, i.e., chart generation. This time, since the 
specifications have much smaller sizes than the original base specification, the 
corresponding charts are also smaller in size. Table 6.1 and 6.2 give the sizes 
of the resulting charts for every functional specification of ACSE and INRES 
in terms of the number of transitions and states.
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Func. Spec. O f States #  O f Trans.
I/B V /C E 11 13
I/B V /D T 15 19
I/B V /D C 3 3
I/BIO/STAO 3 4
I/B IO /STA l 4 5
I/BIO/STA2 1 5
I/BIO/STA3 5 6
R /B V /C E 6 6
R /B V /D T 9 11
R /B V /D C 3 3
R/BIO/STAO 3 4
R /B IO /STA l 3 3
R/BIO/STA2 4 5
Table 6.1. Chart Sizes Of Functional Specifications For INRES
Func. Spec. O f States #  O f Trans.
B V /A E /I 12 15
B V /A E /R 10 12
B V /N R /R Q 20 24
B V /N R /A C 9 10
B V /A R /A A 3 3
B V /A R /P U A 3 .3
B V /A R /P P A 3 .3
Bl/STAO 4 4
BI/.STAl 7 9
B1/STA2 4 4
B1/STA3 12 14
B1/STA4 4 4
BI/STA5 8 9
BI/STA6 4 4
BI/STA7 11 12
Table 6.2. Chart Sizes Of Functional Specifications For ACSE
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Func. Spec. ^  O f Test Cases O f P urposes C overed
I/B V /C E 3 3
I/B V /D T 5 5
I/B V /D C 1 4
I/BIO/STAO 3 4
I/B IO /STA l - -
I/BIO/STA2 - -
I/BIO/STA3 - -
R /B V /C E 1 1
R /B V /D T 3 3
R /B V /D C 1 3
R/BIO/STAO 1 1
R /B IO /ST A l - -
R /BIO /STA2 - -
Table 6.3. Test Cases Generated From Functional Specifications Of INRES
6.2.2 Generation O f Test Cases
The next step is the application of the test case generation algorithm to the 
charts derived from each of the reduced specifications. Tables 6.3 and 6.4 
contain some results related to the test cases generated from the functional 
specifications of INRES and ACSE, respectively. As seen from the data, most 
of the test cases are useful in the sense that they can be used to test for the 
satisfaction of the purposes defined in the related TSS&TP documents. Since 
the test cases consist only of test bodies, one test case may be used to test 
for the satisfaction of more than one test purpose by prefixing it with different 
preambles. This is usually the case for state-oriented test groups where each 
test purpose corresponds to a particular state of the protocol machine. The 
test group IN RES/I/BV/D C is an example of this kind of test group.
The algorithm proposed in [30] and implemen^d in LOTEST requires a 
fully connected state-machine in order to derive the test cases. Related to 
separate phases and states of the protocols, the EFSMs of the reduced specifi­
cations need not be strongly connected, i.e., their initial and final states may be 
different, in order to apply the method implemented in LOTEST to such spec­
ifications, virtual transitions must be added from each final state to the initial 
state of the charts. In other words, the final states must be converted to initial
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Func. Spec.
B V /A E /I
B V /A E /R
B V /N R /R Q
B V /N R /A C
B V /A R /A A
B V /A R /P U A
B V /A R /P P A
BI/STAO
BI/STAl
BI/STA2
BI/STA3
BI/STA4
BI/STA5
BI/STA6
BI/STA7
^  Of Test Cases
4 
3
5 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
3 
1
2
1
9
#  Of Purposes Covered.
6
3
4 
2 
6 
6 
6 
4 
8 
4
12
4
8
4
8
Table 6.4. Test Cases Generated From Functional Specifications Of ACSE
states. In spite of this, .some entries in the table for INRES, such as the ones 
corresponding to IN RE S/I/B IO /STAl, IN R E S/R /B I0/STA 2 test groups, are 
empty. The reason behind this is the fact that INRES jjrotocol ignores in­
valid and inopportune test events. Since no state change occurs in response 
to invalid/inopportune behaviour, the fully connectedness reciuirement of the 
algorithm is violated, and no test cases are generated.
In order to overcome this proljhun, a dilFerent approach can be adopted 
while generating the test cases, and a straightforward majjping from the chart 
to TTCN can be applied. The EFSM can be mapped to a tree describing 
the possible sequences of input and output events. Test cases can be derived 
directly from the EFSMs representing the reduced specifications by developing 
the tree of possible valid sequences while each branch of the tree forms a sep­
arate test case. This tree can I)e described in the standardized test notation 
TTCN, and ‘ Pass’ verdicts can be attached to the nodes corresponding to the 
final states of the EFSM.. The test cases are specified from the point of view 
of the tester, while the specification describes the l)ehaviour of the lUT; there­
fore the direction of events must be inverted. Input events for the lUT are 
output events for the tester, out))ut events sent l)y the lUT are input events.
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i.e., receive events for the tester. For each receive event for the tester an alter­
native OTHERWISE event has to be specified with verdict ‘Fail’ in order to 
deal with unforeseen responses from the HIT, and with verdicts ‘ Inconclusive’ 
to deal with spontaneous transitions that result from non-determinism within 
the HIT. Since there is no inherent directionality in LOTOS interactions, input 
and output events must be made explicit in the specifications. As mentioned 
at the end of Chapter 2, this can be achieved by adding extra event structures 
to the external gates of the specification.
6.2.3 Test Case Reductions
The generated test cases must again be inspected for any redundancy with re­
spect to the assignments and predicates. When we consider the ACSE protocol, 
it is observed that test cases derived from the reduced specifications still con­
tain redundant assignments. This is due to the absence of diagonal reductions 
on the parameters of the processes comprising the body of the ACSE specifica­
tion. For example, the test case given below in TTCN form is generated from 
the reduced specification corresponding to the test group A C SE /B V /N R /R Q . 
It tests the correct operation of the HIT during the normal release procedure 
by stimulating it an A.RELEASErequest primitive and accepting the release of 
the association. Since the assignment statements ‘ c(2 ):= c(6 )’ , and ‘c(6 ):= c(7 )’ 
are redundant, they can be eliminated from the test case without disrupting 
its functionality. The preamble contains the necessary actions to put the lUT 
in the desired state.
+ Preamble
A! ARLSreq 
P? PRLSreq 
c(6)=c(7) 
c(2)=c(6)
P! PRLScnfA 
A? ARLScnfA 
? OTHERWISE 
? OTHERWISE
Cl
C2
C3
C4 Pass
Fail
Fail
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As stated in the previous section, the presence of the assignment statements 
in the rules of the chart is mainly due to value passing in interprocess synchro­
nizations and process instantiations in LOTOS specifications. When diagonal 
reductions are performed on the instantiations and definitions of processes by 
removing some of the formal and corresponding actual process parameters, test 
case reductions carried out on the tests derived from base specifications might 
become irrelevant. In such cases, test case reduction step can also be skipped.
6.2.4 Infeasible Test Cases
When we consider the generated test cases with respect to infeasibility, it is 
observed that none of the test cases obtained from the reduced specifications 
of the ACSE protocol contain any infeasibilities. This is mainly due to the 
fact that, the test cases derived from functional specifications define the only 
the body of the actual tests to be executed on the specification without the 
specification of the preambles. Since the reason behind the infeasibility of a test 
case is an assignment statement within the preamble which causes a predicate 
to always evaluate to false; by prefixing the generated test bodies with suitable 
preambles, feasible test cases can be obtained. For examjjle, the following test 
case given in TTCN form can be made feasible by assigning a proper value to 
the variable ‘ c(6)’ in the preamble.
+ Preamble
A ! ARLSreq Cl
P? PRLSreq C2
P! PRLSind C3
A? ARLSind C4
[c(6)=called]
A ! ARLSrsp C5
P? PRLSrspA C6 Pass
? OTHERWISE Fail
? OTHERWISE Fail
? OTHERWISE Fail
Chapter 7
CONCLUSIONS
A design trajectory that results in testable protocol specifications is proposed, 
and applied to some protocol specifications written in the formal description 
technique LOTOS. The steps followed are the development of formal base spec­
ifications, systematic derivation of functional specifications from the base spec­
ifications, and test design from functional specifications.
Base specifications are develoj)ed in a hierarchical manner by defining the 
implementation options as parameters, and including the behaviours that 
must be tested. Several techniques are proposed that can be used in de­
veloping formal base specifications including PICS parameterization and in- 
valid/inopportune behaviour specification along with valid behaviour specifi­
cation. The proposed methods are applied on two protocols. Formal base 
specifications of the INRES and ACSE protocols are developed, and the prob­
lems encountered while applying the techniques are stated. The PICS proforma 
utilized in the development of the INRES protocol is defined according to the 
OSI standards.
The approach adopted in the derivation of functional specifications is slic­
ing. By performing various types of behaviour reductiotis on base specifica­
tions, slices of those specifications are obtained in a sy: ;.itic manner where
each slice corresponds to a particular function of the protocol. The criteria 
on which the behaviour reductions are leased are obtained from the hierarchi­
cally designed test suite structures of the base protocols. The behaviour slices 
of the developed base speicifications INRES and ACSE protocols are obtained 
according to their respective test suite structures. A test suite structure and 
test purposes document is defined according to suggestions of the O.SI standard
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methodology and framework for conformance testing.
Since the charts obtained from the resulting reduced specifications are 
smaller in size when compared with those obtained from base specifications, 
the test generation process is simplified. The results indicate that the tests gen­
erated from the functional specifications by using the standard tools exhibit 
some important properties regarding the analysis and representation of test 
cases. Some problems arise with respect to the connectedness of the resulting 
EFSMs and this necessitates the application of a different methodology while 
deriving the test cases from reduced specification. A possible solution of deriv­
ing tests directly in TTCN form from the respective functional specifications 
is outlined in Chapter 6.
Possible future work includes the automation of the behaviour reduction 
algorithm given in Chapter 3 by using knowledge based techniques. Also, re­
search is needed in the representation of the test cases generated from reduced 
specifications. This includes PDU/ASP identification, and constraint gener­
ation from the behaviour of the particular test cases by tcd\ing the dynamic 
nature of the test cases into account. Handling nondeterminism within the 
context of reduced specifications also deserves study. Since abstract data type 
definitions comprise the important part of LOTOS specifications, a similar 
study can be conducted by performing reductions on abstract data types along 
with behaviour reductions. The behaviour reductions considered in this study 
are executed on base specifications according to the hierarchically structured 
test suites up until the outermost test groups of the hierarchy. A possible ex­
tension of the methodology can be the generation of more refined specifications 
where each specification provides the behaviour of exactly the individual test 
cases rather than test groups.
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APPENDICES
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Appendix A
INRES Base Protocol Specification In 
LOTOS
The following LOTOS code is the state-oriented formal base specification of 
INRES Protocol. The specification is relatively different than the one given in 
[37]. Some modifications have been performed on the original specification in 
order to bring it in a suitable form for further processing according to the meth­
ods defined in previous chajiters. The definition of the Medium Service is not 
included in order to obtain a specification which describes only the behaviour 
of a protocol entity. The specification is jjarameterized according to the param­
eters defined in the PICS Proforma given in Appendix B, and the behaviour 
and the associated data types related to the Static Conformance Review pro­
cess, are added. The process named ‘Coder’ , responsible for coding the INRES 
PDUs in Medium Service Primitives, is removed and its functionality is dis­
tributed into the other parts of the specification. The specification is flattened 
by applying the steps given in Chapter 3. Specifically, the first phase of the 
chart construction algorithm is applied, the process definitions are rewritten 
in order to make them statically independent, and guards which are not the 
first expressions in their composite behaviour expressions, and which depend 
on input variables are replaced by selection ])iedicates. Finally, in the complete 
specification given below j)rocess identifiers are renamed according to the state 
tables given in Chapter 4.
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specification Inres_Protocol[ISAP,MSAP](cl,c2 
(* cl, c2 : PICS parameters. ♦)
(* cl : Initiator capability is supported *) 
(* c2 : Responder capability is supported *)
Bool);noexit
library Boolean 
endlib
type DecNumb is Boolean 
sorts DecNumb 
opns
0 : -> DecNumb
s : DecNumb -> DecNumb
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9: -> DecNumb
_>_ : DecNumb , DecNumb -> Bool
eqns forall x,y: DecNumb 
ofsort Bool
X == X = tru e ;
s(x) == s(y) = X == y;
s(x) == 0 = false;
0 == s(y) = false;
X < X = false; 
s(x) < s(y) = X < y;
0 < s(y) = true; 
s(x) < 0 = false;
X <= y = (x < y) or (x 
X >= y = not (x < y) ;
X > y = not (x <= y );
== y ) ;
ofsort DecNumb
1 = s(0);
2 = s(s(0))  ;
3 = s(s(s(0)));
4 = s(s(s(s(0))));
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5 = s(s(s(s(s(0)))));
6 = s(s(s(s(s(s(0))))));
7 = s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0)))))));
8 = s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0))))))));
9 = s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0))))))))); 
endtype (* DecNumb *)
type ISDUType is 
sorts ISDU
opns datal,data2,dataS,data4,dataS
endtype (* ISDUType *)
-> ISDU
type Sequencenumber is Boolean 
sorts Sequencenumber 
opns 
0 :
1 :
succ : Sequencenumber
-> Sequencenumber 
-> Sequencenumber 
-> Sequencenumber
_eq_, _ne_ : Sequencenumber,Sequencenumber -> Bool
eqns forall a,b : Sequencenumber 
ofsort Sequencenumber 
succ(O) = 1; 
succ(l) = 0;
ofsort Bool
0 eq 0 = true;
1 eq 1 = true;
0 eq 1 = false;
1 eq 0 = false;
0 ne 1 = true;
1 ne 0 = true;
0 ne 0 = false;
1 ne 1 = false;
endtype (♦ Sequencenumber *)
type InresSpType is Boolean, ISDUType, DecNumb
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sorts SP 
opns
ICONreq,ICDNconf,IDISind,
ICONind,ICONresp,IDISreq : -> SP
IDATreq,IDATind : ISDU -> SP
isICONreq,isICONconf,isIDISind,isIDATreq, 
isIDATind,isICONind,isICONresp,isIDISreq: SP -> Bool 
data : SP -> ISDU
map : SP -> DecNumb
eqns forall d : ISDU, sp 
ofsort DecNumb 
map(ICONreq) = 0; 
map(ICONconf) = 1
map(IDISind) = 2 
map(IDATreq(d)) = 3 
map(IDATind(d)) = 4 
raap(ICONind) = 5 
map(ICONresp) = 6 
map(IDISreq) = 7
SP
ofsort ISDU
data(IDATreq(d)) = d; 
data(IDATind(d)) = d;
ofsort Bool
isICONreq(sp) = map(sp) == 0;
isICONconf(sp) = map(sp) == 1;
isIDISind(sp) = map(sp) == 2;
isIDATreq(sp) = map(sp) == 3;
isIDATind(sp) = map(sp) == 4;
isICONind(sp) = map(sp) == 5;
isICONresp(sp) = map(sp) == 6;
isIDISreq(sp) = map(sp) == 7;
endtype (* InresSpType *)
type IPDUType is Boolean, ISDUType, DecNumb, Sequencenumber 
sorts IPDU
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opns
CR,CC,DR
DT
AK
isCR,isCC,isDT,
isAK,isDR
data
num
map
-> IPDU
Sequencenumber,ISDU -> IPDU 
Sequencenumber -> IPDU
IPDU
IPDU
IPDU
IPDU
-> Bool 
-> ISDU
-> Sequencenumber 
-> DecNumb
eqns forall f: Sequencenumber, d 
ofsort DecNumb 
map(CR) = 0; 
map(CC) = 1; 
map(DT(f,d)) = 2; 
map(AK(f)) = 3; 
map(DR) = 4;
ISDU, ipdu : IPDU
ofsort ISDU
data(DT(f,d)) = d;
ofsort Sequencenumber 
num(DT(f,d)) = f; 
num(AK(f)) = f;
ofsort Bool
isCR(ipdu) = map(ipdu) == 0; 
isCC(ipdu) = map(ipdu) == 1; 
isDT(ipdu) = map(ipdu) == 2; 
isAK(ipdu) = map(ipdu) == 3; 
isDR(ipdu) = map(ipdu) == 4; 
endtype (* IPDUType *)
type MediumSpType is Boolean, IPDUType, DecNumb 
sorts MSP 
opns
MDATreq,MDATind : IPDU -> MSP
isMDATreq,isMDATind : MSP -> Bool
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data
map
MSP -> IPDU 
MSP -> DecNumb
eqns forall d : IPDU, sp 
ofsort DecNurab
map(MDATreqCd)) = 8; 
map(MDATind(d)) = 9;
MSP
ofsort IPDU
data(MDATreq(d)) = d; 
data(MDATind(d)) = d;
ofsort Bool
isMDATreq(sp) = map(sp) == 8; 
isMDATind(sp) = map(sp) == 9; 
endtype (* MediumSpType *)
type StaticConformaince is Boolean
opns CapabilityConform : Bool, Bool -> Bool
eqns forall cl, c2 : Bool 
ofsort Bool
CapabilityConform (cl, c2) =
((cl and not(c2)) or (not(cl) and c2)) 
endtype (♦ StaticConformance *)
behaviour
(* Static Conformance Review. *)
[CapabilityConform (cl, c2)] -> INRES [ISAP,MSAP](cl,c2) 
where
process INRES[ISAP,MSAP](cl,c2 
[cl]-> Initiator[ISAP,MSAP]
□
[c2]-> Responder[ISAP,MSAP] 
endproc (* INR.es *)
Bool):noexit:=
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process Initiator[ISAP,MSAP]:noexit:=
(hide d in
Connectionphase_Ini[ISAP,MSAP,d]
I[d] I d;Dataphase_Ini[ISAP,MSAP] (succ(O))) 
[>Disconnection_Ini[ISAP,MSAP] 
endproc (* Initiator ♦)
process Connectionphase.ini[ISAP,MSAP,d]:exit:= 
hide dd in
Disconnected.Ini[ISAP,MSAP,dd]
I[dd]I dd?z:DecNumb;WaitforCC[ISAP,MSAP,d](z) 
endproc (* Connectionphase.ini *)
process Disconnected.ini[ISAP,MSAPjdd]:exit:=
ISAP?sp: SP[isICONreq(sp)] ; MSAP!MDATreq(CR); dd! s ( 0 ) ; ex it
[]
ISAP?sp:SP[not(isICONreq(sp))];
Disconnected.ini[ISAP,MSAP,dd]
(* User errors are ignored (Invalid/Inopportune Beh.) *)
[]
MSAP?sp:MSP[isMDATind(sp) and not(isDR(data(sp)))]; 
Disconnected.Ini[ISAP,MSAP,dd]
(* DR is only accepted by process Disconnection *)
(♦ System errors are ignored (Invalid/Inopportune Beh.) *) 
endproc (* Disconnected.Ini *)
process WaitforCC[ISAP,MSAP,d](zrDecNumb):exit:=
MSAP?sp:MSP
[isMDATind(sp) and not(isDR(data(sp))) and isCC(data(sp))]; 
ISAP!ICONconf;d;exit 
[]
MSAP?sp:MSP[isMDATind(sp) and not(isDR(data(sp))) 
and not(isCC(data(sp)))];
WaitforCC[ISAP,MSAP,d] (z)
(* System errors are ignored (Invalid/Inopportune Beh.) *) 
(* DR is only accepted by process Disconnection *)
[]
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i; (* Timeout *)
([z < 4]-> MSAP!MDATreq(CR);WaitforCC[ISAP,MSAP,d](s(z))
[]
[z == 4]-> ISAP!IDISind;Connectionphase_Ini[lSAP,MSAP,d])
[]
ISAP?sp:SP[not(isIDISind(sp))];WaitforCC[ISAP,MSAP,d](z)
(* User errors are ignored (Invalid/Inopportune Beh.) *) 
endproc (♦ WaitforCC ♦)
process Dataphase.Ini[ISAP,MSAP]
(number : Sequencenumber):noexit;= 
hide d in
Connected_Ini[ISAP,MSAP,d](number)
(♦ 1 is the first Sequencenumber *)
I[d]I d?z:DecNumb?number:Sequencenumber?olddata:ISDU; 
Sending [ISAP,MSAP](z.number,olddata)
(* z is number of sendings. At the beginning z=l *) 
endproc (♦ Dataphase_Ini ♦)
process Connected_Ini[ISAP.MSAP.d]
(number:Sequencenumber):exit:= 
ISAP?sp:SP[isIDATreq(sp)];
MSAP!MDATreq(DT(number,data(sp))); 
d !s(0)Inumber!data(sp);exit 
[]
ISAP?sp:SP[not(isIDATreq(sp))];
Connected_Ini[ISAP,MSAP,d](number)
(♦ User errors are ignored (Invalid/Inopportune Beh.) *)
[]
MSAP?sp:MSP[isMDATind(sp) and not(isDR(data(sp)))]; 
Connected_Ini[ISAP.MSAP.d](number)
(* DR is only accepted by process Disconnection *)
(* System errors are ignored (Invalid/Inopportune Beh.) *) 
endproc (* Connected_Ini *)
process Sending[ISAP.MSAP]
(z:DecNumb.number:Sequencenumber. olddata:ISDU)rnoexit; 
MSAP?sp;MSP
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[isMDATind(sp) and not(isDR(data(sp))) and 
isAK(data(sp)) and (num(data(sp)) eq number)]; 
Dataphase.Ini[ISAP,MSAP](succ(number))
[]
MSAP?sp:MSP
[isMDATind(sp) and not(isDR(data(sp))) and isAK(data(sp)) 
and (num(data(sp)) ne number) and (z < 4)];
MSAP!MDATreq(DT(number,olddata));
Sending[ISAP,MSAP](s(z).number,olddata)
[]
MSAP?sp:MSP
[isMDATind(sp) and not(isDR(data(sp))) and isAK(data(sp)) 
and (num(data(sp)) ne number) and (z == 4)];
ISAP!IDISind;Initiator[ISAP,MSAP]
(* The Initiator shall not resend more than 4 times *)
(♦ in case of faulty transmission *)
□
MSAP?sp:MSP
[isMDATind(sp) and not(isDR(data(sp))) 
and not(isAK(data(sp)))];
Sending[ISAP,MSAP](z,number,olddata)
(* System errors are ignored (Invalid/Inopportune Beh.) ♦)
[]
i; (♦ Timeout *)
([z < 4]-> MSAP!MDATreq(DT(number,olddata));
Sending[ISAP,MSAP](s(z).number,olddata)
[]
[z == 4]-> ISAP!IDISind;Initiator[ISAP,MSAP])
[]
ISAPTsp:SP [not(isIDATreq(sp))];
Sending[ISAP,MSAP](z,number,olddata)
(* User errors are ignored (Invalid/Inopportune Beh.) ♦) 
endproc (* Sending *)
process Disconnection_Ini[ISAP.MSAP]:noexit:= 
MSAP?sp:MSP[isMDATind(sp) and isDR(data(sp))];ISAP!IDISind; 
Initiator[ISAP,MSAP] 
endproc (* Disconnection_Ini ♦)
APPENDIX A. INRES BASE PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION IN LOTOSm
process Responder[ISAP,MSAP]:noexit:=
(hide d in
Connectionphase_Res[ISAP,MSAP,d]
I[d]I d;Dataphase_Res[ISAP,MSAP](succ(l))) 
[>Disconnection_Res[ISAP,MSAP] 
endproc (* Responder *)
process Connectionphase_Res[ISAP,MSAPjd]:exit:= 
hide dd in
Disconnected_Res[ISAP,MSAP,dd]
I[dd]I dd;WaitforICONrespl[ISAP,MSAP,d] 
endproc (* Connectionphase_Res *)
process Disconnected_Res[ISAP,MSAP,dd]:exit:= 
MSAP?sp:MSP[isMDATind(sp) and isCR(data(sp))];
ISAP!ICONind;dd;exit
[]
MSAP?sp:MSP[isMDATind(sp) and not(isCR(data(sp)))]; 
Disconnected_Res[ISAP,MSAP,dd]
(♦ System errors are ignored (Invalid/Inopportune Beh.) *)
[]
ISAP?sp:SP [isICONresp(sp)];Disconnected_Res[ISAP,MSAP,dd] 
(♦ User errors are ignored (Invalid/Inopportune Beh.) *) 
endproc (* Disconnected_Res ♦)
process WaitforlCONrespl[ISAP,MSAP,d]:exit:=
ISAP?sp:SP[isICONresp(sp)];MSAP!MDATreq(CC);d;exit
[]
MSAP?sp:MSP[isMDATind(sp)];WaitforICONresp1[ISAP,MSAP,d]
(♦ System errors are ignored (Invalid/Inopportune Beh.) *) 
endproc (* WaitforlCONrespl *)
process Dataphase_Res[ISAP,MSAP]
(number : Sequencenumber):noexit:=
(* number is the last acknowledged Sequencenumber *) 
hide d in
Connected_Res[ISAP,MSAP,d](number)
I[d]I d;WaitforIC0Nresp2[ISAP,MSAP] 
endproc (* Dataphase_Res *)
process Connected_Res[ISAP,MSAP,d]
(number : Sequencenumber):exit:=
MSAP?sp:MSP
[isMDATind(sp) eind isDT(data(sp)) 
ajid (num(data(sp)) eq succ(number))] ;
ISAP!IDATind(data(data(sp)));
MSAP!MDATreq(AK(num(data(sp))));
Connect ed.Res[ISAP,MSAP,d](succ(number))
[]
MSAP?sp:MSP
[isMDATind(sp) and isDT(data(sp)) 
and (num(data(sp)) eq number)];
MSAP!MDATreq(AK(num(data(sp))));
Connected_Res[ISAP,MSAP,d](number)
[]
MSAP?sp:MSP[isMDATind(sp) and isCR(data(sp))];
ISAP!ICONind;d;exit
[]
MSAP?sp:MSP
[isMDATind(sp) and not(isDT(data(sp)) or isCR(data(sp)))]; 
Connected_Res[ISAP,MSAP,d](number)
(* System errors are ignored (Invalid/Inopportune Beh.) *)
[]
ISAP?sp:SP[isICONresp(sp)];
Connected_Res[ISAP,MSAP,d](number)
(* User errors are ignored (Invalid/Inopportune Beh.) *) 
endproc (* Connected_Res *)
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process WaitforIC0Nresp2[ISAP,MSAP]:noexit:= 
ISAP?sp:SP[isICONresp(sp)];MSAP!MDATreq(CC);
Dataphase_Res[ISAP,MSAP](succ(l))
[]
MSAP?sp:MSP[isMDATind(sp)];WaitforIC0Nresp2[ISAP,MSAP]
(♦ System errors are ignored (Invalid/Inopportune Beh.) *) 
endproc (* WaitforIC0Nresp2 ♦)
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process Disconnection_Res[ISAP,MSAP]:noexit:^ 
ISAP?sp:SP[isIDISreq(sp)];MSAP!MDATreq(DR); 
Responder[ISAP,MSAP] 
endproc (* Disconnection_Res *)
endspec
Appendix B
PICS Proforma For INRES
B .l Date of Statement
B.2 Implementation Details
The information necessary to uniquely identify the implementation and the 
system in which it may reside.
a) Supplier, implementation name, operating system, suitable hardware.
b) System supj)lier and/or client of the test laboratory.
c) Information on whom to contact concerning the contents of the PICS.
i;i7
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B.3 Global Statement of Conformance
NOTE - If a positive response is not given to this box, then the implemen­
tation does not confirm to the INRES protocol.
B.4 Initiator/Responder Capability
No Capability D I
1 Initiator 0.1
2 Responder 0.1
NOTE - 0.1 ; Exactly one of the capabilities is mandatory for a system 
claiming conformance.
B.5 Supported PDUs
No IPDU
Transmission 
D I
Reception 
D I
1 Connect Request IPDU (CR) cl c2
2 Connect Confirm IPDU (CC) c2 cl
3 Data Transfer IPDU (DT) cl c2
4 Acknowledgement IPDU (AK) c2 cl
5 Disconnect Request IPDU (DR) c2 cl
NOTE - cl : if 4/1 then m else - 
c2 ; if 4/2 then m else -
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B.6 Supported PDU Parameters
This section identifies the parameters supported in INRES PDUs. The supplier 
shall indicate all of the parameters supported for which conformance is claimed, 
and also list any associated limitations.
B.6.1 Data Transfer IPDU (DT)
No Sending Parameter
D I
Value
Allowed Supported
1 Sequence Number m
2 User Information m
No Receiving Parameter
D I
Value
Allowed Supported
3 Sequence Number 111
4 User Information 111
B .6.2 Acknowledgement IPDU (A K )
No Sending Parameter
D 1
Value
Allowed Siipported
1 Sequence Number 111
No Receiving Parameter
D 1
Value
Allowed Supported
2 Sequence Number 111
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B.7 Timers
No Timer
D I
Value
Allowed Supported
1 Retransmission Timer m
Appendix C
Test Suite Structure and Test 
Purposes for INRES
C .l Initiator (I)
Test G roup  O b jective  : To test the lUT in the role of initiator. 
Subgroups :
1. Basic Interconnection and Capability Tests (BIC)
2. Valid Behaviour Tests (BV)
3. Invalid L· Inopportune Behaviour Tests (BIO)
C.1.1 I/Basic Interconnection and Capability Tests 
(BIC)
Test G roup  O b jective  : To provide limited testing of each of the confor­
mance requirements for INRES, to ascertain what capabilities of the lUT can 
be observed, and to check that those observable capabilities are valid with 
respect to the static conformance requirements and the PICS.
Test P urposes :
1. Test the lU T’s ability to issue a CR and receive a CC (I/B V /C E /1 ).
2. Test the lU T’s ability to issue a DT and receive an AK (I/B V /D T /1 ).
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C.1.2 1 /Valid Behaviour Tests (BV)
Test G roup  O b jectiv e  : Behaviour tests test an implementation as throughly 
as is practical, over the full range of dynamic conformance requirements. Tests 
are included to check valid behaviour by the lUT in response to valid behaviour 
by the real tester.
Subgroups :
1. Connection Establishment (CE)
2. Data Transfer (DT)
3. Disconnection (DC)
C .1.2.1 I /B V /C o n n e c t io n  E stablishm ent (C E )
Test G roup  O b jective  : To test the connection establishment procedures 
by having the lUT generate a CR.
Test Purposes :
1. Respond with CC.Check that the lUT established the connection.
2. Respond with DR. Check that the lUT did not establish the connection.
3. Wait until the related timer expires. Check that the lUT retransmits 
the CR.
4. Cause the timer expire four times. Check that the lUT releases the 
connection
C .1.2.2 I /B V /D a t a  Transfer (D T )
Test G roup  O b jective  : To test the data.transfer procedures of the lUT in 
the role of sender, by having it generate a DT.
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Test P urposes :
1. Accept the data sent and send an AK IPDU. Check that lUT behaves 
accordingly.
2. Reject the data sent by the lUT and respond with a negative AK IPDU. 
Check that the lUT retransmits the same piece of data.
3. Reject the data sent by the lUT four times. Check that the lUT releases 
the connection.
4. Wait until the related timer expires. Check that the lUT retransmits 
the data.
5. Cause the timer expire four times. Check that the lUT releases the 
connection.
C .1.2.3 I /B V /D is co n n e c t io n  (D C )
Test G roup  O b jective  : To test the release of a connection by having the 
lUT receive a DR IPDU for each ICPM (Inres Control Protocol Machine) state.
Test P urposes :
1. Disconnected .State.
2. WaitforCC State.
3. Connected State.
4. Sending State.
C.1.3 I/Invalid L· Inopportune Behaviour Tests (BIO)
Test G rou p  O b jective  : To check valid behaviour by the lUT in response 
to invalid and inopportune behaviour by the real tester. The subgroups are on 
a state by state basis. For each state the IPDUs which are not valid for the 
given state will be presented to the lUT.
Subgroups :
1. Disconnected State (STAG)
2. WaitforCC State (STAI)
3. Connected State (STA2)
4. Sending State (STA3)
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C .1.3.1 I /B IO /D is c o n n e cte d  State (STAG)
Test G roup  O b jective : Test the lUT’s reaction to invalid/inopportune 
IPDUs in t’he Disconnected State.
Test Purposes :
1. CC IPDU.
2. AK IPDU.
C .1.3.2 I /B IO /W a it fo r C C  State (S T A l)
Test G rou p  O b jective  : Test the lU T’s reaction to invalid/inopportune 
IPDUs in the WaitforCC State.
Test Purposes :
1. AK IPDU.
C .1.3.3 I /B IO /C o n n e c te d  State (ST A 2)
Test G roup  O b jective : Test the lUT’s reaction to invalid/inopportune 
IPDUs in the Connected State.
Test P urposes :
1. CC IPDU.
2. AK IPDU.
C .1 .3 .4  I /B IO /S e n d in g  State (ST A 3)
Test G roup  O b jective : Test the lUT’s reaction to invalid/inopportune 
IPDUs in the Sending State.
Test P urposes :
1. CC IPDU.
2. AK IPDU with an invalid parameter value.
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C.2 Responder (R)
Test Group Objective : To test the lUT in the role of responder. 
Subgroups :
1. Basic Interconnection and Capability Tests (BIC)
2. Valid Behaviour Tests (BV)
3. Invalid & Inopportune Beliaviour Tests (BIO)
C.2.1 R /Basic Interconnection and Capability Tests 
(BIC)
Test Group Objective : To provide limited testing of each of the confor­
mance requirements for INRES, to ascertain what capabilities of the lUT can 
be observed, and to check that those observable capabilities are valid with 
respect to the static conformance requirements and the PICS.
Test Purposes :
1. Test the lUT’s ability to receive a CR and issue a CC (R /B V /C E /1 ).
2. Test the lU T’s ability to receive a DT and issue an AK (R /B V /D T /1 ).
3. Test the lU T’s ability to issue a DR (R /B V /D C ).
C .2.2 R /Valid Behaviour Tests (BV)
Test Group Objective : To test the valid behaviour of the lUT in response 
to valid behaviour by the real tester.
Subgroups :
1. Connection Establishment (CE)
2. Data Transfer (DT)
3. Disconnection (DC)
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C .2.2 .1  R /B V /C o n n e c t io n  Establishm ent (C E )
Test G roup  O b jectiv e  : To test the connection establishment procedures 
by attempting to establish a connection to the lUT (by sending a CR IPDU).
Test Purposes :
1. The service user at the lUT side accepts the connection. Check the lUT 
sends a CC, and establishes the connection.
2. The service user at the lUT side rejects the connection. Check the HIT 
sends a DR.
C .2 .2 .2  R /B V /D a t a  Transfer (D T )
Test G roup  O b jective  : To test the data_transfer procedures of the lUT in 
the role of receiver (by sending a DT IPDU).
Test Purposes :
1. Present the lUT an in_sequence data (DT IPDU), and check the lUT 
responds with appropriate AK IPDU and delivers the data to its service_user.
2. Present the lUT an out.oLsequence data item, and check the lUT be­
haves appropriately.
3. Present the lUT with a CR IPDU. Check that it informs its user for the 
(new) connection request.
C .2 .2 .3  R /B V /D is c o n n e c t io n  (D C )
Test G roup  O b jective  : To test the release of a connection by having the 
lUT receive an IDISreq primitive for each ICPM state.
Test P urposes :
1. Disconnected State.
2. WaitforICONresp State.
3. Connected State.
C.2.3 R/Invalid L· Inopportune Behaviour Tests 
(BIO)
Test G roup  O b jective  : To check valid behaviour by the lUT in response 
to invalid and inopportune behaviour by the real tester. The subgroups are on 
a state by state basis. For each state the IPDUs which are not valid for the 
given state will be presented to the lUT.
Subgroups :
1. Disconnected State (STAG)
2. WaitforICONresp State (STAl)
.3. Connected State (STA2)
C .2.3.1 R /B IO /D is co n n e c te d  State (STAO)
Test G roup  O b jective : Test the lUT’s reaction to invalid/inopportune 
IPDUs in the Disconnected State.
Test P urposes :
1. DT IPDU.
C .2 .3 .2 R /B IO /W a it fo r IC O N re sp  State (S T A l)
Test G roup  O b jective  : Test the lUT’s reaction to invalid/inopportune 
IPDUs in the WaitforICONresp State.
Test P urposes :
1. DT IPDU.
2. CR IPDU.
C .2.3.3 R /B IO /C o n n e c te d  State (ST A 2)
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Test G roup  O b jective : Test the lUT’s reaction to invalid/inopportune 
IPDUs in the Connected State.
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Test Purposes :
1. DT IPDU with an invalid parameter value.
Appendix D
ACSE Base Protocol Specification In 
LOTOS
This Appendix contains the behaviour part of the LOTOS code of the ACSE 
protocol. The given specification is in the state-oriented style defined in [24]. 
Since it has a total of about 2500 lines of LOTOS code, out of which 90% 
consists of abstract data types, only the behaviour part is reproduced here. As 
in the case of INRES protocol, the specification is flattened by applying the 
steps mentioned in Chapter 3, and some behaviour expressions and data types 
related to PICS parameterization have been iidded.
specification ACSE_Protocol[A,P](cl,c2,c3 : Bool):noexit 
(* cl, c2, c3 : PICS parameters. ♦)
(* cl : Association initiator capability is supported ♦)
(* c2 : Association responder capability is supported *)
( *  c3 : RLRQ APDU is supported for transmission *)
(* Abstract Data Types *)
behaviour
(♦ Static Conformance Review *)
[CapabilityConform (cl, c2)] -> ACSE[A,P](cl,c2,c3) 
where
49
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process ACSE[A,P](cl,c2,c3 : Bool)rnoexit:= 
hide d in
Assoc_Estab[A,P,d](cl,c2,c3)
I[d]I d?c:calltype;(Normal_Rel[A,P](c,cl,c2,c3)
[> Abort[A,P](cl,c2,c3))
endproc (* ACSE *)
process Assoc_Estab[A,P,d](cl,c2,c3 : Bool):exit:= 
hide dd in
Unassociated[A,P,dd](cl,c2,c3)
I[dd]I (dd?f;calltype[f = calling];
AwaitAARE[A,P,d](cl,c2,c3)
[]
dd?f:calltypeCf = called]; 
AwaitAASCrsp[A,P,d](cl,c2,c3)) 
endproc (* Assoc_Estab *)
process Unassociated[A,P,dd](cl,c2,c3 : Bool):exit:=
A ? X : primitive [IsAASCreq(x) and cl];
P ! Out ! PCONreq(make_AARQ(get_AASCreq(x))); 
dd!calling;exit 
[]
P I Input ? X : primitive 
[IsPCONind(x) and IsAARQ(user_data(x)) 
and not(common_prot_version(get_AARQ(user_data(x)))) 
and c2];
P ! Out I PCONrspR(make_AARE(get_AARQ(user_data(x)))); 
Unassociated[A,P ,dd](cl,c2,c3)
[]
P ! Input ? X : primitive 
[IsPCONind(x) and IsAARQ(user_data(x)) 
and common_prot_version(get_AARQ(user_data(x))) 
and c2];
A ! make_AASCind(get_AARQ(user_data(x))); 
ddI called;exit 
[]
P ! Input ? X : primitive
[IsPCONind(x) and not(IsAARQ(user_data(x)))];
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protocol_error[A,P](cl,c2,c3) 
(* Invalid Behaviour *) 
endproc (* Unassociated *)
process AwaitAARE[A,P,d](cl,c2,c3 : Bool):exit:=
(P ! Input ? X : primitive 
[IsPCONcnfA(x) and IsAARE(user_data(x)) and 
(result(get_AARE(user_data(x))) eq accepted)];
A ! madce_AASCcnfU(get_AARE(user_data(x))); 
d!calling;exit
[] (* Source : AC-peer (ACSE Service User Rejection) *)
P ! Input ? X : primitive
[IsPCONcnfUR(x) and IsAARE(user_data(x)) and 
not(result(get_AARE(user_data(x))) eq accepted) 
and IsAssociate_source_diagnostic_genere_0 
(result_source_diagnostic(get_AARE(user_data(x))))];
A ! maLke_AASCcnfU(get_AARE(user_data(x))); 
Assoc_Estab[A,P,d](cl,c2,c3)
[] (* Source : AC-peer (ACSE Service Provider Rejection) *) 
P ! Input ? X : primitive
[IsPCONcnfUR(x) aind IsAARE(user_data(x)) and 
not(result(get_AARE(user_data(x))) eq accepted) 
and IsAssociate_source_diagnostic_genere_l 
(result_source_diagnostic(get_AARE(user_data(x))))];
A ! maJce_AASCcnfP(get_AARE(user_data(x) ) ) ; 
Assoc_Estab[A,P,d](cl,c2,c3)
[] (* Source ; PS-provider (Provider Rejection) *)
P ! Input ! PCONcnfPR;
A ! madce.AASCcnf;
Assoc_Estab[A,P,d](cl,c2,c3)
[]
P ! Input ? X : primitive
[IsPCONcnfA(x) and not(IsAARE(user_data(x)))]; 
protocol_error[A,P](cl,c2,c3))
(♦ Invalid Behaviour *)
[>
Abort [A,P](cl,c2,c3) 
endproc (♦ AwaitAARE *)
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process AwaitAASCrsp[A,P,d](cl,c2,c3 : Bool):exit:=
(A ? X : primitive
[IsAASCrsp(x) and (result(get_AASCrsp(x)) eq accepted)];
P ! Out ! PCONrspA(make_AARE(get_AASCrsp(x))); 
d!called;exit
[]
A ? X : primitive
[IsAASCrsp(x) and not(result(get_AASCrsp(x)) eq accepted)]; 
P ! Out ! PCONrspR(make_AARE(get_AASCrsp(x))); 
Assoc_Estab[A,P,d](cl,c2,c3))
[>
Abort [A,P](cl,c2,c3) 
endproc (* AwaitAASCrsp *)
process Normal_Rel[A,P](c:calltype,cl,c2,c3:Bool):noexit:= 
hide d in
Associated[A,P,d](cl,c2,c3)
I[d]I (d?f:calltype[f = calling];
WaitforRLRE[A,P](c,cl,c2,c3)
[]
d?f:calltype[f = called];
AwaitARLSrsp[A,P](c,cl,c2,c3)) 
endproc (* Normal.Rel *)
process Associated[A,P,d](cl,c2,c3 : Bool):exit:= 
A ? X : primitive [IsARLSreq(x) and c3];
P ! Out ! PRLSreq(mcike_RLRQ(get_ARLSreq(x))) ; 
d !calling;exit 
[]
P ! Input ? X : primitive 
[IsPRLSind(x) and IsRLRQ(user_data(x))];
A ! make_ARLSind(get_RLRQ(user_data(x))); 
d!called;exit 
[]
P ! Input ? X : primitive
[IsPRLSind(x) and not(IsRLRQ(user_data(x)))]; 
protocol_error[A,P](cl,c2,c3)
(* Invalid Behaviour ♦) 
endproc (* Associated *)
process WaitforRLRE[A,P](c:calltype,cl,c2,c3:Bool):noexit:= 
hide d in
AwaitRLRE[A,P,d](c,cl,c2,c3)
I[d]I d;([c = calling] ->
Collision_association_initiator[A,P](cl,c2,c3)
□
[c = called] ->
Collision_association_responder[A,P](cl,c2,c3)) 
endproc (* WaitforRLRE *)
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process AwaitRLRE[A,P ,d](c:calltype,cl,c2,c3 : Bool):exit:= 
P ! Input ? X : primitive 
[IsPRLScnf A(x) 2ind IsRLRE(user_data(x) )] ;
A ! make_ARLScnfA(get_RLRE(user_data(x))); 
ACSE[A,P](cl,c2,c3)
[]
P ! Input ? X : primitive 
[IsPRLScnfR(x) and IsRLRE(user_data(x))];
A ! make_ARLScnfR(get_RLRE(user_data(x)));
Normal_Rel[A,P](c,cl,c2,c3)
[]
P ! Input ? X : primitive 
[IsPRLSind(x) and IsRLRQ(user_data(x))];
A ! make_ARLSind(get_RLRQ(user_data(x))); 
d;exit 
[]
P ! Input ? X : primitive
[IsPRLSind(x) and not(IsRLRQ(user_data(x)))]; 
protocol_error[A,P](cl,c2,c3)
(* Invalid Behaviour *)
[]
P ! Input ? X : primitive
[IsPRLScnfA(x) and not(IsRLRE(user_data(x)))]; 
protocol_error[A,P](cl,c2,c3)
(* Invalid Behaviour *)
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endproc (* AwaitRLRE *)
process Collision_association_initiator[A,P]
(cl,c2,c3 : Bool):noexit:=
A ? X : primitive
[IsARLSrsp(x) ajid (result(get_ARLSrsp(x)) eq affirmative)]; 
P ! Out ! PRLSrspA(make_RLRE(get_ARLSrsp(x))); 
WaitforRLRE[A,P](calling, cl,c2,c3) 
endproc (* Collision_association_initiator *)
process Collision_association_responder[A,P]
(cl,c2,c3 : Bool) : noexit :=
P ! Input ? X : primitive
[IsPRLScnfA(x) and IsRLRE(user_data(x))];
A ! make_ARLScnfA(get_RLRE(user_data(x)));
AwaitARLSrsp[A,P](called,cl,c2,c3)
[]
P ! Input ? X : primitive
[IsPRLScnfA(x) and not(IsRLRE(user_data(x)))]; 
protocol_error[A,P](cl,c2,c3)
(♦ Invalid Behaviour *)  
endproc (* Collision_association_responder *)
process AwaitARLSrsp[A,P] (c.-calltype, cl,c2,c3 :Bool) :noexit: = 
A ? X : primitive
[IsARLSrsp(x) and (result(get_ARLSrsp(x)) eq affirmative)];
P ! Out ! PRLSrspA(make_RLRE(get_ARLSrsp(x)));
ACSE[A,P](cl,c2,c3)
[]
A ? X : primitive
[IsARLSrsp(x) and (result(get_ARLSrsp(x)) eq negative)];
P ! Out ! PRLSrspR(make_RLRE(get_ARLSrsp(x)));
Normal_Rel[A,P](c,cl,c2,c3) 
endproc (* AwaitARLSrsp ♦)
process Abort[A,P](cl,c2,c3 : Bool)rnoexit:=
A ? X ; primitive [IsAABRreq(x)];
P ! Out ! PUABreq(make_ABRT(get_AABRreq(x)));
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ACSE[A,P](cl,c2,c3)
□
P ! Input ? X : primitive 
[IsPUABind(x) and IsABRT(user_data(x))];
A ! make_AABRind(get_ABRT(user_data(x))); 
ACSE[A,P](cl,c2,c3)
[]
P ! Input ! PPABind;
A ! make.APABind;
ACSE[A,P](cl,c2,c3)
[]
P ! Input ? X : primitive
[IsPUABind(x) and not(IsABRT(user_data(x)))]; 
protocol_error[A,P](cl,c2,c3)
(♦ Invalid Behaviour *) 
endproc (* Abort *)
process protocol_error[A,P](cl,c2,c3 
A ! make_AABRind;
P ! Out ! PUABreq(make_ABRT); 
ACSE[A,P](cl,c2,c3) 
endproc (* protocol_error ♦)
Bool)rnoexit:=
endspec
